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Abstract 
This dissertation is supplementing a documentary film entitled Captor and Captive – the 
story of Danger Ashipala and Johan van der Mescht (2010), referred to as Captor and 
Captive, with a duration of 52-minutes. The film follows the story of two soldiers caught 
up in the disorganized machine of war. Johan van der Mescht, a South African Defence 
Force (SADF) soldier was captured in 1978 by Danger Ashipala, a South West Africa 
People’s Organisation (SWAPO) guerilla fighting for Namibian independence. Van der 
Mescht was held as a prisoner of war (POW) in Angola before being exchanged for a 
Russian spy, Aleksei Koslov, at Checkpoint Charlie in Berlin in 1982.  
The main focus of the dissertation is to provide an analysis of representing history 
through film, with reference to Captor and Captive. It explores the manner in which 
history can be represented through the medium of film and add value to historical text, as 
well as historical text adding value to film, and how the two mediums can supplement 
each other. In this instance, Captor and Captive was produced first and the research 
conducted was used to inform the dissertation. It briefly discusses the history of 
documentary film within South Africa; the reality of producing documentary films 
reflecting on Captor and Captive and the theoretical principles involved in the craft of 
documentary filmmaking. 
The dissertation further provides details of the capture of Van der Mescht and his 
experience as a POW in Angola, against the backdrop of the Border War that waged 
between 1966 and 1989 in South West Africa (SWA) and Angola. The political 
landscape and various forces at work within southern Africa during the period of Van der 
Mescht’s capture are discussed. It also provides detail of the role of Van der Mescht’s 
captor Ashipala, and the liberation movement SWAPO. With independence in 1990, 
South West Africa became Namibia and will be referred to as such for the purpose of the 
dissertation. Mention will be made of other POWs during the Border War, providing a 
brief comparative analysis of their respective experiences.  
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Opsomming 
Die verhandeling is aanvullend tot die dokumentêre rolprent Captor and Captive – the 
story of Danger Ashipala and Johan van der Mescht (2010). Die rolprent het ‘n 52-
minute speeltyd, en daar word daarna verwys as Captor and Captive. Dit handel oor twee 
soldate wat vasgevang is in die chaos van oorlog. Johan van der Mescht, lid van die Suid 
Afrikaanse Weermag, is in 1978 gevange geneem deur Danger Ashipala, lid van die 
Namibiese bevrydingsorganisasie SWAPO. Van der Mescht is as ‘n krygsgevangene in 
Angola aangehou, en 1982 uitgeruil vir ‘n Russiese spioen, Aleksei Koslov. Die 
uitruiling het by Checkpoint Charlie in Berlyn plaasgevind.      
 
Die verhandeling gee hoofsaaklik ‘n uiteensetting van die manier waarop geskiedenis 
aangebied word deur die visuele rolprentmedium, met verwysing na Captor and Captive. 
Die wyse waarop ‘n rolprent waarde kan toevoeg tot historiese teks, en hoe historiese 
teks op sy beurt weer waarde kan toevoeg tot ‘n rolprent word ondersoek, asook die wyse 
waarop die twee mediums mekaar kan aanvul. Captor and Captive is vervaardig voor die 
verhandeling aangepak is, en die navorsing is gebruik ter aanvulling van die 
verhandeling. Verder word die agtergrond en geskiedenis van dokumentêre rolprente in 
Suid Afrika kortliks bespreek; die realiteite rondom die vervaardiging van dokumentêre 
rolprente, met verwysing na Captor and Captive, en teoretiese aspekte betrokke by die 
vervaardiging daarvan.    
 
Die verhandeling verskaf inligting omtrent die gevangeneming van Van der Mescht en sy 
ondervinding as ‘n krygsgevangene in Angola. Dit word geskets teen die agtergrond van 
die Grensoorlog (1966 tot 1989) in Suidwes Afrika en Angola. Die politieke omgewing 
en groeperinge binne Suider Afrika gedurende Van der Mescht se gevangenisskap word 
bespreek. Verder word inligting oor Ashipala, wat verantwoordelik was vir Van der 
Mescht se gevangeneming bespreek. Die bevrydingsorganisasie SWAPO, waarvan hy ‘n 
lid was, word ook bespreek. Suidwes Afrika verander sy naam met 
onafhanklikheidswording in 1990 na Namibiё, en vir die doel van die verhandeling word 
daar na Namibiё verwys. Daar word melding gemaak van ander krygsgevangenes 
gedurende die tydperk van die Grensoorlog, en ‘n vergelyking tussen die ondervindinge 
van die onderskeie krygsgevangenes word kortliks ondersoek.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction: Representing history through film with reference to 
various documentary films   
 
Chapter one discusses the motivation, methodology and literature accessed for research to 
inform both Captor and Captive and the dissertation. It further explores the manner in 
which history can be represented through the visual medium of film, as an alternative or 
supplementary approach to representing history in written text. The practice of using film 
to represent history is not a new phenomenon. As early as 1910, artists, intellectuals and 
politicians realized the power of film to help shape the memories of historical realities. 
Historians only bought into the idea of using film to enrich historical knowledge at a later 
stage and during the past three decades it has been researched and explored by academics 
with viewpoints for and against the practice.1 Notable is the work of historian Robert 
Rosenstone, who advocates the use of film to represent history, and is gradually being 
integrated into mainstream Western historiography. Opinions and comments from South 
African documentary filmmakers whose films represent history are discussed, to 
supplement the film academics and critics’ opinions. The chapter includes a brief history 
of film in South Africa for contextual background. The development of film in South 
Africa is not an isolated affair and forms part of a wider global world, despite the cultural 
bans during apartheid which placed restrictions on the film industry.  
 
The dissertation is supplementary to a documentary film entitled Captor and Captive – 
the story of Danger Ashipala and Johan van der Mescht (2010); produced, directed and 
researched by the author, and referred to as Captor and Captive. Summary of the film as 
follows: Johan van der Mescht, a South African Army conscript was stationed on the 
northern border of Namibia when he was captured in 1978. He was held as a POW in Sao 
Paulo prison, Angola, for four years and three months before being exchanged for a 
Russian spy, Aleksei Koslov, at Checkpoint Charlie in Berlin in 1982. Danger Ashipala 
was a young idealist when he joined the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), 
the military wing of SWAPO, to help liberate his country from colonial oppression. He 
                                                 
1 Ashkenazi, O. ‘The future of history as film: apropos the publication of A Companion to Historical Film’, 
Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice, DO1, 2013, p 2. 
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was responsible for Van der Mescht’s capture. The film chronicles the first meeting 
between Van der Mescht and Ashipala in 2009, and explores their respective experiences 
of the war. Ultimately it is a story of forgiveness and redemption. 
 
 
Captor and Captive was produced before the dissertation, over a three year period and 
completed in December 2010. It serves as a useful case study of the manner in which film 
can represent and contribute towards history. Subsequently, after Captor and Captive has 
been produced and the dissertation underway, a book has been published with a dedicated 
section focusing on the essence of the film. Vang ‘n Boer, die stryd tussen Boer en 
Ovambo revolves around the history of the conflict between Afrikaners and the 
Oshivambo people, and dedicates a small section on the story contained in Captor and 
Captive. The author and the book’s author had an agreement to share the research for 
both the film and the book which led to a collaborative effort.2 This is indicative of the 
multi-disciplinary approach available to both film and historical writing.   
 
The motivation for producing Captor and Captive and the subsequent writing of a 
dissertation based partly on the film is due to the author’s interest in the political 
maneuvering behind wars. This entails the manner in which ordinary people are being 
used by politicians and people in power as pawns in war situations, to make sense of a 
troubled past in a transforming society and to explore social issues regarding the period 
of Afrikaner rule during the Border War. The story of Van der Mescht was stumbled 
                                                 
2 The author of the book is Louis Bothma, a former platoon commander (conscript) of 32 Battalion who 
conducted his military service during the period 1977 to 1978. Today he does extensive research about the 
Border War which led to a number of publications. He introduced the author to the Van der Mescht family 
which led to a collaborative effort as the associate producer of Captor and Captive.  
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upon in 2007; the subsequent search for information provided limited material and it 
seemed that there were tension and controversy around his story which makes for good 
film material. In addition, the author also seeks to bring a positive message of 
reconciliation by uniting Van der Mescht with his former captor and enemy, and believes 
that this will contribute towards a better understanding between former enemy soldiers 
and fostering nation building, in an idealistic effort. 
      
Interest in stories and information about the Border War is currently very prevalent and 
topical. It is common for people who participated in wars to only start talking and venting 
out 20 years or more after the events took place. In the instance of the Border War, the 
participants’ age range between 40 and 80 years of age, and primary sources are still 
available to reflect on their respective experiences. Secondary sources such as documents 
from archives, newspaper articles and the few credible publications published to date are 
also available. Most of the documents accessed through the Documentation Centre of the 
Department of Defence were declassified for the first time. However, the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act (PAIA), (No 2 of 2000) had limitations with selected 
information not being made available, which impacted on the verification of primary 
sources.  
 
The Afrikaner community labeled Van der Mescht as a traitor and bad soldier that walked 
over to join SWAPO at the time of his imprisonment. Many closed doors were 
experienced from both former SADF officials as well as the former Afrikaner 
establishment (still partly active today), who did not want to discuss the matter in an 
effort to distance themselves from Van der Mescht and continued to accuse him of being 
a traitor and bad soldier. A prominent journalist from the Afrikaner establishment 
commented that Van der Mescht does not deserve a story, let alone a film. Many similar 
comments from the media and the general public were experienced. The NP government 
and Afrikaner intelligentsia used to discriminate against working class Afrikaners who 
did not fit into the establishment paradigm, and Van der Mescht was considered working 
class. By telling his story 30 years later, Van der Mescht was given a voice and platform 
and could take part in public discourse that he was shut out of before. 
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The South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA) was accessed for newspaper 
articles of the Border War during the period of Van der Mescht’s capture, as well as 
media articles pertaining to his capture and release after imprisonment. A number of 
newspaper articles and publications on the question of the Namibian peace settlement 
were also accessed through SAIIA.  
 
No information was available about the swap between Van der Mescht and a Russian spy 
Aleksei Koslov, except for a few media articles and a SABC news report. According to 
Russian historian Vladimir Shubin, the detailed history of the Soviet Union’s military 
involvement and relations with the Angolan liberation movements, as in the rest of 
Africa, still has to be written. The information has been withheld from the public for 
many years in the USSR and abroad, and not always accessible.3 Attempts to find 
information from former South African National Intelligence Service (NIS) who 
managed the negotiations for Van der Mescht’s release, proved to be unsuccessful.  
 
Making contact with Van der Mescht’s captor and information regarding the history and 
role of SWAPO within the Border War posed challenges. There was limited information 
available about SWAPO’s role in the attack and upon embarking on the project it was 
unknown who the captor was. Official contact was made with former PLAN commanders 
through a military network which arranged for access to Ashipala and other key 
participants who provided information. The SWAPO Party Archive Resource Centre 
(SPARC) was accessed, as well as the Peter Katjavivi collection at the University of 
Namibia. However, the information was very limited compared to that of the SADF and 
the primary sources through oral testimonies were mostly used. Notable in this regard is 
SWAPO activities captured on film by Swedish journalist and filmmaker Per Sanden and 
colleagues from the early 1970’s, which were used extensively in Captor and Captive. 
  
                                                 
3 Shubin, V.G. The Hot “Cold War”, the USSR in Southern Africa, 2008, p 12. 
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Film footage of the Border War was mostly accessed through the National Film Video 
and Sound Archive (NFVSA). This footage was mostly stored on film reels which had to 
be digitized onto tape format. The Kimberley Regiment made private film footage of the 
preparation of the follow-up operation to find Van der Mescht after his capture available; 
it is authentic footage and thus very unique. The SABC made film footage available of 
Van der Mescht’s return to South Africa after imprisonment which proved to be very 
effective for the use in Captor and Captive.  
 
A number of psychologists, including the practitioner who counseled the Van der Mescht 
family were interviewed, regarding war trauma and related aspects. They all requested to 
remain anonymous. Publications on the memory and trauma of war were also accessed 
for information on war trauma and related aspects.  
 
A number of publications were accessed to inform the sections on the theory and history 
of documentary film, as well as representing history through film. Notable is the work of 
historian Robert Rosenstone, who writes extensively on the representation of history 
through film as a proponent thereof. Regarding South African history of film, the work of 
Martin Botha is the most comprehensive resource, covering political divides. Information 
on both feature and documentary films based on the Anglo Boer War and Border War   
was accessed through the NFVSA. A questionnaire was sent to a number of South 
African documentary filmmakers whose films are based on historical events, to add the 
voices of local practitioners to the study, in addition to that of Captor and Captive, for a 
more comprehensive report.        
 
Throughout the dissertation, reference is made of documentaries shot on both film and 
video and broadcast in theatres and / or on television. It excludes current affairs and 
magazine journalism programs of factual nature as these are separate genres with their 
own particular issues and conventions. A distinction is made between feature films 
(dramatized fiction) and documentary films (non-fiction).  
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Documentary film is such a comprehensive and complex film genre which makes it 
difficult to give an exact definition and perfect approach on how to execute. It deals with 
direct representations of actuality and can arouse an activation of belief for viewers. As 
early as 1926, John Grierson a Scottish documentary filmmaker considered the father of 
documentaries, explained that cinema’s potential for observing life could be exploited in 
a new art form, and that unlike fiction where there is an actor and a story, a documentary 
interprets the world and captures the subject from the real world. It has the potential to 
expose, challenge and reveal the real world. Documentary film developed out of the 
Western world’s middle class’ need to explore, document, explain, understand and hence 
symbolically control the world. It boils down to what “We” do to “Them”. The “Them” 
are usually poor, marginalized, oppressed, politically suppressed and disadvantaged.4 
 
Documentary film is the representation of facts or stories of people, communities and 
individuals; or the representation of facts or stories of events, in the past or present. It 
often carries messages of social value, acts as catalysts for change and advocates specific 
causes or action. There are various sub genres including wildlife, natural history, socio-
political, biographies and historical documentaries; each with their own distinct set of 
rules. The dissertation focuses on documentary film based on historical events, with 
reference to Captor and Captive.   
 
Historical films, both documentaries and dramatized, is often the result of filmmakers’ 
struggle with the past in an attempt to make sense of situations in their worlds. This 
usually stems from societies and communities being plagued by war and socio-political-
economical challenges, mostly experienced in Third World or developing countries. 
 
Documentary filmmaking is a complex multi-skilled and multi-dimensional practice. It 
has technical, creative, aesthetic, business and political complexities to be taken into 
consideration. Film is a combination of many elements including: still images, moving 
images, dialogue, sound effects, music, text and emotion. It communicates a variety of 
                                                 
4 Pichaske, K. Colour Adjustment: Race and Representation in Post-Apartheid South African Documentary, 
PhD Thesis, Film and Media Studies, University of Cape Town, 2009, p 47. 
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information and elements simultaneously. Historical documentaries uses a variety of 
material towards the making of the film including: film archive footage; still photos from 
the era or subject matter to create a realistic sense of the historical moment; text from 
newspapers; maps; official documents; filmed interviews; cutaways;5 music; sound 
effects. All of the aforementioned elements get shaped into a narrative to tell a story. 
 
With reference to Captor and Captive, a variety of elements were combined in the 
making of the film including: archive film footage, still photos, text records from 
archives, newspaper clippings, cutaways, re-enactments,6 interviews with the two main 
characters, interviews with the few sub characters and interviews with two “so-called 
experts” to explain the context of the Border War.  
 
According to Robert Rosenstone, a pioneer in the field, historical films have a place in 
the world and historians must start to appreciate and learn to deal with it. It does play a 
role in the way we see, remember, think about, and understand the past.7 South Africa has 
one of the oldest film industries in the world dating back to 1896, with the earliest film 
footage consisting of newsreels available from the period of the Anglo Boer War which 
were filmed at the front.8 A prominent figure who dominated the industry in the early 
days is the New York born immigrant Isadore William Schlesinger, who continued the 
practice of the filming of newsreels started during the Anglo Boer War. Current affairs in 
South Africa was captured and presented in The African Mirror newsreel, and used since 
1948 as propaganda to support apartheid.9 Subsequently, film footage from The African 
Mirror is a useful source today, especially within films of historical and political nature.  
 
As early as 1916, an Afrikaans language feature film that represents an historical event 
De Voortrekkers, was produced by a London based company in South Africa. The film is 
based on the Great Trek movement of the 1830’s, and the screenplay written by 
                                                 
5 Cutaways refer to visual images used to illustrate or support scenes and interviews in films. It could be in 
the format of still photos, text records, newspaper clippings, filmed footage or film archive footage.   
6 Re-enactments refer to actors being filmed to depict certain scenes or scenarios that are not available 
otherwise; or to dramatize certain scenes.   
7 Rosenstone, R.A. Visions of the Past, The Challenge of Film to our Idea of History, 1995, p 197. 
8 Botha, M. South African Cinema 1896 – 2010, 2012, p 9, 11. 
9 Ibid, p 23. 
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Afrikaner historian Gustav Preller. It is based on his interpretation of the events 
surrounding the Battle of Blood River, a watermark event in Afrikaner history, marking 
the clash between the Voortrekkers and Zulu warriors with the Voortrekkers being 
victorious. De Voortrekkers helped create and sustained the ideology that was imprinted 
into the Afrikaner nationalist psyche that the Voortrekkers were the founding fathers of a 
new nation and a group of brave and heroic pioneers. In addition it portrayed black 
people as uncivilized and Dingaan is portrayed as a savage ruler.10 The presentation of 
this historical event on film was approached from the Afrikaner nationalist viewpoint, 
without consulting with the opposing Zulu force that took part in the Battle of Blood 
River for their perspective on the event. This indicates the portrayal of historical events 
through a Nationalist perspective for propaganda purposes. Nearly a century later the 
current ruling party in South Africa has a similar approach to the representation of 
history; representing the victors’ point of view. With reference to Captor and Captive, 
the two main opposing forces fighting each other in the historical event portrayed in the 
film are the SADF and SWAPO. The film attempts to give a voice to both forces and 
represent both ideologies, as opposed to one viewpoint only.  
 
The 1930’s and 40’s started a period in which Afrikaans language films, both features 
and documentaries were used to propagate Afrikaner nationalism. The first Afrikaans 
language film made in South Africa that made use of sound was Sarie Marais (1931), 
directed by Joseph Albrecht, and produced by Schlesinger’s African Film Productions. It 
is based on a historical event and tells the story of a Boer POW during the Anglo Boer 
War. It was followed by Moedertjie (1931), based on a theatre play touching on poor 
white Afrikaners.11  
 
The centenary of the Great Trek movement in 1938 was an important event for the 
celebration and promotion of Afrikaner nationalism, and was documented in the 
propaganda film Die Bou van ‘n Nasie, funded by the state and produced by African Film 
                                                 
10 Botha, M. South African Cinema 1896 – 2010, 2012, pp 24 – 25. 
11 Ibid, pp 26 – 27. 
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Productions.12 The majority of South African documentary films made until 1994 were 
produced and funded by the state and generally served government propaganda, 
especially advocating Afrikaner nationalism and defending apartheid.13 
  
An insightful historical study conducted by Eustacia Riley, examines Afrikaans language 
feature films produced between 1947 and 1989 set in the Cape Province, with the aim of 
exploring landscape, identity and place. Although the focus is not on historical films, she 
suggests that the films can all be viewed as historical evidence of apartheid and analyzed 
within this context. Both feature and documentary films were predominantly subsidized 
by the NP government and used as propaganda, with strong Nationalist overtones.14 
Simon Beyers (1947), directed by Pierre de Wet, is based on a historical incident that took 
place in the late 17th century, involving the first Governor of the Dutch settlement Simon 
van der Stel. According to Riley’s study, the intent of the film was to advocate Afrikaner 
nationalism and historical right to the land. Matieland (1955), also directed by Pierre de 
Wet and set in Stellenbosch, continued to represent the Cape Province as the territorial 
heartland and landscape of the Afrikaner.15  
 
Director Manie van Rensburg based some of his feature films including television drama 
series’ on the history of Afrikaners, exploring interesting dynamics within the Afrikaner 
psyche. Examples include his work set in the 1930’s and 40’s, Verspeelde Lente (1983) 
and Die Perdesmous (1982). Both productions portray historical events concerning the 
Afrikaner at the time, exploring culture, class and rural-urban conflicts. His feature film 
The Fourth Reich (1990) is a critical portrayal of Afrikaner nationalism during the 
1940’s. What makes Van Rensburg’s work unique is the fact that he managed to produce 
work of high filmic quality that still resonates with Afrikaners today. He managed to 
                                                 
12 Riley, E.J. From Matieland to Mother City: Landscape, Identity and Place in Feature Films set in the 
Cape Province, 1947 – 1989, PhD Thesis, Department of Historical Studies, University of Cape Town, 
2012, p 32. 
13 Pichaske, K. Colour Adjustment: Race and Representation in Post-Apartheid South African 
Documentary, PhD Thesis, Film and Media Studies, University of Cape Town, 2009, p 112. 
14 Riley, E.J. From Matieland to Mother City: Landscape, Identity and Place in Feature Films set in the 
Cape Province, 1947 – 1989, PhD Thesis, Department of Historical Studies, University of Cape Town, 
2012, p 4. 
15 Ibid, pp 37 – 43.     
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make the films within the restricted, oppressive system of apartheid; challenging the 
Afrikaner establishment and opposing the system; yet outside of the radical leftwing class 
of filmmakers that emerged in the 1970’s.16   
 
The first film about the Anglo Boer War was produced in 1931, nearly three decades after 
the war has ended, entitled Sarie Marais. It could coincide with the notion that it takes 20 
years or more after the atrocities of war for people to start talking about it and venting 
out, and can also be attributed to the fact that the film industry was still in an infancy 
stage. Sarie Marais was also the first Afrikaans language film with sound to be produced 
in South Africa. In 1949, Sarie Marais was reworked into a full length feature film by 
Unie Films. Since the 1960’s, a number of Afrikaans language feature and documentary 
films were produced representing the war. It includes Voor Sononder (1962), directed by 
Emil Nofal; Die Ruiter in die Nag (1963), directed by Jan Perold; Die Kavaliers (1966),   
directed by Elmo de Witt and Kruger Millions-Miljoene (1967), directed by Ivan Hall. In 
the 1980’s, Dirk de Villiers directed a television series representing the Anglo Boer War 
in Arende, about experiences of POWs in St Helena. The series was edited into a feature 
film for foreign markets entitled Cape Rebel. That Englishwoman (1989), directed by 
Dirk de Villiers, revolves around Emily Hobhouse helping women and children in the 
concentration camps.  
 
Since the centenary commemoration towards the end of the 1990’s, a new wave of 
feature and documentary films representing the Anglo Boer War was produced. 
Examples include the documentary film Scorched Earth (2001), directed by Herman 
Binge, and television miniseries The Feast of the Uninvited (2008), directed by Katinka 
Heyns. The Feast of the Uninvited looks at people who were traumatized by the war.17 
The most recent feature film about the Anglo Boer War, Die Verraaiers (2012), directed 
by Paul Eilers, is partly based on the book Boereverraaiers by Albert Blake. According 
to Albert Grundlingh, an expert in the history of the Anglo Boer War, the term 
“verraaiers” is too strong as most of the men portrayed in the film were technically not 
                                                 
16 Botha, M. South African Cinema 1896 – 2010, 2012, pp 77 – 87. 
17 Ibid, pp 212 – 216. 
National Film Video and Sound Archive (NFVSA), email Trevor Moses, April 2013.    
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traitors but merely “handsuppers”, those who deserted without leave. He does however 
mention that one should consider and leave room for poetic license.18    
 
In 1970, Rosenstone started incorporating the concept of history represented through film 
into his lectures, with the intention of students seeing and experiencing the past in 
addition to reading books. The initiative led to an increase in class attendance and student 
enrolment which resulted in a course in History on Film. Subsequently, many similar 
courses were developed and presented globally. South African documentary filmmaker 
David Max-Brown supports the use of film to represent history, as well as supplementing 
written text in history class context. “We remember best when we can put pictures to 
words. Some images are so strong that they have caused changes in world views around 
certain issues, so students of history will definitely be affected by visual images and 
especially when they are supported by the clever and creative use of the script to support 
the images in a coherent film. I think that film has evolved as a way of representing 
history, from a bland chronological approach to a more nuanced approach in which film 
allows us to get into a time machine and travel with non linear access forwards and 
backwards in history. The best history lessons are given as stories, so the evolution of 
film is the evolution of storytelling and so is the story of history also”.19 Historical films 
produced by Max-Brown include Secret Safari (2001), about the ANC’s smuggling of 
arms into South Africa during its armed struggle, and The Manuscripts of Timbuktu 
(2009), about the origin and history of libraries and text records in Mali.  
 
South African documentary filmmaker David Forbes has similar sentiments and reckons 
that documentary films are critical to teaching history. He produced Cradock Four 
(2010), which revolves around the murder of four anti-apartheid activists by the security 
police near Port Elizabeth in June 1985. This tragic event became known as the Cradock 
Four murders. The film has been shown to a wide ranging audience including school 
children in rural areas, townships and urban areas; university students and film festivals 
across the globe. Forbes says: “The film touches people emotionally; it invokes forgotten 
                                                 
18 Albert Grundlingh, email, May 2013.  
19 David Max-Brown, email questionnaire, March 2013.  
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memories and reveals our hidden past. It brings to the fore questions of justice, dignity, 
equality, democracy and other important issues which make us human and has a lasting 
impact on audiences. This is the value of historical films; they become part of history, 
part of story-telling; part of our culture and remembrance of events”.20 
  
Rosenstone felt that traditional forms of history have limitations that could be developed 
by incorporating film into the discipline. He suggests that filmmakers work in co-
operation with historians when making historical films to ensure credible sources and 
products. Historians have a common approach to history and the challenges thereof 
including verification of evidence, random and overwhelming amount of data that needs 
to be placed, constructing a meaningful past and working within their own viewpoints 
and agendas. Today historians speak by virtue of this discipline, by virtue of special 
training and the standards of a profession. Filmmakers have no such standard training and 
common approach to history. Filmmakers who represent history through film will 
probably portray a more personal reflection on the meaning of the past, without the depth 
and insight that written history might have.21 Historical film and historical text thus need 
a different approach in the making and evaluation thereof.  
 
In 2013, South African documentary filmmaker Rehad Desai, who holds a Masters 
Degree in Social History, produced a documentary series Alexandra, my Alexandra on 
the history of Alexandra, a township east of Johannesburg. He based the content on the 
book Alexandra, a History written by historians Philip Bonner and Noor Nieftagodien. 
This is a good example of history presented in both text and visual format, produced by 
both filmmakers and historians as a collaborative effort. Desai also produced a 
documentary film Bhambatha War of the Heads 1906 in 2008 which posed challenges 
including few visual material available of an event that happened more than a century 
ago, in addition to an event that was not well documented and recorded at the time.  
 
                                                 
20 David Forbes, email questionnaire, March 2013. 
21 Rosenstone, R.A. Visions of the Past, The Challenge of Film to our Idea of History, 1995, p 66. 
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Rosenstone had two of his major written works put onto film and has first hand 
experience in both mediums of written and visual history. He firmly believes that there is 
a place for both disciplines; written word and visual images, and that they can either 
support each other or stand alone as independent entities. Each has its own unique powers 
of representation. Film cannot do what a book does and a book cannot do what film 
does.22 Comparing film and written text led to many questions and dialogue about the 
relationship between moving images and the written word. The following questions and 
issues came up: what happens to history when words are translated into images; what 
happens when images transform information that can be conveyed in words; why do we 
judge films by how it measures up to written history; what can words do that images 
cannot do and what can images do that words cannot do. 
 
In the words of Max-Brown: “History happens from the moment the camera is turned on, 
and from the moment the person speaks in front of it or the image is captured. The image 
or the person in front of the camera is not the same as it once was, time has passed and 
what the camera captures is immediately a part of history. How we use those images and 
how we combine them with sound and music affects the way the story is perceived and 
which emotions are evoked. The best films seem to be those that do evoke emotion and do 
allow the viewer to think in a new way and to make new associations that they would not 
have had without the film, and when any other kind of storytelling medium would not or 
could not have done the same”.23 
  
According to Rosenstone, an advantage of historical documentary films is that it can open 
a direct window onto the past, allowing viewers to see cities, factories, landscapes, 
battlefields and leaders of an earlier time. Documentary film uses film archive footage 
and still photos from a particular period to create a realistic sense of the historical 
moment. It has the capacity to play around with text and visual images in order to make it 
stand out. Using old black and white film footage in a color film has the potential to make 
it stand out and viewers to take note. When using text, despite the availability of using 
                                                 
22 Rosenstone, R.A. Visions of the Past, The Challenge of Film to our Idea of History, 1995, p 15. 
23 David Max-Brown, email questionnaire, March 2013. 
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quotes, italics and footnotes, it does not stand out as visible as in the context of film. With 
reference to Captor and Captive, the editor treated some of the film archive footage to 
look older or more current, according to the context, since the film moves between the 
past and the present. This technique is referred to as grading, which means adjusting the 
color of the visual material.  
     
As with any discourse, there are historians who are not in agreement with the practice of 
history represented through film. The philosopher Ian Jarvie, author of two books on 
motion picture and society argues that moving images are weak and contain poor 
information and therefore cannot portray meaningful history on film. History is a debate 
between historians about exact events, the reason for the events taking place and an 
account of the significance of the events. With moving images, there is no time or space 
for reflection, verification, making logical arguments or evaluation of sources.24 
Rosenstone argues that there are many written historical works representing the past 
without going into debates. If written texts can do this and be considered history, then an 
inability to debate on film cannot rule out the possibilities of history on film. In addition, 
many historical films do verify facts, make strong arguments and evaluate sources which 
makes Jarvie’s argument seems weak.  
 
With reference to Captor and Captive, differing viewpoints were presented. Regarding 
the issue raised about the allegation that Van der Mescht was a traitor, two opposing 
viewpoints were presented by secondary sources, supplemented by dialogue from the 
primary sources, Van der Mescht and Ashipala.   
 
According to Rosenstone, academic historians have a general and unarticulated feeling 
that historical films, particularly dramatized historical films, cannot be as true as history 
in written text format, since words have the ability to provide a serious and complex past 
reality that film cannot do as well since it needs to entertain people. General assumptions 
being made in this regard include: films are inaccurate; distort the past; fictionalize; 
trivialize; romanticize people, events and movements; falsify history. Those in defense of 
                                                 
24 Rosenstone, R.A. Visions of the Past, The Challenge of Film to our Idea of History, 1995, p 26. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
23
23
representing history through film argues as follows: the film medium is difficult for 
historians to control; film shows we do not own the past; film creates a historical world 
with which books cannot compete for popularity; film is a symbol of an increasingly 
post-literate world in which people can read but won’t.25  
 
Film presents historians with a challenge of how to use the medium to its full capabilities 
for carrying information, juxtaposing images and words. Visual media also highlights the 
conventions and limitations of written history since film points towards new possibilities 
for representing the past. Scholars of history argue that written history is shaped by the 
conventions of genre and language, and that this is also the situation with visual history. 
If written narratives are verbal fictions, then visual narratives will be visual fictions, not 
mirrors of the past but representations of it. Rosenstone argues that all history, written 
and other formats is a construction, not a reflection, and that history is an ideological and 
cultural product of the Western world at a particular time in its development, a series of 
conventions for thinking about the past.26   
 
Max-Brown argues as follows: “An historical film, or a film that tells the story set in the 
present day that might one day be considered a historical text, does not have to be factual 
in the sense of substantiated fact followed by substantiated fact to be a good historical 
film. Films can be constructed from the get go, but the reality that is restructured, even 
scripted sometimes can still be true to the vision or the theme. The filmmaker can 
however manipulate the situation. And yet it can still manage to purvey a useful 
interpretation and useful truth in itself which can still be thought of the truth of the 
situation that is filmed or documented”.27 
 
South African Emmy award winning documentary filmmaker Mark Kaplan comments 
that he seeks out subjective truths in his documentary films and makes his standpoint as 
the filmmaker clear so that audiences are clear to make up their own minds. His films 
explore the subjective nature of largely personal histories. The narratives are mined for 
                                                 
25 Rosenstone, R.A. Visions of the Past, The Challenge of Film to our Idea of History, 1995, p 46. 
26 Ibid, pp 10 - 11.  
27 David Max-Brown, email questionnaire, March 2013. 
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their veracity but also for their fallibility and sometimes deliberate lies. His films do not 
seek a balanced interpretation of the past.28 Kaplan is the director of historical 
documentary films including Between Joyce and Remembrance (2003), that follows a 
family who lost a son and father to apartheid’s brutality and their meeting with his killer 
during the TRC hearings; Betrayal (2006), about former ANC exiles returning home; and 
Village under the Forest (2013), about Israeli forces invading Palestinian settlements. 
  
Desai argues as follows: “Truth is always highly subjective but approaching it 
dialectically assists in coming to a ‘truth’. I don’t buy into histories belonging to 
communities, they belong to society. I don’t believe in filmmakers having to be careful 
about who tells whose story, it is post modern nonsense. It is the individual filmmaker’s 
point of view that makes a film unique”.29 
  
The author’s approach in producing historical documentary film is discussed towards the 
end of the dissertation in Chapter five where she reflects on the making of Captor and 
Captive. But to substantiate on the aforementioned comments on truth and objectivity, 
her approach is to present various viewpoints of a story or an event, with a personal point 
of view and message brought across, central to the narrative. Audiences are presented 
with options to interpret in their own way. Stories are presented with the aim of 
stimulating dialogue and raising debate about issues. Her films are not sold as the 
objective truth and it is argued that it depends from whose perspective a story is told. In 
order to present historical documentary films of credible value, content is well researched 
by presenting various viewpoints and verifying factual information as accurately as 
possible.  
 
Rosenstone argues that the question to ask is not whether historical films convey facts or 
make arguments as well as written history. The question should be what sort of historical 
world does each film construct and how does it construct that world and how we judge 
that construction, what it means to us and how does the historical world on the screen 
                                                 
28 Mark Kaplan, email questionnaire, March 2013. 
29 Rehad Desai, email questionnaire, March 2013. 
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relate to written history. Film creates different sorts of projects, pose different sorts of 
questions, give different sorts of answers from written history, carry different sorts of 
data and creates a different sort of historical world than written text.30  
 
Both historians and filmmakers approach the materials of the past with one similarity; 
both possess attitudes, assumptions, beliefs and value systems that influence their 
interpretations of the past. In film, certain techniques have to be used to reproduce events, 
which is not possible by the written word.31 Rosenstone argues that historians should 
reconsider the standards between historical film and written history. Historical films’ 
cannot be evaluated in the same manner and standard as written texts and include many 
elements unknown to written history and historians. Historians need to learn about the 
film practice in order to make critical comments.  
 
In 2006, the editor of the American Historical Review, Robert Schneider noted that film 
analysis by historians does not necessarily contribute to the analytical, sophisticated 
understanding of history.32 Historians tend to use written works of history to evaluate 
historical films, whilst historical books are also subject to being evaluated for its 
credibility within the discipline. Representing history through film does not mean the 
lowering of the standard of historiography, but a different approach and more options 
available towards the understanding of the past. For instance, the density of research and 
conceptualization is often absent in the standard documentary, though one must allow for 
different kinds of research and different kinds of conceptualization within the respective 
medium.33 
   
Robert Toplin, a professor of history at the University of North Carolina who teaches 
film and history suggests the importance of consideration of the people who made the 
films, having their own agendas and interpretations that impact on the outcome of the 
film. The same is applicable to written text of history. Kaplan argues that the characters 
                                                 
30 Rosenstone, R.A. Visions of the Past, The Challenge of Film to our Idea of History, 1995, p 50, 238. 
31 Rosenstone, R.A. Revisioning History, Film and the Constructions of a New Past, 1995, p 6. 
32 Ashkenazi, O. ‘The future of history as film: apropos the publication of A Companion to Historical 
Film’, Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice, DO1, 2013, p 2. 
33 Rosenstone, R.A. Visions of the Past, The Challenge of Film to our Idea of History, 1995, p 231. 
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(subject matters) being interviewed for documentary film also have their own agendas; 
why else would they agree to participate.  
 
Historian and filmmaker Janaki Nair argues that films can serve as a tool to convey a 
social message and bring change to a community in a manner that research papers or 
studies cannot do. Films are more far reaching and assessable to a wider audience since 
research studies often land up in an archive and only used by fellow researchers or 
academics as opposed to the broader public. It is also a valuable tool in Third World 
countries. This was evident in the film that Nair made about a mining community in India 
that was under threat of closing down.  After the Gold (1997), was set out as a research 
study to write a book and resulted in a film.  
 
There are numerous examples in both South Africa and globally that effectively used film 
as a means for social change. In South Africa, the use of film to portray social messages 
to bring about change was used as an effective tool during the mass movement against 
apartheid that gained momentum in the 1980’s, to showcase the atrocities of apartheid. In 
the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, filmmakers outside of the mainstream industry made 
feature films and documentaries reflecting the oppressive apartheid system which were 
mostly screened at film festivals, universities, church halls and trade union offices. It 
involved independent filmmakers such as Lindy Wilson and Kevin Harris; a group of 
students from the University of Cape Town; and collectives such as Video News Service 
(VNS) including filmmakers Brian Tilley, Laurence Dworkin, Nyana Molete, Seipati 
Bulane and Tony Bensusan. Most of these films had small budgets and were funded by 
the producers themselves, progressive organizations such as the South African Council of 
Churches and British and European television stations. These developments that 
coincided with the mass movements against apartheid led to the formation of the Film 
and Allied Workers’ Organisation (FAWO) in 1988, with the aim of uniting all 
filmmakers towards the establishment of a democratic society. This period marked the 
beginning of a new, critical South African cinema, reflecting the realities of the black 
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majority in addition to the Afrikaner nationalist propaganda films of the 1970’s, the 
Bantu film industry and tax-shelter films of the 1980’s.34  
 
The VNS collective was formed in 1985 and became the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions’ (COSATU) unofficial film unit, producing documentaries. They first 
made documentaries for international television companies and later diversified towards 
the production of short documentaries referred to as video pamphlets to use for local 
purposes. VNS was constantly under threat from the state organs and their output is 
considered as remarkable. Examples of their work include Tribute to David Webster 
(1989), about the human rights activist, Fruits of Defiance (1990), showing resistance to 
apartheid in Cape Town in 1989 and Forward to a People’s Republic (1991), juxtaposing 
the mass militancy and mobilization with white militarization. Witness to Apartheid 
(1986), directed by Kevin Harris is a documentary filmed clandestinely during the state 
of emergency and exposes the brutality and violence of apartheid and was subsequently 
banned.35 At the time of production these films were used as agents for change and today 
they are valuable historical sources. When using these films as historical sources, it is 
important to recognize that it was made from a purely leftwing perspective.  
 
Anirudh Deshpande argues for a new relationship between visual and written history in 
the interest of both public memory and a socially relevant history. He explores the use of 
film as a different form and source of history. 
  
With the unbanning of the political parties in 1990, South African filmmakers started 
focusing their themes on the transition period towards democracy. There was a 
realization that film could play a vital role in forging social cohesion, as well as 
documenting history in the making. It led to several documentations on the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) process, which also led to feature films about the 
theme. Post apartheid cinema is characterized by an emergence of a diverse group of new 
                                                 
34 Botha, M. South African Cinema 1896 – 2010, 2012, pp 147 – 149. 
35 Ibid, p 150. 
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voices and diverse themes.36 The period after 1994 led to a time of reflection on 
apartheid, its brutality and devastation. Various documentary films were produced during 
the past 20 years dealing with events that were previously left out of history books, and it 
became guardians of the popular memory. Most of these films are representations of 
historical events, and a valuable contribution towards our collective past in addition to 
written text. South Africa presents filmmakers, especially documentary filmmakers with 
a vast amount of material to make films in the wake of apartheid, as well as the many 
new challenges facing the country today. The country is rich with numerous untold 
stories of the past and present, reflecting diverse voices and cultures. South Africa’s 
socio-political situation lends itself to documentaries of historical nature.   
  
The Long Journey of Clement Zulu (1992), directed by Liz Fish, follows political 
prisoners after their release from Robben Island as they try to rebuild their lives. The Life 
and Times of Sara Baartman (1998), directed by Zola Maseko, tells the controversial 
story of Sara Baartman and is followed up in 2003 by The Return of Sara Baartman. The 
Gugulethu Seven (2000), directed by Lindy Wilson, look at the TRC investigation into 
the murder of seven Cape Town activists. Drum (2004), directed by Zola Maseko, 
chronicles life in Sophiatown in the 1950’s. Born into Struggle (2004), directed by Rehad 
Desai, is a personal essay of his life as a child of political parents who lived in exile. 
Forgotten (2007), directed by Rina Jooste, explores what happened to musicians who left 
the country to join the cultural ensemble Amandla, aligned to the ANC in exile, and the 
impact it has on their lives today. More than Just a Game (2007), directed by Junaid 
Ahmed, tells the story of political prisoners on Robben Island in the 1960’s who created a 
football league. Skin (2008), directed by Anthony Fabian, is the tragic and true story of 
Sandra Laing, a Colored girl born into an Afrikaner home, taken away by the authorities 
and classified as non-white. Afrikaaps (2010), directed by Dylan Valley, explores the 
origin, history and development of the Afrikaans language within the Western Cape.  
 
During the past decade there was an attempt by South African feature and documentary 
filmmakers to explore Afrikaner identity within the broader scope of the country, again 
                                                 
36 Botha, M. South African Cinema 1896 – 2010, 2012, p 203. 
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drawing from history. Promised Land (2002), directed by Jason Xenepoulos, is an 
exploration of choices made by Afrikaners after 1994; the choice to assimilate or to 
continue racial separation. Pure Blood (1999), directed by Ken Kaplan, looks at a group 
of white supremacists who are trying to revive the old order of apartheid. These two 
feature films are an important alternative to the idealized portrait of Afrikaners in the 
Afrikaans language escapism cinema of the 1970’s.37 The Heart of Whiteness (2005), 
directed by Rehad Desai, explores what it means to be an Afrikaner in post apartheid 
South Africa and the reason for fear of change, touching on the past. Ouma se Slim Kind 
(2006), directed by Gustav Kuhn, examines relationships in the 1940’s and how the 
Afrikaner culture at the time destroyed hopes of non-racialism. Betrayed (2007), directed 
by Rina Jooste, explores the psyche of Afrikaner males in post apartheid South Africa 
today, against the background of the Border War. Afrikaner Afrikaan (2008), directed by 
Rina Jooste, uses Afrikaans music as a springboard for discussion, and captures the new 
buoyancy and divergence in Afrikaner identities freed from the straightjacket of 
Afrikaner nationalism, touching on the past.  
 
To get back to Deshpande who argues for the use of film as a different form and source 
of history, he suggests that historians have more options to find information from 
nowadays, in addition to the disciplines of archeology and anthropology. He uses the Iraq 
war as a case in point where access to digital cameras and internet helps to portray visual 
images of the war which adds value and another dynamic to written text. According to 
Deshpande, the greatest asset of film is its ability to show history as an integrated process 
in a holistic manner, using many elements simultaneously to bring it alive, as opposed to 
books that seldom have the ability to be as powerful as film. Emotions and experiences 
not available in written histories can be portrayed through film, and have the power to 
illustrate concepts; complement and enrich written texts such as love, humiliation, hatred, 
anger and helplessness. In summary, Deshpande argues that both disciplines of history 
                                                 
37Botha, M. South African Cinema 1896 – 2010, 2012, p 219. 
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and film can gain from each other in searching for information about the past and 
present.38  
 
Historian and filmmaker Janaki Nair mentions that she gets better access to people’s 
stories and interviews when she has a camera with her as opposed to a notebook and pen. 
It seems as if people are more willing to talk since film is viewed as an opportunity for 
stories to be heard. There is also the situation of it being a cathartic process for people to 
relive their emotions. And then there is the perception of glamour associated to a film 
crew and the possibility of the film as end result. Generally, people like to see themselves 
on screen. 
 
Kristin Pichaske, an American film academic, lecturer and documentary filmmaker who 
worked in South Africa for several years, suggests that the use of characters’ stories and 
interviews for documentary film is a political sensitive and complex situation. The 
subject matter of many documentary films manifests in the use of characters that come 
from poor socio-economic conditions, especially when working in Third World countries, 
including South Africa as a developing country. This inevitably opens the door for 
exploitation. Characters are often very eager to participate; expecting monetary or other 
gain.39 Most television broadcasters requires a signed letter of consent from characters 
participating in films, referred to as release forms. According to Michael Rabiger “Some 
participants are not attentive or sophisticated enough to absorb all the implications, and 
although the signature on the release form discharges legal obligations, it doesn’t meet 
those that are moral”.40 
 
Film is more limited than written history in its inability to deal with a lot of complicated 
ideas at once, although it uses many elements simultaneously. It is a challenge to 
condense large amounts of content including ideas, viewpoints and ideologies into a short 
space of time as opposed to written text which can be elaborated on. Historical 
                                                 
38 Deshpande, A. ‘Films as Historical Sources or Alternative History’, Economic and Political Weekly, 
2004, pp 4458 – 4459. 
39 Pichaske, K. Colour Adjustment: Race and Representation in Post-Apartheid South African 
Documentary, PhD Thesis, Film and Media Studies, University of Cape Town, 2009, p 59. 
40 Rabiger, M. Directing the Documentary, 2004, p 243.  
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documentary and feature films’ length vary between one and two hours and filmmakers 
generally stick to a simple formula for keeping the focus and audience attention. Unlike 
reading a book, when watching a film, there is no time for stopping and reading or 
watching again. According to Kaplan “There is always the danger of oversimplification 
but on the other hand there is a real edge, a sharpness to approach, to interviewing, to 
creating the storyline which can be the real strength of the medium of film”.41 
  
With reference to Captor and Captive, it is a comprehensive piece of work with lots of 
information and issues that had to be condensed into a 52-minute film. It was further 
condensed into a 48-minute and 45-minute version respectively for different broadcast 
specifications. It took careful planning to include all the critical information, retaining the 
focus of the story, retaining audience attention by creating tension and suspense as well 
as the consideration of factual accuracy throughout.     
 
R.J. Raack, a historian who has been involved in the production of many documentary 
films advocates representing history through the medium of film. In his view, film seems 
to be a more appropriate medium for history than the written word. He argues that 
traditional written history is too linear and narrow in focus to illustrate the fullness of the 
complex, multi-dimensional world in which humans live. He argues that only film that 
uses techniques that can juxtapose images and sound, quick cut to new sequences, 
dissolve, fade, speed-up and slow down; can depict real life, preoccupations, distractions, 
sensory deceptions, conscious and unconscious motives and emotions. Only film can 
provide an adequate empathetic reconstruction to convey how historical people 
witnessed, understood and lived their lives. Only film can recover all the past’s liveliness. 
He believes that visual images let us look through a window directly at past events to 
experience people and places as if we were there, more easily than the written word 
does.42 
 
                                                 
41 Mark Kaplan, email questionnaire, March 2013. 
42 Rosenstone, R.A. Visions of the Past, The Challenge of Film to our Idea of History, 1995, p 26. 
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Desai has similar opinions as Raack and says: “I don’t think people like to watch films to 
be taught something, rather they watch to experience and feel, hopefully have empathy. 
Making historical film that is not dry and full of information is exceptionally difficult. The 
key is to bring history alive and ensure that it fosters critical thinking. This is largely 
achieved by showing competing ideas and attempting to be as dialectical as possible”.43     
 
Getting back to South Africa’s film industry and history, a number of films touching on 
the Border War were produced during the 1970’s and 1980’s whilst the war was waging. 
These films were often funded and dictated by the Department of Information and 
serving government propaganda needs, defending the war. The feature film Kaptein 
Caprivi (1972), directed by Albie Venter, became part of the propaganda machine 
advocating the war, with strong undertones of Afrikaner nationalism. The film which 
romanticized the Army motivated white schoolboys towards joining the force to fight the 
terrorists from taking over their country.44 Thereafter, a number of feature films with a 
similar purpose of propaganda followed. It includes: Six Soldiers (1974), directed by 
Bertrand Retief; Mirage Eskader (1975), directed by Bertrand Retief; Die Winter van 14 
Julie (1977), directed by Jan Scholtz; Terrorist (1978), directed by Neil Hetherington; 
Grensbasis 13 (1978), directed by Elmo de Witt; Forty Days (1979), directed by Franz 
Marx; ‘n Wêreld Sonder Grense (1987), directed by Frans Nel. Boetie Gaan Border Toe 
(1984), directed by Regardt van den Bergh, is a satire about military recruits and of 
entertainment value. It is not critical of the war, nor does it seek answers, but it does not 
fall into the propaganda film category either. Following on this film was Boetie op 
Manoevres (1985), again directed by Regardt van den Bergh and of entertainment 
value.45     
 
Documentary films revolving around the Border War produced during the period of the 
war in the 1970’s to 1980’s and serving government propaganda needs include A Visit to 
the Border, The Guardians, Aantree and Dit is Diensplig. These documentaries were 
                                                 
43 Rehad Desai, email questionnaire, March 2013. 
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produced and funded by state organs.46 Also produced during this period, but not funded 
or dictated by state organs, was the documentary film by war correspondent, author and 
filmmaker Al J. Venter, entitled The Last Domino.  
 
A limited number of documentaries and feature films made by leftwing filmmakers 
critical of the war, emerged during the war. The Stick (1987), directed by Darrell Roodt, 
is a feature film that examines the raids conducted by the SADF into Angola during the 
Border War. It explores the trauma of war and impact it has on the people participating, 
in this instance the psychological damage done to conscripts. The film was initially 
banned in South Africa and eventually it was screened at a film festival in 1989.47 
  
After the war, few publications including books and films were produced and there was 
an initial silence for a number of years. This coincides with the notion that it takes 20 
years or more after the trauma of war for people who participated to start talking or 
venting out. Currently it is a very topical issue, and an emotional discourse with 
differentiating viewpoints is in process within the public domain, ranging from causes of 
the war, who won the war to the emotional scars and trauma at stake. Various books 
have, and are published, many of which are personal stories written by former soldiers 
who wants to make sense of a war that seems pointless to them today. There are also 
books published by former generals, as well as historians and the collection of voices of 
the war is expanding. The latest book by military historian Leopold Scholtz, The SADF in 
the Border War 1966 – 1989, published in 2013, was written many years after the war 
ended for the sake of historical perspective, the dust to settle and for official 
documentation to become available through various archives and institutions. A few 
theatre productions and films have emerged as well. Feature films include On the Wire 
(1990), directed by Elaine Proctor, and A Reasonable Man (1999), directed by Gavin 
Hood, both critical of the war effort and produced from a leftwing perspective. Betrayed 
(2007), a documentary directed by Rina Jooste, follows three former 32 Battalion soldiers 
remembering the trauma of war, and the impact it has on their lives today. It becomes a 
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personal story and a process of reflection, leading towards a cathartic process. At Thy 
Call (2008), directed by Christopher-Lee dos Santos, is a short-length feature film that 
was produced as a student project through the African Film and Drama Academy 
(AFDA). It looks at the personal conflicts that a conscript is experiencing during his 
national service on the border, during the Border War. My Heart of Darkness (2010), a 
documentary directed by Marius van Niekerk, is a personal story of his and three other 
war veterans’ experience of the trauma of war. Similar to Captor and Captive, it is a story 
of reconciliation since they are all representing different forces of the war experience, 
meeting each other many years later. In 2007, a documentary series on the Border War 
was commissioned by KykNET entitled Grensoorlog, directed by Linda de Jager. It 
chronicles the Border War from its inception to the end and looks at the various opposing 
sides of the conflict. 
  
It is interesting to note the various viewpoints and comments from academics and 
filmmakers regarding the representation of history through film. The topic is diverse and 
increased dialogue continues to raise questions. Both disciplines of history and 
filmmaking are dynamic in a constantly changing world order and a multi-disciplinary 
approach is an inevitable result. It is evident that the genre of film holds a strong position 
in its representation of history, and filmmakers around the world especially in developing 
countries are contributing to the phenomena. In South Africa there are many untold 
stories waiting to be told in various formats, be it text or visual.  
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Chapter 2: Background to the political situation in southern Africa during the 
period of Van der Mescht’s capture and imprisonment  
 
This chapter explores the political situation in southern Africa at the time of Van der 
Mescht’s capture by Ashipala, and resultant imprisonment, discussing the various armed 
forces and political alignments involved in the conflict. The focus remains with the 
SADF and SWAPO, since they are the two main opposing forces relating to the 
dissertation; Van der Mescht being a SADF member, and Ashipala a member of 
SWAPO.  
 
Gysbertus Johannes (Johan) van der Mescht was born in 1955 in Randfontein and grew 
up in Boksburg in the East Rand of the then Transvaal. After completing standard eight, 
Van der Mescht left school to become a craftsman, following in his father’s footsteps. 
Van der Mescht was part of the first intake of military conscripts who performed nine 
months national service. In 1973, he completed his initial nine months national service in 
Bethlehem and thereafter performed annual military camps which formed part of the 
conscription obligations. For the duration of his national service Van der Mescht was 
assigned to 6 Field Squadron in Bethlehem, part of the Engineering Corps which focused 
on building bridges, landmine detection and the purification of water.48 
  
Ruben Michael (Danger) Ashipala was born in 1947 in the village of Ogongo in West 
Ovamboland where he grew up. His father was a soldier who served in the Union 
Defence Force (UDF) during the Second World War. After completing primary school, 
Ashipala moved to the south of Namibia in search of work, and like many Ovambo’s at 
the time became a migrant worker. He found contract work in a fishing factory in Walvis 
Bay where he became subjected to discrimination from the white authorities. Many of the 
migrant workers, including Ashipala, became politically involved with SWAPO. In 1974, 
Ashipala left Namibia willingly to join the liberation struggle in exile and received 
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military training in the Soviet Union, focusing on reconnaissance. Thereafter, he returned 
to join PLAN in waging war against the SADF, and was destined to become a war hero.49      
 
Chapter two briefly explains the position and role of the SADF within the South African 
political landscape and how it related to the Cold War. The SADF perceived Communism 
as one of the threats to the safety and security of its public. The SADF aligned itself with 
a Western ideology, and its opponent SWAPO with ideologies from the Soviet Bloc, 
suggesting Communism. Therefore one can argue that the Border War was waged within 
the broader context of the Cold War.  
 
The war that took place in Namibia and Angola between 1966 and 1989 is referred to as 
the Border War or the Namibian War of Independence, depending on the participating 
armed force’s ideology. With regards to the dissertation, reference will be made to the 
Border War. It is closely associated and overlapped with the Angolan Colonial War that 
took place during the 1960’s, as well as the Angolan Civil War that started in 1975. The 
Border War took place between South Africa’s armed forces, the SADF and its allies on 
the one side; and SWAPO’s military wing PLAN and its allies on the other side. This 
military conflict took place over a period of 23 years and comprised of many small scale 
operations or skirmishes, as well as a few operations of a bigger and more comprehensive 
scale, ending in a full scale conventional war referred to as the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.  
 
The war had many characteristics and was fought as a revolutionary war, an insurgency 
and counterinsurgency war, a fast-moving, mobile and conventional war.50 The 
geographical area where the various battles took place was vast and comprised the 
northern border between Namibia and Angola stretching from the west to the east with 
the concentration of activity taking place in Ovamboland and the Caprivi. Many cross 
border operations took place within Angola, mostly concentrated in the southern area 
bordering Namibia, and towards the final years of the war it gradually moved north into 
Angola. There were no frontlines, permanent occupation of places or capitals. For the 
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50 Scholtz, L. The SADF in the Border War 1966 – 1989, 2013, p 5. 
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most part, the war was fought within the parameters of a counterinsurgency campaign.51 
Counterinsurgent wars do not focus on the destruction of an enemy on the battlefield, but 
rather winning the hearts and minds of the local population; in this instance mostly 
concentrated within Ovamboland. The mobile war had ever changing positions and 
possession of territory was not an objective. It gradually transformed towards a full scale 
conventional war towards the end of the conflict, which was mostly concentrated in 
Angola.  
 
There are various opposing viewpoints and debates about the causes of the war. 
According to Leopold Scholtz, the origins of the Border War can be traced back as far as 
1884 with the annexation of Namibia by Germany, which formed part of the Scramble 
for Africa by European powers. When the First World War broke out in 1914, the Union 
of South Africa became military involved upon request from Britain, against Germany. 
The military force under the command of General Louis Botha, invaded Namibia and by 
the middle of 1915 the Germans surrendered. After the war in 1919, The League of 
Nations declared Namibia a C-Mandate territory, to be administered by the Union of 
South Africa. When the League of Nations dissolved after the Second World War in 
1946, South Africa applied to its successor, the United Nations (UN) to take over 
Namibia. The request was refused because of South Africa’s racial policies and resulted 
in a long term and controversial legal battle. In 1971, the International Court of Justice 
agreed that South Africa’s rule of Namibia was illegal and that they should withdraw. 
The South African government never officially incorporated Namibia into its territory 
and administered it as a fifth province, with the white minority having representation in 
parliament and apartheid laws being implemented.52 The UN recognized SWAPO as the 
sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people and in 1974 the Security Council 
asked South Africa to transfer power. The Namibian question remained a controversial 
issue and was only settled towards the end of the Border War in 1989 and through 
protracted negotiations. 
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Organized resistance to South African rule within Namibia started with the establishment 
of the Ovamboland People’s Congress in 1957 in Cape Town, by a group of migrant 
workers in an attempt to put an end to the contract labor system. In 1959, the organization 
changed its name to the Ovamboland People’s Organisation, led by Sam Nujoma. The 
organization became increasingly militant and changed its name in 1960 to South West 
Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) with Sam Nujoma as the elected president.53 
Other key founders of the organization included Herman Toivo ya Toivo and Jackob 
Kuhanga. The liberation movement represented all Namibians, but accommodated 
predominantly Ovambo speaking people from the north of Namibia, with its main 
purpose to oppose the oppressing apartheid laws imposed by the South African 
government. In 1962, SWAPO resorted to armed struggle and formed a military wing, 
PLAN. They started clashing with the South African security forces in the north of 
Namibia, with the first official clash on 26 August 1966 at Ongulumbashe, officially 
known as the start of the Namibian War of Independence.54 From the SADF’s 
perspective, it is also generally assumed that the Border War started on this date when a 
number of 121 policemen and 9 SADF members under the command of Jan Breytenbach 
attacked a PLAN base at Ongulumbashe.55  
 
SWAPO had many supporters both in Africa and globally including the Soviet Union and 
Scandinavian countries, contributing financial aid, weapons and military training. In the 
early 1960’s, SWAPO had its headquarters in Dar es Salaam, the capital of Tanzania; a 
diplomatic office at the UN in New York; and offices in Moscow, London, Stockholm 
and various other cities from where it lobbied support to free Namibia from South 
African colonial rule.56 It was an ironic situation as SWAPO waged an armed struggle 
against South Africa whilst it was never officially banned as an organization. The 
                                                 
53 Ferreira, R. and Liebenberg, I. ‘The Impact of War on Angola and South Africa: Two southern African 
Case Studies’, Journal for Contemporary History, 31 (3), 2006, p 44. 
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54 Martin Shalli, interview, January 2010. Former PLAN commander and Chief of Operations at the time of 
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56 Ferreira, R. and Liebenberg, I. ‘The Impact of War on Angola and South Africa: Two southern African 
Case Studies’, Journal for Contemporary History, 31 (3), 2006, pp 44 – 45. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
39
39
members and leadership willingly went into exile and took up an armed struggle as they 
saw no alternative to gaining their independence. As early as 1962, the first group of 
recruits was sent to Egypt for military training. SWAPO camps were set up for the exiles 
that left Namibia where they were accommodated and trained in military practice, and 
from where the armed struggle against the SADF could be waged. SWAPO mainly 
infiltrated into the Caprivi and Ovamboland areas in northern Namibia, where many 
skirmishes took place throughout the war. The majority of SWAPO members were from 
the Ovamboland region. The first SWAPO exile camps were located in Tanzania, and in 
the early 1970’s camps were also set up in Zambia. Before Angolan independence in 
1975, SWAPO had many challenges operating from exile, mainly because of logistical 
reasons and not being able to set up camps and operate from within Angola. The main 
port of supply was in Dar es Salaam and a very long distance to the military areas of 
operation in the Caprivi and Ovamboland.57  
 
Initially from 1966, the South African Police (SAP) was involved to keep PLAN 
infiltrators outside the borders of Namibia. In 1973, the SADF took over most of the 
counterinsurgency operations because it became too much for the SAP to handle, and was 
not solely within their mandate. The SAP maintained a counterinsurgency element for the 
remainder of the war, later to become the much feared and notorious “Koevoet” unit, who 
operated as a special force. The first SADF troops to be deployed in Namibia were 
national servicemen, also known as conscripts from the training battalions. They were led 
by members of the Permanent Force (PF) who were employed as fulltime soldiers. The 
initial focus of attention was the eastern part of the Caprivi, since PLAN infiltrators 
entered from Zambia. By 1974, the SADF has grown its number of combat personnel 
considerably and within the SA Army there were now eight full-time infantry battalions 
and a combat ready parachute battalion.58 
 
                                                 
57 Shubin, V.G. The Hot “Cold War”, the USSR in Southern Africa, 2008, p 207.   
58 Steenkamp, W. ‘The Citizen Soldier in the Border War’, Journal for Contemporary History, 31 (3), 
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Until 1975, the efforts from the South African security forces in protecting its borders, 
was mainly to prevent the Marxist backed liberation movements to take over power from 
the colonial rulers in southern Africa. They posed a common threat of Communism to 
South Africa. The countries at stake comprised Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia. The 
SAP also helped Britain fight against the Rhodesian liberation movements. At that stage 
the perceived military threats for South Africa were Communism, internal uprising from 
the African National Congress (ANC), and African nationalist movements. The idea that 
Communism was a threat to South Africa became entrenched in the minds of SADF 
members. G.D. Scholtz, an Afrikaner historian and journalist wrote many books on 
Communism during the 1950’s and 1960’s, widely read by SADF senior officers.59  
 
Between 1970 and 1974, SWAPO mobilized itself politically. A national strike (1971 – 
1972) by contract workers in Windhoek led to reforms of the migrant labor system. 
Activists expelled from the mines and industry returned to Ovamboland and mobilized 
the people politically on behalf of SWAPO that led to an uprising in 1972 amongst the 
rural people in Ovamboland. This led to increased numbers of SADF troops deployed in 
the north of Namibia.60  
 
By 1974, the political situation in southern Africa changed rapidly and had an impact on 
the strategy of the various armed forces and political alignments in the region. In April 
1974, a military coup took place in Portugal that brought the end of Portuguese colonial 
rule over Angola and Mozambique. A new regional group, the Frontline States came into 
being; consisting of Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia, Botswana, Zambia and Tanzania 
with their primary goal to free South Africa from white rule.61 The Marxist backed 
liberation movements, including the ANC, posed a threat to South Africa and its 
government of white supremacy. The military coup in Portugal also brought the end of 
the Angolan Colonial War, which turned into the Angolan Civil War, and intensified the 
rivalry between the three Angolan rebel movements. These movements include the 
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Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the 
Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA), and they competed in taking over the seat of power in Luanda. The 
United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
also became involved in this regional conflict, and the Cold War theatre escalated in 
southern Africa into Angola. This inevitably meant participation of the allies of the USA 
and the USSR becoming involved, all looking after their own interests with their own 
political agendas, playing out in Angola and Namibia. 
 
The Angolan nationalist movement the MPLA, was founded in 1956 by a group of 
educated exiles mainly from Luanda, who believed that an armed struggle was the only 
solution to overthrow Portuguese colonialism and imperialism. Agostinho Neto, a 
member of the Mbundu tribe, born in a village near Luanda became one of the prominent 
leaders. Whilst studying medicine in Portugal, he became involved in Marxist, anti-
Salazar organizations. The MPLA formed a guerilla army in exile and received military 
training in Ghana, Morocco and Algeria from 1961, and weapons were supplied by many 
Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union. Military bases were opened in Zambia 
towards 1964.62 The military wing of the MPLA was called the People’s Armed Forces 
for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA).  
 
The main rival of the MPLA was the sub nationalist group the FNLA, with its history 
linked to the north of Angola. The FNLA had the same objectives as the MPLA, 
including national independence for Angola and the destruction of Portuguese 
colonialism and imperialism. Its ideology, regional base, foreign affiliations, ethnic 
cohesion and religious roots differed from the MPLA. The FNLA drew their support 
from the Bakango refugees in Zaire, and in 1960 Holden Roberto became its leader. In 
1961, a revolution amongst coffee plantation workers led to a colonial uprising and 
people fled into refugee camps in Zaire where they started seeking military bases, allies 
and weapons to create a guerilla army to resist the Portuguese colonialism and 
imperialism. Zaire was hospitable towards the FNLA and Roberto Holden married 
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Mobutu Sese Seko’s sister in law, creating a more permanent relationship with Zaire. The 
FNLA was threatened by the MPLA whose membership was better educated and more 
organized. Roberto Holden asked for support from the West, claiming to be anti-
communist. The USA, keen to develop anti-Soviet allies in Africa, gave military and 
financial support, South Africa gave support and China supplied weapons. The 
Organization for African Unity (OAU) recognized the FNLA as a provisional 
government in exile.63   
 
UNITA, the third rebel movement fighting against the Portuguese colonial rule in 
Angola, was formed by Jonas Savimbi in 1966. Savimbi was born to a prominent 
Ovimbundu family and received tertiary education abroad. UNITA’s regional focus was 
the highlands of the south and they mainly operated in the southern and eastern parts of 
Angola. The UNITA leadership was initially involved in the exiled political movements 
of both the MPLA and the FNLA, but different opinions led to their own political 
formation. UNITA initially gave support to PLAN guerillas wanting to infiltrate 
Namibia. They turned towards the West for support and stopped helping PLAN when 
they became an ally of South Africa, until the end of the Border War, supported by both 
the USA and South Africa, and fought alongside the SADF in Angola.64 
 
During this period of regional political instability in the mid 1970’s, South Africa’s   
Prime Minister John Vorster, changed strategy and became friendly towards African 
states. He started making secret visits to various African countries in an attempt to make 
friendly overtures which formed part of his African détente initiative. He wanted to 
prevent conflict in especially Rhodesia and Namibia, as well as preventing Marxist 
backed liberation movements to take over the rule in these countries. Further goals of his 
détente initiative were to establish relations with moderate African states to establish an 
economical block of southern African states and to gain membership from the OAU.65  
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In 1975, the Minister of Defence PW Botha, decided that the FNLA needs support in the 
form of weapons and military training to counter the MPLA forces in Angola, after asked 
for assistance by the USA, Zambia and Zaire. This led to South Africa becoming part of 
the anti-Marxist alliance to support both the FNLA and UNITA in Angola. Under the 
code name of Operation Savannah, this was the SADF’s first cross border operation into 
Angola. Jan Breytenbach, founding commander of 32 Battalion, was responsible for the 
training of the FNLA soldiers. The plan was to train and assist both the FNLA and 
UNITA until the election that was scheduled for November 1975. It was soon realized 
that the MPLA was a formidable force and the SADF was instructed to become military 
involved, in addition to training and giving assistance. General Constand Viljoen 
mentioned that it was never the intention of the SADF to capture Luanda. The aim was to 
apply pressure on the OAU, and put in place a government of national unity to avoid the 
MPLA to take over control, by using limited war efforts in the process.66  
 
Operation Savannah was a clandestine operation and the general public in South Africa 
was not aware or informed of its troops being deployed far from home. According to 
General Constand Viljoen, Jonas Savimbi and Roberto Holden also asked the SADF to 
keep it secret.67 National servicemen were not allowed to talk about the war, the policy 
around disclosing information was strict and it remained a secretive war until the end and 
long after. The majority of the soldiers were conscripts and the SADF was dependant on 
them to perform military duties in both Namibia and Angola. Since the early 1960’s, the 
SADF was viewed by Afrikaner leaders, alongside apartheid, as a guarantee for white 
supremacy.68 
  
In 1968, the SADF introduced a national service system whereby all white males from 
age 18 were subject to fulltime conscription for nine months. The period changed to one 
                                                 
66 Hamann, H. Days of the Generals, 2001, pp 25 – 32. 
Jan Breytenbach, interview, July 2007. 
67 Ibid, p 32. 
68 Warwick, R. White South Africa and Defence 1960 – 1968: Militarization, Threat Perceptions and 
Counter Strategies, PhD Thesis, Department of Historical Studies, University of Cape Town, 2009, p 34. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
44
44
year and eventually to two years service, followed by a number of military camps.69 The 
conscription was spearheaded by Commandant General Rudolph Hiemstra who played a 
decisive role in the restructuring of the SADF during the 1960’s in promoting Afrikaner 
interests and apartheid, advocating the SADF as a force to counter the perceived threat of 
Communism. The SADF was increasingly being popularized amongst the Afrikaners. It 
gradually entrenched every sector of South African society, starting at school level, 
mobilizing the white minority, focusing on Afrikaners. Failure to perform national 
service resulted in legal action and imprisonment, whilst the alternative option was self 
exile. Young school leavers getting killed in Namibia and Angola in a war that could not 
be sufficiently explained to the public was an uncomfortable and sensitive situation for 
the NP government, who depended on votes to remain in power. Many of the conscripts’ 
parents were NP supporters, and it was important to reinforce support for the 
government. 
 
War resistance emerged during the 1970’s when youth from mostly English speaking 
universities and churches became politicized and started objecting to compulsory military 
service. The resistance was based on moral and political objections to the role of the 
SADF inside and outside the country. Conscripts started failing to report for national 
service and between 1978 and 1982, twelve conscientious objectors were imprisoned for 
refusing to do national service because of political and religious beliefs. This led to the 
formation of the End Conscription Campaign (ECC) at the end of 1983, with the support 
limited to radical elements within the English universities and churches. In 1988, the NP 
government banned the ECC organization.70   
 
Divisions formed within the political sphere as to the reasons for South Africans to be 
involved in a war outside of their own country, and the government was criticized for 
waging war in the north of Namibia and southern Angola. Opponents to the government 
saw this as a foreign affairs fiasco. There are many reasons and theories about the SADF 
entering Angola in 1975 during Operation Savannah, and continuing with the war until 
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1989. John Vorster told Parliament the reason for the SADF being in Angola during 
Operation Savannah was to protect its Ruacana-Calueque hydro-electric scheme. In a 
Parliamentary speech a year after Operation Savannah, PW Botha mentioned that South 
Africa had to protect itself and its investments from Communist aggression and attacks 
from SWAPO guerillas concentrated in southern Angola. Cuba’s representative to the 
UN had a different perspective, and mentioned in a speech to the General Assembly that 
South Africa entered Angola with the intention of preventing the independence of 
Angola, and occupying the entire territory. Other political observers believed South 
Africa wanted to exploit Angola’s minerals and resources and believed the threat of 
Communism was only an excuse.71 Since Namibia was administered as a fifth province 
of South Africa, it claimed that it was protecting its territory from SWAPO who wanted 
to take over the rule in Namibia, which posed a Communist threat. It also wanted to 
prevent the MPLA of taking over the rule in Angola which posed a Communist threat, 
especially in the light of Cuba sending troops to Angola in support of the MPLA. 
 
According to Louis Bothma, the cause for the war should be found outside of the 
parameters of the Cold War and Communist threats. It should be explored within a wider 
historical context, starting with the annexation of Namibia by Germany in 1884. The first 
clash between South African forces and the Ovambo people was in 1917, and not in 
1966, stated as the official start of the Border War. The South Africans killed the 
Ovakwanyama tribe’s king, Mandume ya Ndemufayo, because he prevented them from 
exploiting Ovamboland’s labor force to work in the mines. The tombstones of the South 
African soldiers, who died in February 1917 at king Mandume’s kraal, can still be seen at 
St Mary’s Mission, a kilometer from the Angolan border. Locals living here related to 
Bothma that the Ovambo people don’t feel comfortable with the soldiers being buried 
amongst them, since they killed their king. Bothma reckons that South Africa lost the war 
long before the Cold War came into play.72 This article published in the local media to 
explain that the causes of the war should be found outside of the parameters of the Cold 
War, was in reaction to a Border War publication of 2011, Ons was daar – Wenners van 
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die oorlog om Suider-Afrika, edited by General Jannie Geldenhuys. This publication 
portrays the general belief that the SADF was fighting Communism during the Border 
War. The trade union Solidarity, who published the book, reacted strongly to Bothma’s 
opinion stating that he does not know his facts. In return, Bothma comments that he is 
open to criticism and opposing viewpoints from fellow soldiers, but not from trade union 
administrators that lacks military experience.73   
 
Journalist and author Rian Malan wrote a review of the publication under discussion. He 
summarizes the book as an attempt to portray the war as a Cold War clash between a 
Communist super power and the Boers and their allies. He reckons this viewpoint is 
insulting towards those who prefer to see it as a struggle between freedom fighters and 
apartheid racists. He does however consider the book to be an important contribution.74 
 
According to Jan Breytenbach, the reason for the SADF being in Angola was to prevent 
the Communists from taking over Angola, Namibia and eventually South Africa.75 The 
latter argument seems to be the most common explanation given by former PF members 
of the SADF. According to General Constand Viljoen, the reason why South Africa 
became involved in the internal affairs of Angola was because Zambia, Zaire and UNITA 
asked for help. He further mentioned that in the military it became clear that they should 
become part of Africa in line with Vorster’s détente strategy. Apart from the threat of 
Communism this was the most important reason for meddling in Angola.76  
 
The various opposing viewpoints are indicative of the varying emotions involved in the 
aftermath of the Border War. It is interesting to note that the most recent publication of 
the Border War, The SADF in the Border War 1966 – 1989, by Leopold Scholtz, 
published in 2013, again evoked intense emotion and varying viewpoints from the public, 
especially in reaction to book reviews on the publication. Comments are mostly restricted 
to the opinions of former conscripts and PF soldiers who romanticize the war and defend 
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any criticism towards it; former conscripts who tries to make sense of the war and suffer 
from war trauma, who asks if it was worth it, question why they had to fight in a war, and 
feels betrayed by the NP government whom they feel sold them out to the ANC; and 
lastly the liberal voices who objected to national service and criticize the Border War as a 
matter of principle.77 
 
In an essay where he tries to make sense of the Border War, Albert Venter identifies five 
political paradigms with which the Border War is analyzed, criticized, attacked and 
legitimized. They comprise of the total onslaught, the liberal opposition analysis, the 
struggle critique, the technical analyses and the radical critique. Under PW Botha’s rule 
(1978 – 1989), South Africa increasingly became more militarized and the security forces 
comprising the SADF and the SAP gained increased power. In 1977 the Department of 
Defence published a White Paper spelling out the belief that South Africa faced a total 
onslaught against the political system and the solution to counter this became known as 
the total strategy. The total strategy was fought internally against black resistance forces, 
and externally against Marxist backed neighboring states. The basis of the total onslaught 
against South Africa was the fear of black majority rule and the threat of Communism. 
One of the justifications to legitimize the Border War was the fear of the total onslaught 
against South Africa that needed to be countered by the total strategy. The liberal 
opposition criticized this viewpoint by arguing that the NP government attracts the total 
onslaught through maintaining the repressive laws of its policy of apartheid. They did not 
support the Border War and viewed it as a waste of money. The ANC and its military 
wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) was one of the main opponents in the total onslaught 
against South Africa. Throughout its struggle against apartheid, the ANC received 
support from Marxist backed countries. The ANC indirectly took part in the Border War 
because it had military camps in Angola and Tanzania. However, MK was never directly 
involved in a military war against the SADF. The importance of the ANC paradigm in 
relation to the Border War is that it is used in post apartheid South Africa to influence the 
historiography of the war. Public debates about who won the battle of Cuito Caunavale 
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started in 2008 to popularize the struggle history of the ANC and implicates that MK 
took part in this battle which they did not. Regarding the technical analyses of the Border 
War, Venter looked at the work of authors who analyzed the war purely from a military-
strategic-historical viewpoint and not seeking to justify it morally or otherwise. Authors 
include Chester Crocker, Willem Steenkamp and Helmoed Römer Heitman who supports 
the Border War within the wider context of the Cold War. They further view the Border 
War as a means for the military to buy time, in order for the politicians to find a political 
solution. Radical critical analysts that wrote about the Border War view it from within the 
total onslaught strategy which they criticize as a Communist plot orchestrated by 
Moscow. The SADF is portrayed as a group of officers being paranoid about 
Communism. They further view the Border War as protecting white and by implication 
Afrikaner rights within South Africa. Although the SADF claims to be non-political, the 
radical critical analysts view the organization as an extension of the apartheid state and 
NP political leadership. According to Venter, the aforementioned paradigms to explain 
and justify the Border War can be reduced to one reason: to protect the white minority 
political rule against a black majority political rule.78   
 
When Angola became independent in November 1975, the MPLA came to power, 
supported by the Soviet Union, various Eastern European countries and Cuba supplying 
most of the troops for the civil war. The USA supported FNLA, who in turn formed an 
alliance with UNITA. MPLA supported SWAPO and the situation enabled them to set up 
military and refugee camps in southern Angola from where it was easier to launch attacks 
into northern Namibia (Ovamboland) and the Caprivi. This also led to an increase in 
young people leaving Namibia to join the struggle for independence. With Angola and 
Mozambique having Soviet backed governments in place, the Communist threat 
increased for South Africa. The military support from the Soviet Union and Cuba to the 
MPLA, SWAPO and the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) was a concerning 
factor for the SADF. Algeria, Egypt, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Soviet Union, China, 
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North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba were all involved at one stage or another in helping the 
southern African liberation movements.79     
 
After the Soweto student uprising in June 1976 that escalated throughout South Africa, 
the political situation and climate in southern Africa changed rapidly. This led to an 
increase of ANC youth leaving the country for exile, joining the military training camps 
in Angola and Tanzania. From here they could infiltrate back to South Africa to take part 
in the urban war fighting against apartheid. Politically, South Africa increasingly became 
more isolated and Vorster’s attempt to establish relations with African states failed.80  
 
When the SADF withdrew from Angola after Operation Savannah in March 1976, 
UNITA and the FNLA were left largely to fend for themselves. The soldiers from FNLA 
were mostly taken in by 32 Battalion who used them as troops in their fighter platoons. 
Those not taken in disappeared as a military force. UNITA withdrew into the south-
eastern corner of Angola and built a capital in the bush at Jamba, where they started to 
regroup and organize themselves.81 Until the end of the Border War in 1989, UNITA was 
aligned with the SADF from whom they received support. The stage was now set for a 
new era and strategy within the SADF, and the main enemy that they fought in Angola 
and northern Namibia was PLAN.  
 
In 1977, the Western Contact Group was formed by Western members of the UN 
Security Council including Canada, France, West Germany, United Kingdom and the 
USA. The group’s aim was to find a solution to the Namibian transition to independence. 
South Africa had reservations and wanted all Cuban soldiers first to withdraw from 
Angola. South Africa was concerned that Namibia will become another safe haven for the 
ANC and SWAPO, from where they could enter South Africa. At the time, Namibia was 
also going through political changes. In September 1977, Dirk Mudge broke away from 
the ruling white National Party to form the Republican Party which formed alliances with 
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political parties from other race groups. In 1978, Andreas Shipanga, a SWAPO stalwart 
returned from exile, broke away from SWAPO and formed the SWAPO Democrats 
which became part of the Namibian National Front. In September 1977, meetings 
between the Western Contact Group and South Africa ended without any agreements 
being reached. In February 1978 at a meeting in New York with South African Foreign 
Affairs, Sam Nujoma said that SWAPO was not interested in taking part in elections. 
SWAPO’s aim was to take over control in Namibia, and would do everything in their 
power to disrupt and wreck the negotiation process.82 According to Ep van Lill, a former 
PF SADF soldier who often conducted cross border operations for the duration of the 
war, and part of the rescue operation that were tasked to find Van der Mescht after his 
capture: “SWAPO was informed that South Africa wanted to negotiate, but they preferred 
violence instead”.83 Similar statements were repeated during various interviews with 
former PF and conscripts from the SADF. It is indicative of the general belief system 
within the SADF at the time; SWAPO was a terrorist organization resorting to violence 
and killing innocent people and the SADF had to protect its public from the terrorists.      
 
In 1978, the UN introduced Resolution 435 for settling the Namibian problem. It called 
for a cease fire and holding of elections in Namibia under UN supervision, and 
withdrawal of the SADF troops from Namibia, which ultimately led to the independence 
of Namibia in March 1990. These were all important developments taking place in 
Namibia whilst the war between the SADF and PLAN intensified.  
 
It is necessary to set the political situation in southern Africa at the time into the context 
of the Cold War that was playing out in the region. As African countries started to gain 
their independence from colonial rule and waves of nationalism spread throughout Africa 
in the 1950’s and 1960’s, the USA and Soviet Union started competing in Africa. Both 
had an interest in Africa due to the many resources available. The Angolan Civil War 
running parallel to the Border War, created the opportunity for the USA and Soviet 
Union to compete with each other in southern Africa. The Soviet Union assisted African 
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countries with the liberation and fight for independence from colonial rule, mostly 
through military training and supplies of military hardware. Supporting the struggle of 
people for national liberation and social progress was confirmed as one of the aims of 
Soviet foreign policy in the USSR Constitution of 1977.84 In October 1976, Agostinho 
Neto and Leonid Brezhnev signed a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation in Moscow. 
In addition to this treaty, Angola signed a series of political, economical and military 
agreements with Cuba, East Germany and Bulgaria. The agreements with Cuba led to 
thousands of Cuban troops and advisors being sent to Angola.85    
 
Shubin reckons that there is a tendency to look at the conflict in Angola, from the 
perspective of rivalry between the Soviet Union and USA during the Cold War, as the 
only factor, especially by Western academics. It was definitely a factor, but the Soviet 
Union did not only assist because of the Cold War. It formed part of the world anti-
imperialist struggle, waged by the socialist community, the national liberation 
movements and the working class of the capitalist countries. For the Soviet Union, the 
global struggle was not a battle between the two super powers and their allies, but a 
united fight of the world’s progressive forces against imperialism.86   
 
MPLA leaders visited the Soviet Union in July 1961, on invite from the Solidarity 
Committee. The meeting raised financial assistance and provision of arms to the MPLA, 
as well as training of party cadres in the Soviet Union. This was the beginning of 
assistance given to the MPLA to fight for independence in Angola. The interest from the 
USA in the Portuguese colonies was primarily strategic as the Portuguese islands off the 
African coast were important for Western air communications. Co-operation between 
Portugal and the leading Western countries took place within NATO structures.87 Archive 
documents and oral sources prove that Cuba made its own decision to become involved 
in the Angolan conflict, and Cuba was not acting as Soviet proxies. In 1975, Fidel Castro 
initiated Cuban armed support for the MPLA without Moscow’s agreement or 
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knowledge.88 According to Shubin, detailed history of the Soviet Union’s military 
involvement and relations with the Angolan liberation movements, as in the rest of Africa 
still has to be written. The information has been withheld from the public for many years 
in the USSR and abroad and not always accessible.89 
 
The USA had a global approach and saw the regional conflicts in southern Africa, 
Central America and South East Asia as global confrontations with the USSR. Since 
South Africa was threatened by the Soviet’s involvement in southern Africa, it became an 
ally of the USA, although the USA could not acknowledge it publicly. Varying opinions 
in the USA prevailed about the conflict with the Soviet Union in southern Africa and 
aligning with apartheid South Africa against the Communist threat. When President 
Ronald Reagan took over office in the USA in 1981, together with his African Affairs 
adviser Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker, they abandoned the critical 
approach to South Africa adopted by the Carter regime. Chester Crocker was clear on 
how the USA viewed its role in southern Africa. Its intention was to protect Western 
interests and ensuring access to mineral wealth and the Cape shipping routes.90 They 
embarked on the constructive engagement process through extensive political 
consultations with all the role players. Periodic rounds of talks were held in Paris, New 
York, London and various African capitals between 1983 and 1988 between the West and 
East, to try and resolve the war in Angola and transfer of power in Namibia. Throughout 
this period, Reagan continued the global struggle with the Soviet Union, was sympathetic 
towards South Africa, and hostile towards the ANC and other liberation movements in 
Africa.91  
 
Wars are seldom won through military intervention, and political will is often the 
decisive factor in determining the winner. International pressure on South Africa to end 
apartheid increased towards the late 1980’s, and was one of the contributing factors 
towards additional momentum to the peace negotiations to put an end to the Border War   
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and subsequent transfer of power in Namibia. The peace process was negotiated by 
politicians and high ranking military officers, far removed from the operational area. The 
various participants of the Border War continuous to debate on who won the war, and 
there are various opposing viewpoints. With regards to the two opposing forces relevant 
for the dissertation being the SADF and SWAPO, both claim to have won the war. 
Leopold Scholtz is of the opinion that the only manner in which to determine and 
conclude who won the Border War is to identify each participant’s objectives and 
measure whether it was met. Regarding SWAPO’s main objective of gaining majority 
rule in Namibia; it did become the ruling party of Namibia in 1990, but fell short of its 
intended two-thirds majority. Regarding South Africa’s main objective if it is reduced to 
the core intention of remaining the status quo; it could be argued that the NP government 
handed over political power to the ANC. This is however a contentious issue amongst 
many former soldiers and the general sentiment is that the NP government sold them out 
to the ANC. Similarly, the white, mostly Afrikaner establishment, is still getting to terms 
with the loss of political power. General Constand Viljoen mentioned that the aim of the 
Border War was never to win but to stop the spread of Communism in southern Africa, 
which the SADF succeeded in doing.92 
 
It was during this period of complex political dynamics and conflict taking place in 
southern Africa, that SWAPO embarked on a strategy to counter the military strength of 
the SADF. As a consequence, PLAN increased its guerilla activities against the SADF in 
northern Namibia and southern Angola, and one of these planned military operations led 
to the successful capture of Van der Mescht in February 1978.  
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Chapter 3: Van der Mescht’s capture and subsequent imprisonment in Angola   
 
This chapter explores SWAPO’s strategy towards 1978 to counter the SADF’s attempts 
to keep PLAN soldiers from infiltrating into Ovamboland with their strong military force. 
It discusses SWAPO’s propaganda strategy intending to capture SADF soldiers which 
they referred to as Boers.93 It further describes the background and planning of the attack 
on the waterhole near Elundu in Ovamboland where Van der Mescht was captured, and 
his imprisonment in Angola as a POW. The International Rules of Law embodied in the 
Geneva Convention pertaining to POWs is briefly discussed. Reference is made to other 
POWs imprisoned in Angola during the Border War as well as reference to South 
Africans held as POWs during previous wars, dating back to the Anglo Boer War (1899 – 
1902). The SADF’s reaction on the capture of Van der Mescht, including the results of 
the Board of Enquiry after the attack will be interrogated, in the light of the incident that 
was destined to have major ramifications.  
 
Towards 1978, the war fought in Ovamboland and the south of Angola between the 
SADF and PLAN intensified. PLAN operated as a guerilla force and conducted their war 
within the parameters of guerilla tactics which do not end quickly through military action, 
and often needs to be resolved through political negotiation. Although the SADF 
conducted a counterinsurgency campaign to get back at PLAN, theoretically it was 
structured as a conventional armed force and had many advantages over PLAN. They 
were well equipped, having access to military hardware including helicopters, fighter 
aircraft and various armored vehicles; infrastructure, resources and equipment that PLAN 
could not match. The advantage that PLAN had over the SADF was that they knew the 
operational area very well and could operate in small mobile groups. SWAPO members 
were mostly drawn from Ovamboland and received support by means of food, shelter and 
information from the local population in the area of operation. PLAN conducted guerilla 
warfare using small groups of foot soldiers who moved fast, and is almost the equivalent 
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of the Boer commandos in the Anglo Boer War. 32 Battalion, who operated as foot 
soldiers in Ovamboland and the south of Angola at the time, observed that SWAPO 
became more aggressive and started moving in bigger groups to look for contact with the 
enemy and increasingly gained more military success. PLAN bases in the south of 
Angola were difficult to detect, the locations often moved and the guerillas commonly 
attacked by surprise which left the SADF in a position of vulnerability.94 Ep van Lill 
comments: “PLAN was an enemy that frustrated us because we never knew where they 
were going to attack next. Our tactical information was limited”.95 Interviews with 
various former SADF conscripts and PF members serving on the border between 
Namibia and Angola during this period confirmed that PLAN was “an armed force to 
reckon with”. Martin Shalli summarized it aptly: “No amount of machines can defeat 
people who are committed and united in a common purpose”.96 
 
Against this background, SWAPO embarked on a strategy to counter the military strength 
of the SADF. Towards the end of 1977, Sam Nujoma, the leader of SWAPO and 
commander-in-chief of PLAN, gave the direct order to capture a Boer. The purpose was 
to use the captured enemy as propaganda to further the liberation struggle of SWAPO, 
with the intent to impact negatively on the morale of the military strength of the SADF. 
Nujoma was concerned about the many SWAPO members taken prisoner by the SADF 
and urged PLAN to counter the situation.97 At that stage the NP government imprisoned a 
number of SWAPO members in Pretoria and Robben Island under the Terrorism Act, and 
held them as political prisoners. SWAPO prisoners were not given the status of POWs 
because they were viewed by the government as terrorists committing illegal acts. One of 
the founder members of SWAPO, Herman Toivo ya Toivo was arrested in Namibia in 
1966 and held in detention in Pretoria for nine months before he was brought to trial. He 
was allegedly tortured throughout this period, according to SWAPO’s Department of 
Information and Publicity.98 In 1979, SWAPO uncovered a concentration centre at 
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Hardapdam near Mariental in the south of Namibia, where as many as 140 SWAPO 
members, allegedly captured during the Cassinga raid, was held in appalling conditions 
and tortured by the SADF.99  
   
Ashipala told Nujoma that he would try his best to capture a Boer, since he specialized in 
reconnaissance tactics. The operation was planned by the command structure of PLAN’s 
northeast front at Oihapeto which served as both headquarter and military base. Oihapeto 
is approximately 25 kilometers north of the cut line (border between Angola and Nambia) 
in Angola. The regional commander at the time was Mbulanganga Ndakolo; Chief of 
Staff, Charles Namoloh, whose battle name was Ho-Chi-Min, adopted from the Chinese 
Cultural Revolution, inspired by Mao Zedong; Chief of Operations, Martin Shalli; Chief 
of Engineering, Martin Nashandi.100 
  
Ashipala started conducting reconnaissance in Ovamboland to find a suitable target 
where the South African soldiers could be captured. Hosea Martin, an informer living in a 
local village, suggested the waterhole next to his village as a possible target. The 
waterhole was used by the SADF and permanently guarded. The geographic location of 
the waterhole; absence of physical barriers and structures for protection such as sandbags, 
walls and underground bunkers; made it an open target, vulnerable to a possible attack. 
Ashipala studied the routine and activities of the SADF soldiers around the waterhole and 
noticed poor discipline. The absence of physical security structures combined with the 
poor discipline of the SADF soldiers were the decisive factors in choosing this target. 
The tactic decided upon for the operation was to make the nearby SADF bases Eenhana 
and Elundu the primary targets, and the waterhole the secondary target. The plan was to 
create chaos at Eenhana and Elundu to give Ashipala’s group the chance to capture the 
SADF soldiers and allow enough time to retreat to Angola. The attack would start with 
the shelling of Eenhana and Elundu after midnight, thereafter attacking the waterhole. A 
strong artillery presence, commanded by Martin Shalli, would be positioned on the cut 
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line to stop the SADF from following Ashipala and his captives. It was decided to capture 
a number of four SADF soldiers at the waterhole.101 
  
Soldiers were selected from various PLAN units to take part in the operation. Ashipala 
trained a group of 30 soldiers for the attack on the waterhole. The operation had as a 
result the more structured formation of PLAN’s unit of reconnaissance soldiers. The unit 
was named Volcano at the time and renamed Typhoon at a later stage, commanded by 
Ashipala, who subsequently became the Chief of Reconnaissance for the duration of the 
war.102  
 
Completely oblivious to all of this, Van der Mescht received call up papers in December 
1977 to perform a three month military camp on the border. This would have been his 
last camp. At the time the 22 year old Van der Mescht, his wife Cheryl and nine month 
old baby daughter Chantal was living in Sishen in the Northern Cape with his parents. 
Van der Mescht was an apprentice boiler maker working for Iscor. He left Sishen by train 
for border duty on 4 January 1978, reported at Grootfontein and eventually reached 
Elundu on 15 January, where he was to be deployed for the next three months.103 
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Elundu is situated on the border of Angola towards the east of the operational area.  
Courtesy of Louis Bothma. 
  
 
Elundu was a small base approximately 10 kilometers south of the cut line, 25 kilometers 
east from Eenhana and positioned within the east of the operational area of Ovamboland. 
Elundu was initially a temporary base for infantry soldiers conducting patrols in the area 
and served as a logistical station for cross-border operations into southern Angola. When 
the water pipes at Elundu were sabotaged by PLAN in December 1977, a waterhole was 
dug approximately 2 kilometers from Elundu, next to a local village, to provide water to 
the many soldiers operating in the area. The primary task of Van der Mescht and his 
colleague Sapper Gerrit Nel, was to purify the water for human consumption. There were 
no physical structures at the site, except for one tent that served as sleeping quarters for 
both Van der Mescht and Nel.   
 
Waterhole at Elundu, an open target for possible attack. 
Photo courtesy of Louis Bothma. 
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In December 1977, A Company, 54 Battalion, a camp of 2 South African Infantry (2 
SAI) was moved from Walvis Bay to Elundu. The battalion group under the command of 
Lieutenant Flip de Witt was stationed at Elundu with the aim of patrolling the operational 
area, and to protect the nearby waterhole. At the time 2 SAI shared the base with 32 
Battalion, who operated their tactical headquarter from Elundu. Nine infantry soldiers 
provided permanent protection at the waterhole and rotated at weekly intervals. Cattle, 
livestock and local people from the adjacent village also made use of the waterhole for 
their water supplies. The daily presence of people from the village made Van der Mescht 
uncomfortable as he suspected they might be studying the routine for intelligence 
purposes. Shortly before sunset on 18 February 1978, nine infantry soldiers from 2 SAI, 
under the command of temporary section leader Rifleman Hannes Ferreira, arrived at the 
waterhole to take over the protection from the previous section.104 
    
On 18 February 1978, PLAN was ready for the operation they have been planning 
meticulously the past few months. PLAN often attacked in the early hours of the morning 
during full moon when it is easy to approach the target in moonlight, and attacked upon 
the moon going down. On Sunday 19 February around 3h00 in the morning, Ashipala and 
30 men approached the waterhole. The attack group was split into two with one group 
positioned on the northern wall of the waterhole right across the tent. This was the 
support group that had to fire on the tent and neutralize the only Bren machine gun 
position. The second group, with Ashipala in the front, took position west of the tent. The 
attack group was in position too early and Ashipala waited for Eenhana to be shelled so 
he could start the attack on the waterhole. Getting the signal from Eenhana took longer 
than anticipated and Ashipala was getting concerned that it would be light before they 
could retreat to Angola. He was also concerned about the movements of the men on duty. 
Movement towards the tent suggested that they might have been aware of PLAN’s 
presence. The moon went down and Ashipala decided to start the attack without waiting 
for Eenhana’s shelling. He used a stick to beat on his AK47 machine gun to give the 
signal for attacking. Intense fire came from the support group towards the tent, and 
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Ashipala threw hand grenades at the tent.105 Kamati ka Elio, the troop that physically 
picked up Van der Mescht, recalls Ashipala’s command: “Forward, forward, capture the 
enemy, capture the enemy”. As Ashipala’s group moved towards the tent, the fire from 
the north turned towards neutralizing the Bren machine gun.  
 
Van der Mescht was shot and wounded by shrapnel from the hand grenades thrown into 
the tent. He crawled out of the tent and was lying between the tent and the waterhole 
when Ashipala instructed ka Elio to pick him up.106 Equipment such as radios, clothing 
and ammunition were raided during the attack.107 Ashipala and his men managed to 
capture two soldiers, including Van der Mescht. Ashipala relates that “the second soldier 
who was caught was big, obnoxious and refused to co- operate”. As a result, he was 
killed a few hundred meters from the tent by the section leader, Commander Haufiku.108 
Hannes Ferreira’s body was ripped apart by an AK47 machine gun and finished off with 
several bayonet stabs.109 Van der Mescht was carried away by Ashipala’s group on a 
stretcher, made by wooden poles taken from the village and a sleeping bag looted from 
the tent.      
 
After the attack, the PLAN unit again split into two groups to retreat back to Angola. 
Ashipala’s group used different directions towards the cut line to deter the enemy and 
avoid contact as was instructed by him during the training phase. The group under the 
command of Haufiku didn’t follow the instructions and made their way directly north 
towards the cut line. 32 Battalion picked up the tracks and set an ambush, killing Haufiko 
and another PLAN soldier.110 Ashipala was very upset with Haufiku’s actions and the 
                                                 
105 Danger Ashipala, interview, October 2009, December 2009. 
106 Kamati ka Elio, interview, December 2009. 
107 2MG, Box 156, Ops Hoёr IN/UIT, Ref Q/OPS/693/24 Feb 78, Documentation Centre, Department of 
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108 Danger Ashipala, interview, October 2009, December 2009.  
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killing of Ferreira, a few hundred meters from the waterhole. He believed it could have 
been avoided, if his instructions were followed.111     
 
During the attack, two of the infantry soldiers ran back to Elundu to find help. No one 
was allowed to go back to the waterhole until daybreak, for fear of landmines on the road 
and a possible ambush by PLAN. Shortly after daybreak, the six wounded and two dead 
soldiers were picked up by helicopter from the waterhole and transported to Grootfontein 
and later to 1 Military Hospital in Pretoria.112 When it was discovered that Van der 
Mescht was missing, Allouette helicopters, also referred to as gun ships were dispatched 
from Oshakati to do a search and rescue operation.113 The retreating PLAN soldiers were 
detected from the air and the helicopters circled above them. When Van der Mescht 
waved at the helicopter to alert them of his presence, Ashipala held an AK47 machine 
gun to his head and told him if he tries it again he will be killed.114 The helicopters had to 
turn around and cease the air operation.       
 
Three hours after the attack, a group of paratroopers were dropped at the waterhole to 
assist with a search and rescue operation on foot to find Van der Mescht, which was 
unsuccessful.115 32 Battalion continued to do a land search and rescue operation to find 
Van der Mescht, in addition to retaliation of the PLAN attack. When they reached the cut 
line to enter Angola, they found PLAN’s strong artillery presence under the command of 
Martin Shalli. A brief skirmish took place and 32 Battalion had to retreat without finding 
Van der Mescht.116     
                                                 
111 Danger Ashipala, interview, October 2009, December 2009. 
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114 Danger Ashipala, interview, October 2009, December 2009. 
Johan van der Mescht, interview, 2007 – 2009. 
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116 Eddie Viljoen, interview, October 2009. Former SADF PF member and attached to 32 Battalion in a 
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Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
62
62
 
32 Battalion operational area, 1976 – 1980. 
Elundu and waterhole clearly marked on the left, bottom of map. 
Courtesy of Louis Bothma. 
 
Ashipala ensured that the wounded Van der Mescht was looked after well. For the 
propaganda strategy and operation to be successful, it was crucial that Van der Mescht 
was kept alive. Only one SADF soldier was captured as opposed to the intended four. 
After crossing the cut line, Van der Mescht was transported to Oihapeto by vehicle and 
handed over by Ashipala to his commanders. He was successful in his mission to capture 
a Boer, and continued with his war efforts until the end of the war in 1989. Van der 
Mescht did not remain at Oihapeto since the command structure knew the SADF would 
come looking for him. He was moved to Cassinga, approximately 250 kilometers north of 
the cut line in Angola. At Cassinga, he was kept in a hut for a few days and interrogated 
by SWAPO senior command. It was evident that Van der Mescht was just an ordinary 
conscript who was doing his border duty and had limited information available. It did not 
matter since the purpose was to use him as a propaganda tool and not for military 
intelligence.117 From Cassinga, Van der Mescht was moved to Lubango, another SWAPO 
base. 
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Upon the failed land and air search and rescue missions, the SADF senior command 
instructed a major rescue follow-up operation to find Van der Mescht. The task was given 
to a mechanized infantry battalion, Battle Group Juliet, under the command of Joep 
Joubert, code named Operation Striker. This was Battle Group Juliet’s first combat 
experience and Ep van Lill was in command of the Ratel infantry combat vehicles. In 
addition to the Ratel vehicles, Eland armored combat vehicles and G2 guns accompanied 
the battle group. Eddie Viljoen, senior officer at 32 Battalion, accompanied the group 
since he was familiar with the operational terrain in southern Angola. Battle Group Juliet 
left Oshivelo in Ovamboland on Sunday afternoon for Eenhana where they waited until 
Tuesday 21 February to enter Angola, two days after the capture of Van der Mescht.118 
 
Political decision making by the NP government to authorize entry into Angola, 
preparing the equipment and clearing the roads from landmines by the Kimberley 
Regiment all contributed to the delay in the rescue response.119 It was the first time that 
the Ratel vehicles operated in southern Angola, the unit had no experience and the 
equipment was not adequate for the terrain. A light wingspan aircraft moved with the 
ground forces to help navigate through the dense vegetation. Despite the air support, the 
vehicles got stuck in trenches in temporary PLAN bases and had to be towed out. It 
became a logistical challenge to continue.120 The instruction given was to destroy the 
PLAN bases of Nutalala and Eengosha and advance as far as Oihapeto and then return, 
with or without Van der Mescht. At Oihapeto, PLAN and the SADF fired at each other, 
Van der Mescht was not found and Battle Group Juliet returned to Namibia the following 
day on 22 February.121 Shalli says of the battle at Oihapeto and attempt by the SADF to 
find Van der Mescht: “I don’t know who won the battle, probably both of us won, if you 
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like, depending on what the objective was. Their aim was to recapture Van der Mescht. 
They did not. Our aim was to prevent them from capturing him. So now you judge who 
won”.122 
 
During the time of Van der Mescht’s capture, Nordic countries supported the liberation 
movements in southern Africa. In 1962 the Nordic countries launched their first joint aid 
project in Tanganyika (Tanzania). The motivation for both Sweden and Norway to 
contribute towards development aid for Third World Countries stems from their 
respective security consideration in the post Second World War period. Small countries 
concerned with creating peace and stability within the international political arena viewed 
development aid as a good investment for a peaceful future, in addition to gaining 
influence. Both Sweden and Norway’s involvement in the UN provided an arena where 
they could co-operate, and together gain influence on international politics. Another 
motivation behind development aid was moral obligations and international solidarity 
with international socialism as the broad ideology whereupon these ideals were based. 
Sweden’s support was the most prominent of all the Nordic countries, and served as a 
bridge between southern African liberation movements and the West.123 
 
Swedish Television was tasked to join SWAPO activities in order to film their war efforts 
to use for propaganda purposes, and raise awareness about the liberation struggle. This 
task was given to a Swedish journalist and filmmaker Per Sanden, who started working 
with SWAPO in 1972, assisted by a few colleagues. Subsequently, Per Sanden remained 
with SWAPO and is still a member today, traveling between his home in Stockholm and 
Windhoek. When Van der Mescht was moved to Lubango after his capture, Sanden was 
instructed to interview and film him, assisted by his colleague Tommy Bergh. A photo of 
Van der Mescht surrounded by three PLAN soldiers was sent throughout the world as 
part of the SWAPO propaganda strategy. Van der Mescht was under the impression that 
Sanden came to rescue him, but was informed by Sanden that they are Swedish 
journalists covering the war in support of SWAPO. Van der Mescht was very shocked 
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and traumatized and Sanden felt pity for his situation. He was in no position to offer him 
hope or do anything for him, other than giving him assurance that SWAPO will not cause 
him any harm nor kill him, since they keep him for propaganda purposes.124 
 
Van der Mescht surrounded by PLAN guerillas. Directly to his right is Martin Shalli. 
Photo courtesy of Per Sanden.  
  
Questions asked to Van der Mescht in the interview included: reason for the SADF 
making war against SWAPO in Namibia; will SWAPO gain power in Namibia; why was 
Van der Mescht doing border duty for the SADF in Namibia; what happened during the 
attack on 19 February 1978.125 Sanden says he could tell that Van der Mescht was not 
honest in his interview and that he was trying to please SWAPO for the fear of getting 
killed. In a letter written to Cheryl shortly after he was captured, Van der Mescht 
mentioned that he lied in the interview with the Swedish journalist. He was concerned 
that she would see the interview and wanted to alert her to the fact that he tried to protect 
himself and his family at home. Sanden sent the filmed interview to London where the 
material was edited by the BBC and distributed throughout the world. The BBC 
broadcast the filmed interview on 9 May 1978, including extracts of the Cassinga 
massacre that took place on 4 May 1978.126  
 
On Wednesday night 22 February 1978, Cheryl was informed by a police constable at her 
parents’ home in Boksburg that Van der Mescht was missing on the border, and that his 
whereabouts are unknown. At the time, she was visiting her parents whilst she was 
waiting for Van der Mescht to return home to Sishen. Van der Mescht’s parents were   
not at home either and visiting relatives in the Western Transvaal. The SADF had 
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challenges locating both Cheryl and Van der Mescht’s parents and they were given late 
notice as a result. The available contact address was that of the house in Sishen. It was 
SADF policy to inform relatives of a missing soldier within 48 hours after the incident. 
On 23 February, the SADF issued an internal statement that confirmed that Van der 
Mescht was taken POW during contact on 19 February at 04h00 in the morning, and that 
follow up operations were unsuccessful thus far.127 The office of the Minister of Defence 
sent a letter to Cheryl on 24 February stating that the SADF shares her concern about her 
husband’s whereabouts and will support her during this difficult period. The Minister 
requested the SADF to ensure that Cheryl and Chantal are taken care of regarding welfare 
and financial matters.128 On 25 February, Cheryl was officially informed by the SADF 
that Van der Mescht was captured and being held by SWAPO as a POW.  
 
A welfare officer from the SADF, Major van Wyk, was appointed to take care of Cheryl 
and Chantal in terms of financial and emotional wellbeing. Throughout the period of Van 
der Mescht’s imprisonment, Major van Wyk visited Cheryl on a monthly basis, in 
addition to regular telephone calls to make sure she is comfortable. Cheryl did not return 
to Van der Mescht’s parents in Sishen and decided to remain with her own parents in 
Boksburg. She received Van der Mescht’s monthly salary from the SADF as well as his 
monthly salary from Iscor for the duration of his imprisonment, which enabled her and 
Chantal’s financial needs to be met. In 1981, Cheryl had to move out of her parents’ 
home and found alternative accommodation paid for by the SADF. The agreement was 
that the SADF would pay the rent until Cheryl found employment, which she did, later 
that year.129  
 
Shortly after the incident where Van der Mescht was captured, a Board of Enquiry was 
convened by the SADF on 28 February to investigate the successful attack on the 
waterhole. It was found that three soldiers were killed, five wounded and one captured 
during the incident. Hannes Ferreira and Rifleman R.O. Hunter were killed. Rifleman H. 
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Bosh were wounded and died from his injuries a while later. Sapper Gerrit Nel, Riflemen 
T. Buchwald, F.C. Bezuidenhout, H.A. Aspeling and J.P. Coertze were wounded. 
Rifleman J.H.S. de Lange was unharmed and fled to Elundu for help during the attack. 
Rifleman de Beer had no physical scars and also fled to Elundu with de Lange during the 
attack, however he was sent back to South Africa because his mental health 
deteriorated.130  
 
The summary of the Board of Enquiry found that the discipline of 2 SAI soldiers, under 
the command of 54 Battalion deployed to protect the waterhole, was bad and the morale 
was low. During the period of the attack, the national service was extended from one to 
two years, and many of the conscripts had to remain doing border duty and could not 
return home as was expected. The military command possibly never considered the 
impact of the extension of military service on the morale of conscripts. For logistical 
support 2 SAI based at Elundu resorted under Eenhana, and for operational support under 
Onkankolo, creating confusion and limitations to the logistical capacity and support. 
Lieutenant de Witt, the company commander had no operational and limited command 
experience. He had to divide his attention between the management of logistics and 
tactical responsibilities. Soldiers did not have access to enough weapons and ammunition 
to protect the waterhole, and only one Bren machine gun was positioned on a wall for fire 
support. There was no access to sandbags or equipment to build barriers for protection 
either. The lack of adequate weapons and the geographic location made the waterhole an 
easy and open target for a possible enemy attack. The lack of logistical support in Elundu 
included late delivery of letters, inadequate food rations and the absence of a canteen to 
buy basic items such as cool drinks and cigarettes. The tents that served as sleeping 
quarters at Elundu were in a bad state and conscripts mostly slept on the sand. There was 
a lack of recreational facilities and down time for soldiers at Elundu. Protecting the 
waterhole was a welcome break and perceived as down time where the infantry soldiers 
relaxed, played in the water and sat around a camp fire at night. These were all 
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contributing factors to the low morale and ill discipline of the soldiers responsible for 
guarding the waterhole that contributed to the successful attack.131  
 
The Board of Enquiry found that Lieutenant de Witt, company commander, was held 
directly responsible for the successful attack on the waterhole. The tactical protection of 
the waterhole was his responsibility. There were no standing orders, defence plan or 
procedures in place to protect the waterhole in the event of an attack. De Witt visited the 
waterhole a few times, but never enquired or initiated standing orders for protection of 
the location. He left this responsibility to his platoon commanders and failed to take 
responsibility himself. De Witt was more concerned to solve logistical problems than the 
tactical situation at the waterhole. He lacked the necessary training and experience of 
tactical warfare that would have enabled him to focus on the protection of the 
waterhole.132 
 
The Board found that Second Lieutenant M.J. van Niekerk, the second in command from 
2 SAI, was held directly responsible for the successful attack on the waterhole. Sections 
protecting the waterhole rotated on a weekly basis. On the night of 18 February, a new 
section under the command of Corporal J.S. Dryden was deployed at the waterhole. He 
didn’t feel well and requested permission from Van Niekerk to remain in the base. Van 
Niekerk approved of Dryden remaining at Elundu and left the responsibility to hand over 
command to Dryden who gave the acting command position to Ferreira, who had no 
leadership or tactical experience. Van Niekerk didn’t have time to assist in a tactical 
briefing of protecting the waterhole because he had to manage incoming rations that he 
deemed more important. The Board found that Dryden was held indirectly responsible for 
the successful attack on the waterhole. By remaining in the base because of a minor 
illness he neglected his responsibility as section leader and handed over to an 
inexperienced person, without giving clear instructions.133 
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The Board found that Rifleman Ferreira from 2 SAI, the acting section leader who was 
killed during the attack, was held directly responsible for the successful attack on the 
waterhole. He instructed two soldiers to be on guard duty together between 22h00 to 
6h00, rotating on an hourly basis; one positioned at the Bren machine gun, the other a 
roving guard. The Bren machine gun was the only defence position at the waterhole, 
placed on a wall. There were no sandbags or other equipment to protect and cover in the 
event of an attack, and the waterhole was an open target. It is clear that the weaponry and 
defence at the waterhole was inadequate. De Lange, who guarded the Bren at the time of 
the attack, testified that the position was not conducive to shooting and defending and the 
Bren could thus not be used effectively during the attack. It was not tested before guard 
duty started either. De Lange fell asleep in his position at the Bren at 03h00 and only 
woke up during the attack. The tent was the sleeping quarters of the two engineering 
(Sappers) soldiers only. The infantry soldiers protecting the waterhole had to sleep at 
their respective guard duty locations surrounding the waterhole, and not in the tent. 
However, it was found that they often slept in the tent which was also the case on the 
night of the attack. Soldiers on duty, patrolling at night, were not allowed to take off their 
uniform and boots. It was found that some of the soldiers removed their boots on the 
night of the attack, which further indicates the ill discipline at the waterhole.134 
 
The position that the Board of Enquiry took towards Ferreira is alarming. Not only was 
he killed during the incident, but he was given a responsibility that he was clearly not 
equipped to handle. The fact that there were a lack of ammunition and no barriers 
surrounding the location was not his responsibility as a junior conscript. One would 
expect that he would have been excused for his lack of tactical leadership considering he 
had no combat experience, nor training, and had to take responsibility in a more senior 
person’s place.    
 
The Board of Enquiry recommended disciplinary action against the people held 
responsible for the successful attack on the waterhole. The incident had a far reaching 
impact affecting many people over many years.  
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Two weeks after his capture, Cheryl wrote a letter to Nujoma where she appealed for Van 
der Mescht’s release. She wrote: “My daughter of nine months and I miss him more than 
words can describe. If you had a son suddenly taken away from you, would you not do 
everything in your power to get him back”?135 She also wrote a letter to Van der Mescht 
and SWAPO’s publicity director in Windhoek, and was assured by the Sunday Times that 
the letters will be delivered to the respective parties. The Sunday Times used the incident 
and capitalized on it for increased newspaper circulation. Cheryl’s father, Wilfred Ford 
started interfering in attempts for Van der Mescht’s release. He used his daughter’s young 
age, unemployed status, a baby to care for and his position as a disabled pensioner as 
motivation for consideration. He was in direct contact with both the local press and 
SWAPO, and made statements without consulting with the SADF and the NP 
government first. The situation disrupted official and diplomatic government 
communication and continued to cause tension and discomfort for all the parties 
involved; including the government, SADF, Van der Mescht and Ford families.  
 
Shortly after the incident, a rumor developed within the SADF that Van der Mescht was a 
traitor that walked over to join the enemy, and that the capture was a smoke screen. The 
story is still prevalent today, and he is often referred to as a bad troop by former SADF 
officers and troops. Cheryl relates how people talked about her husband being a traitor 
and joining the enemy, whilst he was imprisoned. This rumor was confirmed by a number 
of former SADF officers, some still serving in the South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF). The officers, mostly working for Military Intelligence and the Engineering 
Corps, request to remain anonymous. Ep van Lill says he is aware of the strong rumor 
that was spread about Van der Mescht being a traitor. He says that he does not know 
where it stems from or the reason for the allegation. He further mentions that as a 
militarist, he never had any sympathy for Van der Mescht’s situation. Clarity was 
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requested on the statement “no sympathy for Van der Mescht’s situation” whereupon 
Van Lill answered that he does not want to comment any further.136    
 
The various viewpoints from the former SADF and current SANDF officers stating that 
Van der Mescht was a traitor include sweeping statements such as: why was he at the 
waterhole; what did he do there; he slept when he was supposed to protect the waterhole; 
why did he not protect himself during the attack; he met with the enemy the day before 
the attack; he is a bad soldier; why was he the only person being captured amongst a 
group of eleven soldiers; he is now training the enemy in Angola; impossible that the 
follow-up reaction force was not able to recapture Van der Mescht which suggests he 
made sure to vanish with the enemy. They claim that there are too many loose ends 
involved in his capture that points the finger to him and suggests that he walked over to 
join the enemy. No text records were found to substantiate the traitor allegations, and 
were spread by word of mouth only.137 
 
Shalli confirms that Van der Mescht was captured in combat, and that there were 
witnesses present. He says: “in my view that was totally outrageous, from the leadership 
that sent young people into battle and then disclaims them, totally outrageous. Du Toit 
was captured in Cabinda. Was he a traitor”? Shalli suggests that the SADF was shocked 
by the unexpected incident and didn’t know how to react, comment and tell the public.138    
 
The capture of Van der Mescht was both a shock and embarrassment to the SADF. A 
soldier was caught in the early morning hours whilst sleeping, approximately 10 
kilometers from the border inside Namibia and taken across the border into Angola. His 
duty was to purify water and he was protected by a section of nine infantry soldiers who 
could not safeguard him. The rescue operations including trained infantry soldiers, 
paratroopers, aircraft and mechanized motor convoys failed to find Van der Mescht. 
PLAN was perceived by the SADF as a guerilla army without discipline and military 
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teeth, and yet they managed to capture Van der Mescht successfully. It is clear that the 
SADF underestimated the efficiency of PLAN. The SADF and NP government were very 
secretive about operations and activities in both Namibia and Angola, and tried to keep it 
hidden from the public. However, the capture made headline news in South Africa and 
abroad and highlighted the possibility of young men getting killed and held captive in 
Angola. It became more evident through the South African media and became 
increasingly difficult to hide from the public. The NP government needed the public’s 
vote to remain in power. It seems that it was easier to put the blame on a troop with little 
use for the SADF than to accept responsibility for the incident, and spread a rumor of him 
being a traitor. Throughout the Border War, the SADF continuously glamorized their 
victories and maintained an image of a powerful military force.   
 
From Lubango, Van der Mescht was flown to Luanda and handed over by SWAPO to the 
MPLA government of Angola, and held in Sao Paulo prison for four years and three 
months. He was held as a POW of SWAPO under MPLA supervision for the duration of 
his imprisonment that started on 10 March 1978. Sao Paulo was originally a civilian 
prison, used during the colonial period for political detainees. It consisted of several 
buildings surrounded by a high wall.139    
 
On 11 March 1978, SWAPO held a press conference in Luanda chaired by Nujoma, to 
introduce Van der Mescht to the world’s press. It made news headlines in South Africa 
and abroad. The conference was purely propaganda driven, and Van der Mescht was 
paraded before foreign newsmen and television cameras, questioned by Nujoma. He was 
handed a telegram from his father and told that he could reply immediately, to show that 
SWAPO allows him to receive communication from home. Nujoma stated: “we have 
given you a human treatment in accordance with the Geneva Convention on war 
prisoners, and I give you this cable so that you can read it”. Van der Mescht told the 
press that he was treated well by SWAPO. The Sunday Express broke the news to the 
Minister of Defence PW Botha, and to Cheryl, who said she is relieved to see that her 
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husband is alive and well. The Rand Daily Mail reported that the Minister of Defence 
said he had no comment on “an obvious attempt at propaganda by making a prisoner 
make certain statements under pressure”. He did not want to comment on reports that 
SWAPO was prepared to exchange Van der Mescht for SWAPO members held by South 
Africa. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Pik Botha, declined to comment on the fact that 
Van der Mescht was paraded before foreign newsmen, or to indicate whether his 
department was taking steps to secure his release.140 
  
On 4 May 1978, incidentally the same day as the Cassinga massacre, a press release was 
issued by SWAPO’s Department of Information, disclosing that SWAPO communicated 
a recent photo of Van der Mescht to his wife through the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) on 2 May. It stated that SWAPO is living up to their declared 
principles regarding the treatment of POWs in accordance with the Geneva Convention, 
unlike the racist South African regime who callously disregard and violate all aspects of 
such international conventions.141   
 
A POW is a person, whether civilian or combatant, who is held in custody by an enemy 
power during or immediately after an armed conflict. POWs receive protection under a 
set of international humanitarian law, which regulates the conduct of armed conflicts. It 
contains the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Conventions, treaties, case law and 
customary international law. The Geneva Conventions comprise a set of rules that 
establish the standards of international law for the humanitarian treatment of the victims 
of war. It is applicable in times of armed conflict and seeks to protect people who are no 
longer taking part in hostilities, such as POWs.142 The practicality and actual enforcement 
thereof varies in different parts of the world and the manner of war at stake. The Geneva 
Convention is an idealistic theory which in the practical chaos of war is not always 
enforced and monitored by organizations such as the ICRC. It seems easier to enforce the 
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Geneva Conventions in an international war, whereas it can be easily overlooked at in the 
event of civil wars and liberation struggles, such as the Border War / Namibian War of 
Independence.       
 
The history of POWs in the South African context can be traced back to the Anglo Boer 
War. POW camps for captured Boer forces were initially set up in the Cape and Natal 
colonies. When it ran out of space, the captured Boer forces were sent to POW camps in 
St Helena, Ceylon, India and the islands of Bermuda. The general treatment of the POWs 
depended on the respective camp management. More than 20 000 Boer forces including 
boys as young as eight years old were held as POWs during the war. At the end of the 
war in 1902, which was victorious for the British Empire, they had to pledge their 
support to the British Crown before returning home. The Boer forces held British troops 
as POWs in Pretoria and outside of Nelspruit during the course of the war.143  
 
The legacy of the Anglo Boer War contributed towards the political division amongst 
South Africans regarding participation in the First World War. It reached boiling point 
with the 1914 Rebellion when a group of former Anglo Boer War soldiers with strong 
anti-British sentiments contested participation in the war. South African armed forces of 
the UDF did however participate in the First World War; in both Africa and Europe. 
South African soldiers taken prisoner during the war were given the status of POWs but 
there is limited information available about the camps and their conditions and 
circumstances. Therefore it is sufficient for the sake of this study, to merely note that 
there were South African POWs held during the First World War. 
 
With the Anglo Boer War still not forgotten, followed by the 1914  
Rebellion and participation in the First World War which further divided the country 
politically; the UDF decided to participate in the Second World War, again as an ally of 
Britain. The UDF relied heavily on volunteers and motivation to participate was often 
due to economical reasons. According to the 1946 official year book of the Union of 
South Africa, a total of 14 583 South Africans were taken prisoner during the Second 
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World War.144 South Africans were mostly captured during the North African campaign 
by German forces during the Battle of Sidi Rezegh in November 1941, and during the fall 
of Tobruk in June 1942, where over 10 700 South Africans were taken prisoner.145 The 
POWs were handed over to Italian forces and initially held in transit camps in North 
Africa from where they were moved to camps in Italy. The transportation modes included 
marches on land, boats, cattle trucks and trains; and POWs often endured inhumane 
conditions and attacks since they moved through war zones. Following Italy’s Armistice, 
the Germans took control of the POWs and they were moved to prison camps in 
Germany towards 1943, which they found to be more organized than the camps in 
Italy.146 General treatment in the camps and the relationships between POWs and their 
captors was dependant on the camps’ commanders and it varied. During the course of the 
war, South Africa held nearly 100 000 Italian POWs that were captured in East and North 
Africa and started arriving from 1941, in addition to the small number of German, Vichy 
French and Indo-Chinese POWs.147  
 
The post war government and new political direction followed after 1948, resulted in the 
government distancing itself from participation in the war and it came to be largely 
disregarded in scholarly publications and popular history.148 Most POWs shut down 
emotionally after their return and continued with life as if nothing has happened. Their 
situation was not a priority, it was not politically correct within the new political 
landscape and few people understood.149 This is a global phenomenon experienced by 
many war veterans, and parallels can be drawn with POWs of the Border War.  
 
The South African Air Force (SAAF) took part in the Korean War (1950 – 1953), which 
was the first serious clash between the East and the West after the Second World War. 
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The communist North Korea invaded South Korea. The personnel of 2 Squadron, a 
combat aircraft unit, comprised of volunteers and not conscripts as was the case with the 
Border War. A number of eight South Africans were held as POWs during the Korean 
War. Dennis Earp evacuated his aircraft after being shot at, was captured and held as a 
POW for a period of 23 months. According to Earp, the Geneva Convention on POWs 
did not apply to prisoners held by communists, and the conditions were very hostile. The 
SAAF POWs were interrogated by Chinese, Korean and Russian officers who were 
interested in the tactical information of the squadron. The interrogation often included 
solitary confinement, deprivation of food, threats of summary execution and other 
threatening techniques.150  
 
Limited information is available on POWs during the Border War, partly because the war 
was secretive, and partly because the issue of young men held captive in Angola was a 
political embarrassment to both the NP government and the SADF. This was especially 
applicable in the beginning phase and specifically during Operation Savannah. The first 
record of POWs dates back to 1975 and 1976 during the period of Operation Savannah, 
when eight SADF soldiers were captured inside Angola, during different incidents.     
 
On 13 December 1975, Corporal J.G. Terblanche was instructed to recover an enemy 
vehicle across the border inside Angola. He was assisted by Private R.H. Wiehahn, R. 
Wilson and G.E. Danney. Later that night they were reported missing. News from Radio 
Luanda reported that they were captured with the recovery vehicle inside Angola. On 4 
January 1976, Riflemen A.H. Potgieter, L.J. Kitshoff and P.J. Groenewald had gone 
missing after contact between a fighting unit of Group Orange and enemy forces took 
place. An infantry platoon went looking for the men without success. Uniform pieces and 
a rifle were found on the terrain where the soldiers were probably loaded onto a vehicle. 
On 26 August 1976, Rifleman E. de Lange got lost at Macusso in Namibia and 
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accidentally drove over the cut line into Angola. He was captured by a MPLA and Cuban 
patrol force.151  
 
The eight POWs were held in a prison in Luanda, as Cuban prisoners, and not in Sao 
Paulo prison where Van der Mescht was later imprisoned. Angola was in the middle of a 
civil war with various role players involved, hostile towards South Africa who fought 
their war with SWAPO on Angolan soil, and they claimed calamity from Pretoria. As a 
result, the negotiations for release and diplomacy in this regard were complex. The 
parents of the eight POWs wanted their sons back, and some were angry with the SADF 
and held them responsible for the fate of their sons. The ICRC was involved to assist the 
POWs in a humanitarian capacity in Angola and report back to the NP government.152 In 
August 1978, the eight POWs were released in return for three Cuban POWs held in 
Pretoria. This exchange was a result of negotiations between South Africa and the 
Angolan authorities with the assistance of the ICRC, and took place inside Angola at 
Ndjiva.153 Van der Mescht was not part of the exchange deal, since he was captured and 
held as a POW by SWAPO. 
 
The next available record of a POW from the Border War is that of Captain Wynand du 
Toit who was captured in May 1985 in Cabinda, Angola, and held as a POW by MPLA 
for a period of two years and four months. Du Toit was captured by FAPLA, the military 
wing of MPLA, and held in a prison in Luanda. He was tortured by enemy forces since 
he was captured during a secret mission to sabotage the oil refinery in Cabinda, and could 
provide valuable information. This is in contrast to Van der Mescht who was a conscript 
and of no value to the enemy regarding information. Du Toit was released in an 
                                                 
151 OAMI, Group 10, Box 1, Ref MI/106/23, MI/203/1/2, 8 August 1978, Documentation Centre, 
Department of Defence.  
152 MVV, Group 5, Box 73, Ref MV/62/14, HSP/DMR/TS/106/23/1, 14 June 1977, HSP(4)/TS/106/23/2, 
Welfare Report, 23 June 1978, GG/106/23/2/ Welfare Report, 18 May 1989, Documentation Centre, 
Department of Defence. 
153 Rand Daily Mail 12.05.1982. Reference was made to the POWs released in 1978 in the report of Van 
der Mescht’s release in 1982.     
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
78
78
international prisoner exchange in Maputo that made international news headlines in 
1987.154  
   
The last available record of a POW captured during the Border War is that of Rifleman 
Johan Papenfus, who was captured in May 1988 inside Angola, during a battle between 
Cuban forces and 101 Battalion. Badly wounded, he was sent to a hospital in Cuba where 
he was held as a POW, and displayed to the media in Havana. He was released in an 
exchange in April 1989 and returned to South Africa.155  
 
According to Article 146A of the Defence Act 1957, POWs remain members of the 
SADF who is morally responsible to look after them and their families’ welfare.156  
 
According to Victor Frankl, an Auschwitz survivor and psychiatrist, prisoners experience 
three mental phases during captivity, starting with consignment to prison and resultant 
shock, acceptance of camp routine and finally liberation.157 It is interesting to note the 
similar emotions experienced by POWs globally. They include shame and guilt for being 
captured; leading towards survivors guilt; fear for getting killed or tortured by the enemy 
forces; anger, hopelessness, depression, longing for home and uncertainty about the 
future that sets in whilst being captured; and lastly the perseverance, resilience and hope 
that keeps them going.  
 
During Van der Mescht’s imprisonment, Sao Paulo prison held inmates ranging from 
mercenaries, diamond smugglers, Portuguese prostitutes; as well as soldiers from 
FAPLA, UNITA, PLAN and the ANC. The prison authorities, warders and most of the 
inmates spoke Portuguese which made communication for Van der Mescht problematic. 
Initially, Van der Mescht was held in solitary confinement for military intelligence 
purposes, but it was realized that he had no military strategic and tactical information 
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available for use by SWAPO. He requested to be transferred to a communal cell where he 
could interact with other people and the request was approved in November 1978. Van 
der Mescht now shared a communal cell with British and American mercenaries. They 
were sentenced by the MPLA during the Luanda Trial of 1976, for supporting the FNLA 
during the Angolan civil war. The post-colonial wars in Africa from the 1960’s onwards 
created a breeding ground for mercenaries. Cecil Martin (Satch) Fortuin was originally 
from South Africa and became a British citizen from where he conducted his mercenary 
work. Van der Mescht and Fortuin communicated in their home language Afrikaans, and 
became good friends as a result.158   
 
Inmates in the communal cell were free to move around within the prison compound 
during the day. There were no planned routine or activities followed. They were locked 
up in the cell from 22h00 at night until 7h00 in the morning. Inmates were allowed to 
watch television over weekends. They slept on beds with mattresses, had access to 
drinking water and could shower on a daily basis with soap and toothpaste provided. Van 
der Mescht regularly received three meals a day, mostly consisting of bread and coffee in 
the morning, rice and fish for lunch and supper, and at times tinned fruit and corned 
beef.159  
 
Van der Mescht received the same hostile treatment as the rest of the political prisoners, 
and there were no reported incidents of torture during his imprisonment, or before when 
he was held by SWAPO on the way to prison.160 Van der Mescht had no information on 
military intelligence of value to the enemy. It was also important for SWAPO to remain 
the party that treated Van der Mescht well, whilst claiming that the SADF treated their 
prisoners bad and denied them POW status.   
 
During his imprisonment, Van der Mescht received six visits from the ICRC delegate in 
Luanda, always accompanied by an Angolan government representative. The first visit 
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took place on 1 September 1978 and it became his main source of communication with 
the outside world. The remainder of the visits took place on 13 February 1979, 3 
September 1979, 10 April 1981, 27 April 1981 and 9 November 1981. Van der Mescht 
received one visit from a SWAPO representative, Mr Mushimba, in May 1979.161  
   
After the September 1979 ICRC visit, it was reported that the conditions have been fairly 
harsh for Van der Mescht between February and September of that year. Since the 
previous December, he received no mail from home. At that stage, Van der Mescht only 
received two letters from home since his imprisonment started; one from Cheryl and one 
from his parents. All inmates received collective punishment and were locked up in their 
cells for a two month period. Van der Mescht became increasingly worried about his 
future and his morale was low.162 
 
Communication with Cheryl and his parents remained challenging and problematic 
throughout Van der Mescht’s imprisonment. Letters and parcels between the parties 
arrived late, at irregular intervals, or not at all. Van der Mescht’s family was not allowed 
to visit him, neither were telephone calls allowed. Months literally passed without 
communication between husband and wife; and son and parents. In addition, when letters 
were received it was censored, and the communication remained a problem. There were 
various reasons for this unfortunate situation.  
 
In the beginning, Cheryl and Van der Mescht’s parents wrote letters in Afrikaans that 
could not be censored by the Angolan authorities and as a result the letters were never 
delivered. This matter was not communicated to the respective parties. From the 
beginning of his imprisonment, Van der Mescht decided to smuggle his letters out of 
prison through a contact that was postmarked from Portugal. In the letters, Van der 
Mescht mentioned that he had lost all faith in the SADF and that his family should not 
trust them either, nor should they write back. He requested his family to communicate 
with the ICRC and the NP government to plead for his release. These letters were 
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intercepted by the NIS who withheld it from the family. The SADF supported the idea 
that Van der Mescht’s family should receive the letters, but the Department of Foreign 
Affairs disagreed. Cheryl’s father had direct contact with SWAPO and there was the 
possibility that he might leak information to SWAPO and the local media. The content of 
Van der Mescht’s letters was not favorable towards the SADF and it was feared that it 
might cause additional stress and trauma to his family, as well as painting a negative 
picture of the SADF to the public. If it became known to SWAPO and the Angolan 
prison authorities that Van der Mescht was smuggling letters out of prison, it could 
complicate and jeopardize the negotiations towards his release, and impact on his 
safety.163  
 
In 1981, it came to the attention of the SADF that Van der Mescht has smuggled a letter 
from prison to Cheryl that she has received. In the letter he mentions a visit from a 
Russian, probably the KGB, and requests that she finds an attorney to attend to his 
release and / or swapping as advised by the Russian, else he plans to escape from prison 
in July 1981. It was not in his best interest to escape from prison, since he would have 
difficulties leaving Luanda. Cheryl’s welfare officer Major van Wyk, explained to her 
that they are putting Van der Mescht’s life in danger by taking matters in own hand. 
Cheryl understood and agreed to, in future, communicate all matters with the SADF 
first.164 Both Van der Mescht and Cheryl were frustrated since the communication was 
erratic and unstable for the duration of his imprisonment, and they were often in the dark 
about what the present or the future was holding. Cheryl was very young and had to take 
care of their daughter and the situation remained unstable and insecure for all parties 
involved, until Van der Mescht’s release in May 1982.  
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SWAPO’s successful capture of Van der Mescht and the fact that he was kept alive was 
very important to them in terms of propaganda value. After Ashipala handed Van der 
Mescht to his commanders in Oihapeto, he continued with the war effort until 1989 when 
it ended. Ashipala was known amongst SADF soldiers operating on the border as a 
ruthless terrorist, and was feared by many. He did not visit Van der Mescht in prison, but 
often wondered about him long after Van der Mescht’s release. It turned out that Van der 
Mescht became Ashipala’s trophy and that he became a legend within SWAPO and a 
hero for the struggle for liberation; partly because of his soldiering skills and partly 
because of his capture of Van der Mescht. He wanted South Africans to remember him 
for saving the life of an enemy. He emphasized that Van der Mescht was kept alive 
during the attack and retreat to Angola until he was put into jail.165 A war song dedicated 
to Van der Mescht was composed and sung throughout the war as a motivational song 
within SWAPO. The song was performed to Van der Mescht by members of the police 
force at Eenhana, in 2009 when Van der Mescht returned to visit the site of his capture. 
The refrain as follows: “we capture Johanna alive in Elundu”.166  
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Chapter 4: Van der Mescht’s release from prison and experience of war trauma; 
comparing the different circumstances of POWs Van der Mescht and Du Toit 
 
This chapter discusses the negotiations for the release of Van der Mescht as a POW of 
SWAPO by the NP government during the period 1978 to 1982. It further discusses Van 
der Mescht’s return home and the challenges he and his family faced in adapting to the 
situation. The psychological impact that the attack and imprisonment had on the psyche 
of Van der Mescht over an extended period is briefly explored. This leads to a summary   
on the impact that the trauma of war has on soldiers, often leading to post traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD). The fact that Van der Mescht spent four years and three months in 
prison as a POW contributed to his trauma and added another dimension to the situation. 
  
Then, for comparative purposes, the chapter further focuses on the capture of a Special 
Force soldier, Wynand du Toit, who was captured by FAPLA and held as a POW of 
MPLA in Angola for two years and four months. Through limited available literature and 
popular belief, it might seem as if Du Toit was given better treatment whilst in prison and 
thereafter, in contrast to Van der Mescht. It will be analyzed to reveal what the situation 
was, since many factors were at stake regarding the different circumstances surrounding 
Du Toit and Van der Mescht’s capture, imprisonment and release.  
 
During his imprisonment, Van der Mescht received six visits from the ICRC delegate in 
Luanda over an extended and irregular period starting on 1 September 1978, followed by 
visits on 13 February 1979, 3 September 1979, 10 April 1981, 27 April 1981 and 9 
November 1981.167 During these visits, Van der Mescht was informed that negotiations 
were taking place to arrange for his possible release or prisoner exchange, but no details 
were available. No visits took place during 1980 and his future remained uncertain whilst 
he was mostly kept in the dark throughout his imprisonment. Van der Mescht was of the 
opinion that not much was done by government or the SADF to secure his release; 
however this was due to the limited communication and information available, with long 
periods where no news was received from home. Various press reports and official 
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records were found in the Documentation Centre of the Department of Defence, to 
substantiate that the NP government was doing extensive work behind the scenes, 
maneuvering and negotiating in an attempt to release Van der Mescht. It was a complex 
scenario with Van der Mescht held as a POW of SWAPO in an Angolan prison under 
MPLA authority. Angola and South Africa were not waging war with each other, but the 
diplomacy between the two countries were not friendly since South Africa used Angola’s 
territory to fight their war against SWAPO, and South Africa’s apartheid policy was 
condemned by the Frontline states. The complex political landscape and scenario 
whereby Van der Mescht was being held as a POW in Angola necessitated negotiations 
for his release to take place in secrecy. In addition, the NP government could not reveal 
to its public that it was meeting with its perceived Communist enemies in an attempt to 
release Van der Mescht.     
 
The negotiations to release Van der Mescht were managed by NIS in co-operation with 
the Department of Foreign Affairs, with input from the SADF.168 The Bureau for State 
Security (BOSS) was formed in 1969, renamed the Department of National Security in 
1978 and changed its name to NIS in 1979. Official information and an interview were 
requested from Niёl Barnard, former Director-General (1980 – 1992) of NIS, to inform 
Captor and Captive as well as the dissertation. Barnard played an instrumental role in the 
negotiations towards the exchange of Van der Mescht for a KGB spy in 1982. The 
request was denied and further attempts to secure information through PAIA were 
unsuccessful.  
 
Five days after Van der Mescht’s capture, the Star reported that the case of suspected 
abduction on the Angolan border was taken up with the Angolan government in the 
appropriate manner, according to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Brand Fourie. The 
Rand Daily Mail reported that they made direct contact with SWAPO and was given 
news of Van der Mescht by the Vice President, Misheck Muyongo. He confirmed that 
Van der Mescht was captured by SWAPO, held in Angola, in good hands and treated as a 
POW. Muyongo added that there is no question of Van der Mescht getting released 
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anytime soon, until a settlement for Namibian independence could be reached. He added 
that South African forces captured SWAPO guerillas and none have been released. The 
South African government did not regard or treat SWAPO prisoners as POWs. Sources in 
Lusaka said that SWAPO was planning to exhibit Van der Mescht before the OAU 
Liberation Committee and make him confess to the atrocities committed by South 
African forces in Namibia. The Beeld reported on the same matter at a later date.169  
 
As early as 28 February 1978, the Department of Foreign Affairs’ Mission at the UN in 
New York entered into discussion about the situation of Van der Mescht. Communication 
relating to the matter took place between the Chief of the SADF and Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs, Brand Fourie.170 On 2 March 1978, SWAPO issued a press release about the 
status of Van der Mescht from their headquarters in Lusaka. SWAPO’s administrative 
secretary Moses Garoeb, stated: “SWAPO would consider the release of captured soldier 
Johan van der Mescht, only if South Africa made a request for his release through the 
UN. South Africa must make contact with SWAPO through the UN or the contact group 
of the five Western Nations on the UN Security Council. We are at war with South Africa 
and any question on the exchange of war prisoners can only be done through these two 
organizations. South Africa should know that we are a force to reckon with”.171 On 3 
March 1978, the Rand Daily Mail reported about the statement made by SWAPO. The 
Minister of Defence PW Botha, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Pik Botha, both 
declined to comment on the report.172 The Cabinet’s response was due to diplomacy and 
to avoid jeopardizing the negotiations that started shortly after Van der Mescht’s capture. 
It could be viewed as lack of interest taking into consideration the traitor allegation 
discussed in Chapter three, if not considered within the context of diplomacy.  
  
On 3 March 1978, the SADF issued an internal statement through a signal document 
stating that the Department of Foreign Affairs will initiate negotiations to swap Van der 
                                                 
169 The Star, 24.02.1978  
Rand Daily Mail, 25.02.1978 
Beeld, 27.02.1978 
170 HSOPS, Group 5, Box 7, Ref HSOPS/106/23, Telegram, 28 February 1978, Documentation Centre, 
Department of Defence. 
171 MVV, Group 5, Box 73, Ref MV/62/14, Documentation Centre, Department of Defence. 
172 Rand Daily Mail, 03.03.1978 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
86
86
Mescht with a political commissar from SWAPO held prisoner in Rundu, Namibia. The 
Chief of the SADF requested the Chief of the Army to ensure that the political commissar 
is in good health.173  
 
The NP government increasingly received pressure from the opposition about the 
situation in Namibia regarding the war, and capture of Van der Mescht. On 4 March 
1978, the political correspondent of the Transvaler reported that the Prime Minister, John 
Vorster told Parliament that several diplomatic channels were used in an attempt to find 
out where Van der Mescht was shortly after his capture, to ensure his safety and return. 
Follow up operations were conducted without success and no information were available 
of his current whereabouts.174 
 
On 12 and 13 March 1978, the Van der Mescht capture made news headlines both locally 
and abroad and stated that SWAPO is prepared to release Van der Mescht in exchange 
for SWAPO prisoners held by South Africa.175 These reports followed the press 
conference held by SWAPO and chaired by Nujoma on 11 March in Luanda, to introduce 
Van der Mescht to the world’s press. SADF spokespeople declined to comment on the 
news reports.   
 
Several months later, in September 1978, a meeting was held between the NP and MPLA 
governments to discuss an attempt to secure peace in the southern African region, with 
South Africa viewed as an aggressor, fighting SWAPO on Angolan territory. One of the 
agenda points noted the discussion of the wellbeing and release of Van der Mescht. The 
MPLA officials commented that the Van der Mescht question is a matter between 
SWAPO and South African authorities. The South African officials commented that Van 
der Mescht’s continuous detention would be a negative factor in the relations between 
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Angola and South Africa, and in the event of harm being done to Van der Mescht, none 
of the SWAPO prisoners will be released.176  
 
Since 1977, the Department of National Security (predecessor to NIS) in co-operation 
with Foreign Affairs was in contact with a representative of the Angolan Intelligence 
Service, with the code name of SYDNEY. The negotiations for the release of the South 
African POWs captured during Operation Savannah were arranged through SYDNEY, 
and they were subsequently released in August 1978. In August 1979, the Chief of the 
SADF was informed by the Secretary of National Security that negotiations for the 
release of Van der Mescht are being discussed through the same channel and in 
process.177 During the course of 1980, the Consul General in New York and the Chief of 
the SADF communicated about the possibility of an exchange between four SWAPO 
prisoners and Van der Mescht.178 
 
In 1981, Van der Mescht smuggled a letter out of prison to Cheryl telling her about a visit 
from a Russian, probably an agent of the KGB, who suggested that he should find an 
attorney to attend to his release and / or swapping. The communication channel between 
prison and home was erratic and unreliable, hence Van der Mescht smuggled letters out 
with the help of a contact. In the letter he asked Cheryl to find an attorney to help them. 
Cheryl discussed the matter with the President of the ICRC in South Africa, Kelsey 
Stewart, who also happened to be an attorney and subsequently offered his service in this  
regard. The head of the mission of the ICRC in South Africa, Mr de Rougemont, 
suggested the use of an attorney with experience of similar cases based in London. The 
SADF supported the idea of the London based attorney to handle the case, because at that 
stage all previous efforts to release or swap Van der Mescht were in a phase of 
stalemate.179 This new possibility would have been additional to negotiations already 
underway.  
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In October 1981, the Soviet Union made diplomatic overtures to South Africa for the 
release of their captured military adviser, Warrant Officer Nicolai Pestretsov, who was 
captured by the SADF in Angola. This raised hope for the release of Van der Mescht. The 
contact between the two countries took place at the UN headquarters and the ICRC acted 
as the mediator.180 
    
In November 1981, a secret meeting was held in Paris between a South African and an 
Angolan military and diplomatic delegation. South Africa requested the meeting with the 
purpose of continuing dialogue between the two countries. Angola agreed because the 
continuous military aggression on Angolan soil prevented securing peace in the region. 
One of the agenda points noted the possibility of returning prisoners on both sides. South 
Africa wanted an indication from Angola what the situation on releasing Van der Mescht 
was. South Africa regarded the Van der Mescht matter as him being removed from 
Namibia by SWAPO, and assumed that Angola as a sovereign state would suggest to 
SWAPO to have him released. The Angolan spokesman emphasized that Van der Mescht 
was in SWAPO custody, held in an Angolan prison and suggested Angolan facilitation 
for direct talks between South Africa and SWAPO. He further indicated that the Van der 
Mescht question remains a matter between South Africa and SWAPO.181 
 
Towards the end of April 1982, negotiations to release Van der Mescht reached 
finalization, unbeknown to him and the public. The NIS and the KGB negotiated directly 
and in secret without involvement of any other Western agency.182 The plan was to 
exchange Van der Mescht and a number of Western intelligence agents for a KGB agent, 
Major Aleksei Koslov, who was held by the NIS in Pretoria. Koslov, posing as a German 
businessman, visited South Africa since 1976 to gather information on the ANC. In July 
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1980, during his fourth visit, Koslov was captured and detained by agents of the NIS until 
the swap took place.183  
 
In preparation for the swap, Koslov was flown to West Berlin in Germany, accompanied 
by NIS agents spearheaded by Barnard. He was held in a place of safety in West Berlin 
for a period of two weeks, whilst final preparations and negotiations were arranged for 
the exchange. At the same time, Van der Mescht was flown from Luanda to East Berlin, 
and held in the Karl Marx Prison for a period of two weeks. He was not given any 
information about the reason for being released from Sao Paulo prison, and only assumed 
that it meant possible freedom. On 11 May 1982, both Van der Mescht and Koslov were 
taken to Checkpoint Charlie, the neutral territory between East and West Berlin. Here 
they were released, met by their countries’ intelligence agents and flown by helicopter 
over the Berlin Wall towards East and West Berlin respectively.184 Van der Mescht was 
taken to a hotel where he was prepared for the return journey home.  
 
After the successful swap the Prime Minister PW Botha, informed Parliament, and the 
news was welcomed by all parties including the opposition. The SABC news reported on 
the story the same evening. It stated that Van der Mescht was on his way home after a 
major exchange deal had been clenched in Europe, involving a Russian KGB spy, eight 
Western intelligence agents and Van der Mescht. The Western agents who had been in 
custody behind the Iron Curtain for some time were not identified but included people 
from the USA, Israel, Britain and France. Botha claimed this swap to be a major 
diplomatic coup that was the culmination of difficult and protracted negotiations, carried 
out periodically and in secret over many months. The release of Western agents held 
behind the Iron Curtain is proof of South Africa’s goodwill towards Western countries 
and its contribution to end Communism, according to Botha. It seems as if the NP 
government made an attempt to showcase South Africa as an opponent to Communism to 
win support from the West. Botha praised Barnard from the NIS who was leading the 
negotiations and commented that the ethics of intelligence work demand secrecy and 
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behind the scenes maneuvering. Therefore no further detail or information about the 
negotiations and resultant swap could be supplied to Parliament or any other media.185  
 
A spokesperson from SWAPO commented that Van der Mescht’s release did not signify 
a change in their policy. “He was just a kid who happened to be caught and there is 
nothing to be gained from holding him any longer. We would expect the South Africans 
to start to observe the Geneva Convention on POWs and treat our prisoners in the same 
manner as we have treated theirs”.186 
 
Late afternoon on the day of the successful swap, Cheryl and the 5 year old Chantal, 
accompanied by Major van Wyk, were taken to a hotel in Pretoria where they were 
accommodated with Van der Mescht’s parents, his brother and sister, in preparation for 
his return. The family was told that he is in an apparent good mental and physical 
condition, and that Cheryl and Chantal will be allowed to meet Van der Mescht inside the 
aircraft before he meets his parents and the press. They were further briefed that a press 
conference would be held and that they are not allowed to ask questions or make 
comments during the proceedings. Early the following morning, the family was flown by 
helicopter to Air Force Base Waterkloof where Van der Mescht was due to arrive later in 
the morning.187 
 
Van der Mescht’s return on 12 May 1982 turned out to be a big media affair. Air traffic 
control who received instruction from government authorities, directed the aircraft 
between the public airport Jan Smuts outside Johannesburg and Air Force Base 
Waterkloof outside Pretoria. The aircraft circled between the respective airports before 
finally touching down at Air Force Base Waterkloof. Cheryl recalls the bewildered look 
in Van der Mescht’s eyes when she met him in the aircraft and how upsetting it was to 
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see him in such a state.188 A news conference was held and the incident was widely 
publicized in both the local and international printed and broadcast media.189  
 
After the press conference, Van der Mescht, Cheryl and Chantal were taken to premises 
of Military Intelligence where they were accommodated for a week. During this period, 
Van der Mescht was interrogated by officers from Military Intelligence and NIS to find 
out details about the capture and imprisonment. It involved sessions with infantry soldiers 
who were present at Elundu and the waterhole during the attack in order to arrive at a 
more comprehensive report of the incident. No documentation of the interrogation and 
proceedings could be accessed through any channels, despite PAIA. Van der Mescht’s 
recollection of this period is vague and he only recalls that he was given bad treatment 
and could not substantiate any further.190 The allegation that Van der Mescht was a traitor 
that walked over to join SWAPO was now doing the rounds within the SADF and the 
public and impacted on the manner he was treated and perceived by fellow soldiers.  
  
Lieutenant De Witt, who was held responsible by the committee of the Board of Enquiry 
after the successful waterhole attack, was summoned to attend a session during the 
interrogation phase. De Witt was never found guilty by a military court of law; however 
the incident did limit his career options within the SADF. De Witt developed a fierce 
resentment and anger towards Van der Mescht that was further influenced by the traitor 
allegation, and held him responsible for the slow progress in his career. For the first time 
in four years De Witt was now faced with meeting Van der Mescht. The anger has 
developed to such an extent that De Witt planned to shoot Van der Mescht. No weapons 
were allowed in the interrogation room, the proceedings were kept highly secret and strict 
security measures were implemented. The firearm was removed from De Witt upon 
entry, without anyone knowing of his intentions to shoot Van der Mescht. De Witt who 
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remained a member of the SADF and later the SANDF, passed away in 2004. His wife, 
Elsa de Witt commented that the incident at the waterhole in 1978 changed her husband 
forever and limited his promotion opportunities within the SADF.191   
 
After the week of interrogation by Military Intelligence, Van der Mescht, Cheryl and 
Chantal were free to continue with their lives. They returned to their flat in Boksburg 
where Cheryl and Chantal had been living. Van der Mescht was exempted from future 
military camps and obligations, and received backdated salary from the SADF in a lump 
sum, equal to the period that he was imprisoned. Cheryl also received his salary whilst he 
was in prison to keep her and Chantal financially secure.192 
  
Shortly after his return, Van der Mescht was approached by Scope magazine to sell his 
story. Scope published a comprehensive article about the experiences of Van der Mescht 
during his capture, imprisonment and release. The article concludes by commenting that 
Van der Mescht is deeply scarred and traumatized by the experience and would hopefully 
heal one day. It pays respect to his traumatic experience as a POW.193  
 
Van der Mescht received medical care from the SADF to attend to physical scars 
sustained during the attack, including treatment of a perforated eardrum and removing a 
bullet from his lower back. He was offered psychological counseling by the SADF for 
trauma suffered but declined. A few months after his return, Van der Mescht was re-
employed by Iscor to continue his apprenticeship as a boilermaker, and remained an 
employee for a number of years thereafter. His nickname at work was SWAPO. 
However, the impact of the trauma that Van der Mescht was exposed to during the attack 
and thereafter soon started manifesting in PTSD.  
 
Van der Mescht shut down emotionally, spoke very little about his experience and 
continued with life, as if the past few years never happened, a matter of self-induced 
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memory repression. Cheryl recalls the recurring nightmares at night, how he didn’t want 
to talk about it and how he suffered from insomnia, to this day. She recalls how the event 
changed her husband from being a gentle person to a very hard man. Chantal was nine 
months old when Van der Mescht was captured and was only introduced to her father at 
the age of five. They had problems adapting and getting used to each other, competing 
for Cheryl’s attention which caused additional tension in the household. Van der Mescht 
was restless and unsettled, and his anger was mostly directed at the SADF who he felt 
betrayed him.194 After two years of this tension, Cheryl requested help from her former 
welfare officer Major van Wyk, and the family was referred to psychological counseling 
at 1 Military Hospital in Pretoria. The psychological reports were not available through 
PAIA because of ethical restrictions placed on mental health information. The 
psychologist who treated the Van der Mescht family shared selected information and 
requested to be anonymous. The psychologist is referred to as Psych X.  
 
Psych X’s summary of the situation as follows: “I saw Van der Mescht, Cheryl and 
Chantal for a few sessions, approximately two years after his return home. It was a sad 
situation and I felt sorry for Cheryl who seemed vulnerable and bewildered about the 
situation they found themselves in. Van der Mescht was angry with the SADF for loosing 
four years of his life and it seems as if he was expecting to be given more in terms of 
material needs. I remember there was tension because of the competition between Van 
der Mescht and Chantal for Cheryl’s attention”. After a few sessions, Psych X felt she 
made little progress and referred the matter to the Social Service of the SADF. The report 
that Psych X received from Social Service was similar to her own experience and 
summary of the situation.195 
  
During this period in 1984 when the Border War was escalating in Ovamboland and 
Angola, Psych X was primarily counseling PF members and conscripts returning from 
the operational area, who were exposed to war trauma. During military training young 
conscripts, who were mostly from protected backgrounds, were indoctrinated to believe 
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that they were fighting a justifiable cause and to uphold the ideology of apartheid. They 
were taught not to think for themselves and to strictly follow orders without asking 
questions. In the operational area they were exposed to war trauma, having to kill the so 
called enemy, or the risk of getting killed and it was a harsh reality to deal with. They 
were the aggressors and perpetrators of the war, despite what they were told by the 
authorities. They were instructed not to talk about their war experience with people at 
home, to forget about it and continue with civilian life after completion of national 
service, as if it never happened. Testimonies of returning PF soldiers, especially 
conscripts, challenged the SADF and NP government’s status quo of upholding their 
apartheid ideology. As a result, most soldiers, especially the conscripts remained quiet 
about their war experience and trauma, lived in denial and avoided psychiatric or 
psychological counseling; a recipe for future disaster.  
 
According to Anthony Feinstein, PF members in operational areas generally regarded the 
war as an institution for strong men and signs of weakness were not tolerated. Feinstein 
performed his national service during the period 1982 to 1983, after completing his 
medical degree and served as a medical doctor, specifically attending to psychiatry 
matters. He was initially assigned to the psychiatry ward at 1 Military Hospital in 
Pretoria, and is of the opinion that mental health was not high on the agenda of the 
SADF.196 He observed tension in military psychiatry with mental health being submissive 
to the state’s demands. Feinstein illustrates this by using the following example: soldiers 
suffering from low intensity anxiety have it under control at home and in comfortable 
surroundings. When the same person gets exposed to war trauma or stressful military 
surroundings it could lead to severe anxiety and psychotic behavior. The SADF’s manner 
of treating this would be to suppress the condition with medication to avoid the problem 
and send the soldier back to war. This is done to ensure the military machine is well oiled 
and keeps producing soldiers to make war.197 Feinstein further comments that the SADF 
military machine eventually encompassed and consumed one completely and that no one 
could escape that reality.   
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When Feinstein started working in the psychiatric ward after his basic military training, 
he only had his medical degree and no work experience yet, let alone psychiatric training 
and experience. Although he worked under supervision, he was given a huge 
responsibility to treat psychotic patients, mostly soldiers returning from the operational 
area having suffered war trauma. He reckons that the team including his seniors and PF 
medical doctors were inexperienced to deal with the situations they were faced with, and 
didn’t understand the extent and magnitude of the problems. After working in the 
psychiatric ward for six months, Feinstein was sent to Oshakati in Ovamboland to 
manage a psychiatric unit to treat soldiers close to the operational area, so they can be 
returned to service quickly, without removing them from the area. He voiced his concern 
about his inexperience for such a responsible position, and in return was told that it is 
war, he will do as told, not ask questions and continue his duty.   
 
According to Psych X, patients who became psychologically disturbed as a result of the 
Border War, were by far more scarred and damaged than those with physical injuries. 
There are numerous examples of broken people diagnosed with PTSD as a result of war 
trauma. PTSD is the most widely publicized trauma related psychiatric disorder which 
develops after exposure to traumatic events. Symptoms follows any serious psychological 
trauma such as exposure to combat, accidents, torture, disasters, assault, rape; anything 
out of the extraordinary. It can take immediate effect or surface years after the incident 
took place.198 Symptoms associated with war trauma include survivor’s guilt, self 
punishment, feelings of being a scapegoat, self pity, severe rage and violent impulses, 
alienation from one’s own feelings, depression, substance abuse and suicide.199   
 
The impact of war on the psychological wellbeing of soldiers has a long history dating 
back to the American Civil War (1861 – 1865) when the Army’s Surgeon General 
identified certain behavioral patterns amongst soldiers. No physical symptoms of disease 
were identified, but behavior manifesting in the form of fatigue, insomnia and psychotic 
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conditions were noted. In years to follow, similar behavior and conditions were observed 
with soldiers participating in various wars. During the First World War the psychological 
damage and impact of war trauma on soldiers was officially recognized and psychiatrists 
became part of the military medical personnel.200 By the end of the First World War,  
80 000 soldiers were treated for shell shock and some 200 000 veterans received pensions 
for nervous disorders that led to a reconsideration of psychoanalytic theory. Much 
contemporary work that seeks to understand what is now called war trauma stems from 
this period.201   
 
American military intervention in Vietnam during the period 1955 to 1975 and the 
devastating impact it had on soldiers suffering from war trauma necessitated urgent 
psychiatric intervention. In the late 1970’s, the mental health sector in the USA 
acknowledged the effects of combat on soldiers. It was realized that psychological 
problems can emerge and manifest months or years after the actual trauma took place and 
can gradually worsen over time. In 1980, PTSD became an official category in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Psychiatric Disorders, the official publication of the 
American Psychiatric Association. Military combat forms part of this classification.202  
 
Getting back to the South African POW case involving Du Toit who was captured in 
1985; it is argued that his story is given more media publicity and coverage than the 
POWs that were captured between 1975 and 1978, who received very little media and 
scholarly attention.203 This is true regarding the eight POWs that were captured during 
Operation Savannah which was conducted in a clandestine manner. The fact that all eight 
were captured inside Angola was an uncomfortable situation for the SADF and NP 
government and had to be kept secret from its public. However, a few media articles did 
appear in the local and international press, and the fact that the POWs families’ had to be 
liaised with made it difficult for the authorities to keep it secret. Today, a few official 
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records of the POWs can be accessed through the ICRC and the Documentation Centre of 
the Department of Defence. With regards to Van der Mescht’s situation who was 
captured inside Namibia; it became progressively more complicated for the SADF and 
NP government to keep the reality of soldiers getting abducted from its public. Operation 
Savannah’s POWs were released shortly after Van der Mescht’s imprisonment started, 
which further complicated matters. Official records of Van der Mescht’s capture are 
available at the Documentation Centre of the Department of Defence and the ICRC, and 
his story was more widely reported in the local and international media than was the 
situation with the POWs captured during Operation Savannah. A month after Van der 
Mescht’s return home, a comprehensive article was published in the Scope magazine 
about his capture, imprisonment and release. The Scope was not a mainstream publication 
and mainly focused on soft pornography stories, a publication that the NP government 
and SADF would not want to be associated with. In the article Van der Mescht was not 
given the status of a national hero, although he did receive recognition for the ordeal and 
trauma suffered as a POW in Angola. A similar article appeared shortly thereafter in Rooi 
Rose magazine. Van der Mescht received a Pro Patria medal from the SADF in 1979 and 
his mother received it on his behalf. The medal was awarded to SADF members who 
served in the operational area.204  
 
The Documentation Centre of the Department of Defence and other archival state organs’ 
have no official records available of Du Toit’s capture and release, despite requests made 
through PAIA. It is assumed that information on the secret missions conducted by the 
Special Forces was either destroyed or not made public, despite PAIA. It is further 
underlined by the fact that no information of NIS was made available to this study either.  
However, it does seem as if Du Toit’s story was given popular publicity when a book The 
Wynand du Toit Story, sponsored by Military Intelligence, was published within a record 
time of two weeks after his release.205 It was written from an SADF propaganda 
perspective and clear that the objective was to portray the SADF as the victorious 
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military force and to turn the situation into a positive story, defending the Border War. 
Du Toit is sketched as a brave and heroic soldier, a patriot who carried out a secret 
mission for his country, got captured in the process and suffered torture as a POW in 
Angola. His release received both local and international media attention, and locally he 
received the status of a national war hero by the NP government and its public. Today it 
is known that the purpose of the mission was to sabotage and destroy the oil refinery at 
Cabinda, whilst in the book it is stated that the mission was to detect PLAN and ANC 
military camps in Angola for intelligence purposes.206  
 
Du Toit was a member of the Special Forces, an elite group of soldiers commonly known 
as the recces. Only the best candidates got selected to serve in this elite corps and the 
training was exceptionally rigorous. In contrast to Van der Mescht who was a conscript, 
Du Toit joined the SADF willingly as a PF member making a career of it, believing in the 
ideology and system that was propagated. The primary task of the Special Forces during 
the Border War was to conduct secret operations deep inside Angola behind enemy lines; 
doing reconnaissance, gathering intelligence information, destroying or sabotaging 
strategic installations and extracting soldiers from missions. Du Toit hails from a well 
respected Afrikaner family and grew up on a farm in the Western Cape. This is in stark 
contrast to Van der Mescht who came from a working class Afrikaner family, born in the 
West Rand and grew up in the East Rand of the then Transvaal, considered working class 
residential areas. Van der Mescht was an ordinary troop without rank who performed his 
national service in Namibia and his primary task was to purify water for human 
consumption.  
 
In May 1985, Du Toit commanded a group of selected Special Force soldiers on a secret 
mission to sabotage the oil installation at Cabinda. The mission didn’t go according to 
plan and they were detected by FAPLA whose bases surrounded the oil installation. 
During an ambush with FAPLA, two of Du Toit’s men were killed, some managed to 
return safely home and Du Toit was captured. Already badly wounded, he was beaten up 
by his captors who initially thought that he was a mercenary. Du Toit was first taken to 
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the town of Cabinda where he was interrogated and tortured by FAPLA. After hours of 
interrogation, Cuban doctors performed an operation on Du Toit’s badly wounded arm in 
a makeshift hospital.207  Thereafter he was flown to Luanda where he was admitted to a 
hospital for further medical care. The Angolan authorities handed Du Toit to the Cubans 
who imprisoned him. During the first 10 months of imprisonment, Du Toit was held in a 
cell that was four meters square in a Cuban military base in Luanda. His movements were 
monitored by his interrogators through a television camera. Here he was interrogated on a 
daily basis by Cubans and Angolans. When the physical torture stopped, the mental and 
emotional torture followed. Initially Du Toit was not given POW status since he was 
captured by FAPLA and considered a terrorist, infiltrating their country without 
permission in an attempt to destroy infrastructure. After each SADF operation into 
Angola, Du Toit was interrogated more vigorously.208  
 
In April 1986, Du Toit was moved to another jail in Luanda, and held in solitary 
confinement for the duration of his imprisonment which stretched over a period of two 
years and four months.209 Van der Mescht was imprisoned for a period of four years and 
three months, and in solitary confinement for a period of nine months. Du Toit had very 
little freedom, limited communication except with his guards and was seldom taken out 
of his cell. He was able to do exercise in a small cage outside of his cell. For most of his 
imprisonment, Du Toit had access to a television set and radio in his cell. He received 
three meals a day, similar to the food that Van der Mescht received.  
 
Van der Mescht was a POW for a much longer period than Du Toit, had relative freedom 
of movement outside of his communal cell during the day, and communication with 
fellow prisoners. For both POWs, communication between prison and home were 
challenging and erratic and little news were received. Du Toit’s wife Louwna, visited him 
on three occasions in August 1985, March 1986 and December 1986. Du Toit was 
captured by FAPLA and held as a POW by Cuban forces waging war in Angola. Visits 
by his wife were arranged by the Angolan authorities, who treated her like a VIP; it was 
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manipulated for propaganda purposes, showing diplomacy and goodwill towards the 
West. Van der Mescht was captured by SWAPO and held in an Angolan prison as a 
POW of SWAPO. The political circumstances and authorities in power differed for the 
two POWs, and SWAPO did not allow visits by Van der Mescht’s wife. As detailed in 
Chapter three, the SADF made a concerted effort to look after the welfare of Cheryl and 
Chantal whilst Van der Mescht was imprisoned. It seems as if the SADF and NP 
government did not favor any parties, they were attempting behind the scenes to get the 
respective POWs released. As with Van der Mescht, the ICRC visited Du Toit, monitored 
his captivity and submitted reports to the NP government.  
 
Du Toit had feelings of guilt when he was in prison and thereafter. He felt that he failed 
his country and his unit, he did not succeed with the operation, two of his men died and 
he was captured.210 Van der Mescht also felt guilty about the fact that he survived the 
attack and fellow soldiers got killed. In defence of Van der Mescht’s situation, it can be 
noted that Van der Mescht was performing his national service as a conscript; he was not 
the aggressor and attacked in the early morning hours; whilst Du Toit was committing 
sabotage in Angola as the aggressor on behalf of the SADF. 
 
After Du Toit’s capture, PW Botha instructed the Ministers’ of Defence and Foreign 
Affairs to do everything in their power to release Du Toit.211 The urgency that stemmed 
from the most senior office in the country might have been absent at the time of Van der 
Mescht’s capture, however comprehensive negotiations for his release did take place as 
set out in the beginning of the chapter. Various avenues were followed in order to release 
Du Toit, amongst others working through the ICRC, but without success. At this stage 
the diplomatic relationship between South Africa and Angola was strained to the extent 
that communication broke down which made negotiations very complicated.   
 
Negotiations for Du Toit’s release made no progress until a French businessman with 
interests in southern Africa came to the rescue in July 1986. He used a pseudo name of 
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Monsieur Jacques, and acted as the international peace broker in the complicated 
negotiations towards organizing a prisoner exchange. Monsieur Jacques had the consent 
from his own Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, to act on non diplomatic terms as a French 
citizen. He also had the loose mandate from the NP government and worked with an 
SADF official in meeting with Angolan authorities. Today it is known that the man’s real 
name is Jean-Yves Ollivier. He recently financed a documentary film Plot for Peace 
(2013) about his alleged involvement in bringing peace and stability to southern Africa 
towards the release of Nelson Mandela in 1994, which involved the release of Du Toit in 
1987.212  
 
The main actors in the prisoner exchange deal were the governments of South Africa, 
Angola, France, the Netherlands and Mozambique; the independent homeland of Ciskei; 
and UNITA. The airport at Maputo was chosen as the neutral location for the exchange to 
take place. Jonas Savimbi offered a number of 133 FAPLA soldiers that UNITA held 
captive to use in the exchange. Pierre-André Albertini, a French citizen who smuggled 
arms for the ANC became part of the prisoner swap, in exchange for the French 
involvement. He was imprisoned in the homeland of Ciskei at the time. A Dutch citizen, 
Klaas de Jonge, who smuggled arms for the ANC and was held captive in Pretoria, 
became part of the prisoner swap, and Du Toit completed the list.213 
  
On 7 September 1987, Du Toit was released from prison. From Luanda he was flown to 
Maputo in an Angolan presidential aircraft. Only now was the exchange agreement 
signed between Monsieur Jacques and two Angolan cabinet ministers present in the 
aircraft. A very specific route was followed so the aircraft with Du Toit onboard could be 
picked up by radar, for the remainder of the role players to start their respective journeys 
towards Maputo for the exchange to take place. The plan was that the various aircraft 
would reach Maputo at roughly the same time and park in a predetermined position. 
Albertini was onboard an aircraft from Ciskei, De Jonge was onboard an aircraft from 
Pretoria and the FAPLA prisoners were onboard a South African passenger aircraft from 
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Namibia. An Angolan passenger aircraft temporarily withdrew from the national airline 
to fly to Maputo to fetch the FAPLA prisoners to return them to Angola. The Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Pik Botha, was onboard a presidential aircraft from Pretoria in which Du 
Toit would return to South Africa. A French executive aircraft was on its way to Maputo 
to fetch De Jonge and Albertini and return them to Europe.214 
  
In Maputo, Du Toit was first met by an SADF medical doctor who explained to him that 
Pik Botha was present to welcome him, that he was considered a national hero at home 
and that the international media was waiting to report on the major international 
exchange about to take place. According to Mozambique officials, the media contingent 
present was the biggest seen in the country since independence. The various prisoners 
walked across the runway towards their freedom and boarded the respective aircraft that 
would return them home. Du Toit arrived at Air Force Base Ysterplaat in Cape Town 
where he was personally welcomed by PW Botha and several other high ranking 
politicians and senior SADF officers. He was accompanied by Louwna and their son 
Klippie to the presidential home for a welcoming reception and party, attended by high 
ranking politicians and senior SADF officers.215  
 
The homecoming reception that Du Toit received is in stark contrast to Van der Mescht’s 
return, although Van der Mescht did receive a warm welcome by SADF officials at Air 
Force Base Waterkloof. This can be attested to the fact that Du Toit was an elite soldier 
with the rank of an officer in contrast to Van der Mescht who was an ordinary troop 
conscript without rank. Differential treatment between officers and non-commissioned 
officers is common practice in the military. Van der Mescht lacked both the educational 
and military credentials that Du Toit had, and it was easier to continue the allegation that 
he was a traitor, since he was of little value for the NP government and the SADF.  
  
It has to be considered that Van der Mescht and Du Toit was captured and released 
during different periods of the war. September 1987 saw an increased military action in 
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Angola that leaned more towards a conventional war, with FAPLA, Russian and Cuban 
forces getting progressively more involved. International pressure and local opposition 
increased on South Africa to resolve the Namibian independence matter and retreat its 
military force from Angola. The fact that Du Toit was captured as an aggressor deep 
inside Angolan territory did not sit well with the anti-apartheid community waiting for 
South Africa to settle its domestic affairs. Again, as was the case with the previous POWs 
captured, it reminded the public at home of the possibility for young men to die and get 
captured in the Border War waged far from home. Keeping its voters and the public 
satisfied became increasingly challenging for the NP government.     
 
It is clear that Du Toit received a better welcome when he returned home and became a 
national hero whilst Van der Mescht was branded a traitor. In addition to the factors 
already discussed, it could further be attributed to a class division between Van der 
Mescht and Du Toit that stems from a historical Afrikaner perspective on class. Van der 
Mescht is viewed as a working class Afrikaner whilst Du Toit is viewed as part of the 
Afrikaner establishment. After school, Van der Mescht became an artisan which is   
considered a blue collar worker. In contrast, Du Toit was considered of a higher social 
standing because of his educational and military qualifications, holding a military tertiary 
degree and his position as an officer in the elite forces of the SADF.  
 
Class division amongst Afrikaners can be traced back to the 1890’s when the question of 
white poverty became an issue in Afrikaner politics, reaching urgency in the 1930’s when 
it threatened white supremacy. After the Anglo Boer War, the scorched earth policy of 
the British Army forced many Afrikaners to leave their farms and find work in urban 
areas. The urban economy was already dominated by English speaking communities who 
were mostly better educated than the Afrikaners. The majority of the first generation 
urbanized Afrikaners lacked formal education and labor skills, and as a result became 
excluded from the formal job market, having to compete with workers other than white 
for the lowest levels of work that led to poverty.216 
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After the Union of South Africa was established in 1910, divisions between Afrikaners 
emerged as a result of those in favor and those against British sentiments, in the wake of 
the Anglo Boer War. General Jan Smuts, who became the leader of the South African 
Party and Prime Minister in 1919, unofficially represented the English. His Afrikaner 
supporters and followers were mostly wealthy and well educated.217 The Pact government 
of General Hertzog that came to power in 1924 unofficially represented Afrikaners with 
republican and nationalist ideals and of a more conservative and modest status than those 
following Smuts. At the time it was referred to as the Sappe supporting Smuts and the 
Natte supporting Hertzog, and this dynamic dominated Afrikaner politics until the NP 
victory in 1948.  
 
Between 1933 and 1950, the poor white issue was seriously addressed by the authorities 
and partly solved. The growth of the white educational system to help address the 
problem produced an Afrikaner intelligentsia comprising of teachers, academics, 
journalists, church ministers, politicians and legal professionals. After the NP victory in 
1948, the newly formed government ensured that the interests of the working class were 
protected against competition from workers other than white. The new political 
dispensation comprised an alliance between Afrikaner intelligentsia, middle class and the 
working class. The working class was fully absorbed into the nationalist movement, but 
not placed in key positions. They were guaranteed employment through the civil service 
and state owned organizations such as Iscor and the South African Railways.218 
 
During the 1960’s, the average economic growth of six percent, led to the emergence and 
the rise of an Afrikaner middle class. The majority of Afrikaners benefited materially 
during this period. They improved their education and business skills, and a new class of 
urban, financial, industrial and commercial capitalists emerged, leading towards a new 
Afrikaner social order.219 Availability of credit and a better disposable income, coupled 
with a new consumer culture, contributed towards a shift in the Afrikaner social order. 
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This new found status identification created a differentiated society with Afrikaners 
competing for social and economic success. Status was measured in terms of wealth and 
education, and increased wealth brought about a class division. Economic growth 
impacted on Afrikaner politics and differences occurred between the so called “verligte” 
and “verkrampte” Afrikaner, with the NP government increasingly represented as a 
bourgeoisie party, emphasizing economic growth and portraying whites as modern and 
the elite.220 Towards the end of the 1970’s, the class division amongst Afrikaners 
increased because of continuous political differences and Afrikaner unity further 
declined. The working class felt uncomfortable with the NP government’s policy of 
introducing skilled work to workers other than white who became competition in the 
labor market. This further led to a class differentiation between the educated intelligentsia 
and less educated middle and working class Afrikaners.221 
 
As in other state organizations, the SADF also absorbed working class and lower working 
class elements. During the 1960’s, the SADF was still dependant on officers who were 
mostly English speaking, with experience from the Second World War. The SADF 
increasingly promoted Afrikaner interests and by the late 1960’s, Afrikaners dominated 
the numbers within the organization, with an Afrikaner nationalist overtone, suggesting 
Broederbond infiltration in management positions. Membership to the Broederbond, who 
was concerned about Afrikaner unity and growth of Afrikaner interests, was not keen on 
accepting working class Afrikaners into its ranks, which further contributed to class 
differentiation. The NP government made an attempt to integrate the SADF into the 
Afrikaner domain. This situation remained the status quo until the SADF was 
transformed into the SANDF in 1994.222 
 
There are both similarities and differences in the circumstances in which Van der Mescht 
and Du Toit were captured, imprisoned and released. They were captured by different 
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enemy forces during different periods in the war, resulting in different political dynamics 
to their respective circumstances. Class division played a role in the manner that Van der 
Mescht and Du Toit were treated and perceived by their government and public. 
However, both men suffered trauma as a result of being POWs and imprisoned in a 
foreign hostile country.  
 
Van der Mescht continued working for Iscor until he received a severance package in the 
wake of the new political dispensation in the 1990’s. Since then he has worked in war 
torn Iraq on a few occasions, building armored vehicles; and work as a boiler maker for 
different companies. 
  
After his return from Angola, Du Toit continued his employment within the SADF and 
left a number of years later to form a private security company in Johannesburg, in the 
period of transition to a new political dispensation. Du Toit and his first wife Louwna 
separated at the end of 2001.223 Du Toit and his new family, wife Frances and two pre-
school children, permanently relocated to the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) in 
2011 where they now live on the farm Belle Terre (Beautiful Land) that they lease from 
the government. Congo (Brazzaville) invited South African farmers to start commercial 
farming, develop the agricultural sector, contribute towards food security and transfer 
skills in a country where only two percent of the land is farmed and most food is 
imported. Ironically, Du Toit was asked to lead the first group of mostly Afrikaner 
farmers to the Congo (Brazzaville) by road and they passed not far from where he was 
captured 26 years prior. But this time the mission had a positive objective, to contribute 
in the centre of the African continent. The group of mostly Afrikaner farmers left South 
Africa for both economical and political reasons, although Du Toit says that his reason is 
not political, but economical: “I don’t bother with politics, the new government is better 
than the old one and I’m angrier with the old government”.224 
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Chapter 5: Reflecting on the reality of documentary filmmaking, with reference to    
the production of Captor and Captive 
 
This chapter discusses the process towards the production of Captor and Captive, from 
inception to the end product, reflecting on the experience and the various challenges 
thereof. It explores the realities of producing documentary films with specific reference 
to Captor and Captive. The theoretical principles involved in the craft of documentary 
filmmaking are outlined, whereby documentary film can be analyzed. Captor and 
Captive is a documentary film of historical nature, drawing from historical events as well 
as the present. It follows the stories of two men, the main characters or protagonists of the 
documentary, namely Van der Mescht and Ashipala. Their respective stories form the 
narrative of the documentary, supplemented with additional content from sub characters. 
Very often, the content of documentary film is controversial and contentious, and 
characters’ stories often traumatic, dramatic and painful, as is the situation in Captor and 
Captive. The factual reality of documentary film brings filmmakers into close contact 
with their characters and they ideally have to dig deep into characters’ personal lives and 
everyday realities to maximize on the content.225 This inevitably leads to ethical matters 
which will be unpacked since it is an important aspect when representing individuals’ or 
communities’ stories through film. The chapter further discusses the role of filmmakers 
within the production process, having their own agendas, perceptions, viewpoints, ideas 
and perceived outcome, and how this ultimately impact on the outcome of a product. This 
is especially important when dealing with documentary films of historical nature, where 
matters of factual truth and objectivity versus subjectivity are at stake.  
 
Filmmakers need to consider the criteria from film fund organizations as well as potential 
markets and distribution platforms for their products. In this regard, business decisions 
and principles are at stake. The reaction from the South African public on Captor and 
Captive is discussed, which underlines the opposing emotions and viewpoints regarding 
the Border War involved. This is measured against the reaction from the Namibian public 
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which is in stark contrast, underlining the impact that the portrayal of a heroic character 
has on a film.  
 
To evaluate documentary film’s relationship to reality, presenting the truth and ethical 
issues is a difficult task partly because the genre itself is difficult to define. There are 
many sub-genres, each with their own unique demands. To outline a theoretical 
framework for analyzing the practice of documentary filmmaking, the work of Bill 
Nichols is mostly used since his work is the most familiar and widely used within film 
analysis, and he is considered the guru of documentary theory by some film academics.  
 
Bill Nichols developed a typology of documentary modes, recognizing that 
documentaries cannot be rigidly categorized. His work seeks to provide a framework for 
analyzing different forms and functions of documentary, which breaks down the 
documentary genre into six distinct sub-genres or modes. Each of these modes represents 
a set of features and conventions with the aim of representing the reality in documentary 
more accurately and ethically. Most contemporary films contain elements of more than 
one mode and it offers fluid strategies that can be applied across a wide range of films.  
 
The expository mode of documentary is didactic and often uses voice-over with strong 
arguments advocating for a specific cause. Although the characters are given interviews 
to voice their opinions, their input is limited and the filmmakers’ point of view is upfront. 
Expository mode assumes that the filmmaker knows absolute truths about the real world. 
Contemporary critics argue that no filmmaker has access to or can accurately represent 
the truth.226  
 
Observational mode is a fly on the wall type of filmmaking where real events are 
observed and filmed as they happen with minimal intervention from the filmmaker. The 
editing style is also minimalist, observing the realities as it plays out in front of the 
camera. The term cinema vérité that developed in Europe, is also used to describe this 
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mode, as well as direct cinema that developed in North America, which are similar styles 
with slight variation.227  
 
With participatory mode, characters actively engage, ask questions, investigate and 
provoke action and dialogue before the camera. The most common interaction is the on-
camera interview whereby characters speak for themselves directly to the viewer. 
Characters’ commentary tends to carry more weight and become more central to the films 
argument in participatory mode than in expository mode. It also lacks the didactic tone of 
expository mode. It could be argued that the participatory mode is a form of collaborative 
filmmaking.228  
  
Reflexive mode encourages viewers to see documentary for what it is; a constructed 
representation. Filmmakers often appear on camera revealing their own roles in 
constructing representations of reality and viewers might trust the process more. This 
mode of filmmaking challenges conventional assumptions of truth, order and authority.229 
 
The poetic mode is concerned with exploring the aesthetic and emphasizes mood and 
tone. Its main feature is not to convey factual information or make strong arguments, and 
it is not ideal for portraying social messages. Poetic mode combines experimental and 
documentary elements.230 
 
The performative mode emphasizes understanding and empathy and is less focused on 
making arguments and presenting factual information. Performative films tend to allow 
viewers to walk in the shoes of the characters. It is well suited for representing 
marginalized people or communities.231 
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Captor and Captive contains elements of observational, participatory, poetic and 
performative modes of filmmaking. It was produced with a clear point of view and 
message without being didactic and allowed the content to speak for itself. At times the 
camera followed the characters, observed their emotions and let them play out in front of 
the camera without interference. The main characters’ voices were heard throughout, they 
were given a platform to express their respective stories and it became the dominant 
narrative in the storyline. Some scenes in the film had to be reconstructed due to a lack of 
visual material available regarding the historical events which involved aesthetic 
principles, in addition to the archival film footage that was utilized as cutaways. Van der 
Mescht’s story was presented with the aim of evoking empathy for his situation, and 
slightly manipulated.  
 
The author met Van der Mescht in September 2007 to explore the possibility of making a 
documentary film about his experience as a POW, against the background of the Border 
War. It was decided to include the story and perspective of Van der Mescht’s SWAPO 
captor Ashipala, to present a more balanced story of an incident that took place more than 
30 years ago. On its own, Van der Mescht’s story was not strong enough to carry a 52-
minute historical documentary film. September 2007 marks the beginning of an exciting 
yet challenging project, stretching over a period of more than three years to completion of 
the film.  
 
Kristin Pichaske, an American film academic, lecturer and documentary filmmaker notes 
that documentary films bear a particular significance for societies in transition; in terms 
of reclaiming history, redefining identities, and giving previously marginalized people a 
voice. The intention with the production of Captor and Captive was due to the author’s  
personal interest in the Border War, to make sense of a troubled past in a transforming 
society and to tell a previously untold story within the context of the war. She aimed to 
show how innocent people are used by politicians as pawns in war situations, which is a 
global phenomenon and not exclusive to the Border War. Van der Mescht was given a 
platform to tell his side of the story not voiced before, and participate in the public 
discourse of the war which is currently very topical. The intention was to show that Van 
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der Mescht was wrongly accused of being a traitor through a rumor that was spread to 
cover the SADF’s mistakes during the incident where Van der Mescht was captured. It 
was not intended to expose the SADF in a negative manner, although it transpired as such 
and matters were left to unfold. In contrast to the SADF’s portrayal, PLAN featured as 
the heroic military force. It stems from portraying Ashipala as the victor who captured 
Van der Mescht successfully and the SADF not being able to find the captured soldier, a 
huge embarrassment for them at the time. This relates to one incident in a war that took 
place over a period of 23 years, and the respective armed forces’ performance cannot be 
measured based on one incident, and should be seen within a wider context. Ashipala was 
also given a platform to present his version of the story. He was a proud and confident 
soldier and regarded as a national liberation hero in Namibia.232 Ashipala naturally came 
across as the victor of the story and limited intervention was needed. Captor and Captive 
further aimed to bring old enemy soldiers together through the first time meeting between 
Van der Mescht and Ashipala more than 30 years after the incident that changed both of 
their lives. This was an idealistic attempt to contribute towards reconciliation and nation-
building in the southern African context, after many decades of colonial oppression.      
 
Documentary film continues to raise dialogue and debate about the relationship between 
truth and the filmic image, matters of representation, as well as matters of accuracy and 
objectivity when representing stories. A topic often discussed is whether documentary 
film directly represents reality, as opposed to describing it in text format. Early 
documentary filmmakers such as John Grierson, believed that it was their responsibility 
to record and interpret the world as they saw it. Grierson argued that you photograph the 
natural life but also create an interpretation of it.233 Nichols describes documentary film 
as a means by which pleasure and power, ideologies and utopias, subjects and 
subjectivities receive tangible representation. However, he notes that documentaries 
cannot fully capture the historical world and argues that filmmakers have an obligation to 
acknowledge their inability to do so. Film academic Jay Ruby argues that documentary 
filmmakers should attempt to produce documentaries that are subjective of nature rather 
                                                 
232 Ashipala passed away in May 2010, a few months after filming was completed. 
233 Pichaske, K. Colour Adjustment: Race and Representation in Post-Apartheid South African 
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than attempt to capture an objective truth.234 South African documentary filmmaker 
David Max-Brown is of the opinion that all films are created and filmmakers are 
interpreters of situations. “Cameras do not make films, people do. There is no stopping 
viewpoints or perceptions coming to bear on the outcome of a film, and when filmmakers 
declare more openly what their viewpoint is then the product will be more 
trustworthy”.235 
 
If we assume that documentary film cannot perfectly capture reality in an objective 
manner, then filmmakers still have a responsibility to ensure that their films are as 
factually correct as possible through thorough research; as well as ethical consideration 
towards the individual, group or community that is represented. This will also ensure that 
documentary films are valuable sources of content with integrity. The manner in which 
people, cultures and ideas are represented through documentaries often becomes the norm 
and viewers tend to believe what they see. Filmmakers inevitably have a huge 
responsibility. With regards to documentary film of historical nature, matters of truth and 
objectivity are even more critical to consider, since the discipline of history has its own 
set of rules and conventions. Historical texts cannot be considered as completely 
objective or truthful as is the case with documentary film of any genre; and it depends on 
the perspective, ideology and viewpoint of the author or filmmaker.  
 
When filmmakers set out with a clear point of view and seek subjective truths, the 
content might be more authentic, as opposed to trying to sell it as being the absolute 
objective truth. Documentary film that is objective have no authors; only reporters who 
present the ‘who, what, when, where and whys’ of the truth.236 News reporting is factual 
and unbiased, and presents the facts and detail in an objective manner, devoid of emotion. 
In contrast, documentary film takes a position on an event and expresses a point of view 
on the situation. Making subjective films allows documentary filmmakers to present their 
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own opinions and having their own voice. However, filmmakers’ have a duty to declare 
or make clear the position taken and not disguise it as the only truth.237  
 
 South African documentary filmmaker Mark Kaplan says: “I seek out subjective truths. 
As to objectivity, I seek to make it clear what my standpoint is as the filmmaker so that 
audiences are clear to make up their own minds”.238 
 
The author’s approach with Captor and Captive is similar to that of Kaplan’s. She has a 
clear point of view, present different perspectives and wish for viewers to have their own 
opinion. The content of Captor and Captive is considered to be subjective truth and the 
aim is to present well researched content with verification of factual information as far as 
possible. One of the key priorities throughout the process was consideration of ethical 
matters and respect towards the characters.  
 
Pichaske suggests that the intent, integrity and approach of filmmakers are important for 
representational accuracy. She identifies three factors that are critical to accurate and 
ethical representation. This includes representing the filmmaker’s point of view as 
opposed to objective representation of pure facts; building of meaningful relationships 
between the filmmaker and characters, with a level of understanding and empathy 
towards the characters; collaboration between filmmakers and characters to a degree 
where characters have input towards their representation, as opposed to outside 
storytelling.239 
 
When documentary film is character driven and the narrative sourced primarily from 
characters’ stories, filmmakers should ideally spend ample time with characters to get to 
know them and win their trust; and ultimately get as much content from interviews as 
possible. This inevitably means entering characters’ personal lives and space and forming 
close relationships. It asks for a subtle approach from filmmakers who need to set 
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boundaries for both parties in the process, as well as ethical responsibilities towards their 
characters. Pichaske’s conclusion from her experience as a documentary filmmaker and 
doctoral dissertation notes that the existence of a meaningful, long-term relationship 
between filmmaker and filmed is the single most reliable determinant of ethical 
documentary practice, and has positive aesthetic implications.240 In addition, characters 
often use the opportunity as a cathartic process through reliving their stories and 
memories which might be painful and traumatic, but emotionally helpful in the end. 
 
With regards to the relationship between filmmaker and characters, filmmakers generally 
hold the balance of power through the control of the production process, and are able to 
manipulate the content to suit their point of view. The concept of representation, meaning 
who has the right to represent whom and in what fashion creates ethical challenges and 
responsibilities for documentary filmmakers. There is no single correct approach or clear 
set of ethical guidelines available. In feature films the characters are actors and in 
documentary films the characters are social actors whose real lives are revealed on 
screen. Documentary filmmaking touches on disciplines of art, journalism and social 
science and each has their own ethical considerations. Artists using people for their 
aesthetic creations generally have greater artistic freedom than is the case with 
documentary film. Investigative journalism has set a precedent that justifies the practice 
of damaging reports about individuals or communities without their consent and without 
taking responsibility for the impact that it might have on the individual or community.241   
 
The most powerful and effective elements of documentary film include drama, conflict, 
suspense and emotion; elements which might require intervention from filmmakers or 
exposing the characters in vulnerable moments. This situation can lead to exploitation of 
characters, but it could also be treated subtly without any harm done towards characters, 
depending on filmmakers’ approach.242 
 
                                                 
240 Pichaske, K. Colour Adjustment: Race and Representation in Post-Apartheid South African 
Documentary, PhD Thesis, Film and Media Studies, University of Cape Town, 2009, p 69. 
241 Ibid, pp 44 – 45. 
242 Ibid, p 51. 
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There seems to be a perception that it is glamorous to be characters in documentary film 
and appear on television, and therefore characters often willingly and eagerly agrees to 
participate in documentary film. It is important for filmmakers to have access to 
characters for their stories, in order to make their films. Most often, characters don’t 
understand the full consequences and scope of the work, being unfamiliar with the film 
process, which often leads to unrealistic expectations. It is therefore important that 
filmmakers explain the process to characters as thorough as possible. Broadcast law 
requires informed consent either in the form of a signed contract referred to as release 
forms or acknowledgement on camera. This meets the legal responsibility that 
filmmakers have towards their characters and the various screening platforms. The ethical 
question however remains if this meets the moral responsibility filmmakers have towards 
their characters. Filmmakers decide how much to reveal to characters about their 
intentions and plans and sometimes have to withhold information for better access. 
  
The general practice in global documentary filmmaking regarding payment towards 
characters’ participation is that they do not get compensated financially. However this is 
the general consensus and not a fixed rule; situations differ and each film has its own 
unique demands. When there is extreme poverty as is often the situation when filming in 
Third World or developing countries, exceptions are often made. Filmmakers often 
contribute towards food parcels or work in conjunction with and donate funds towards 
social organizations active in poverty stricken communities. It sometimes happens that 
characters make unrealistic demands towards filmmakers for telling their stories.  
Documentary films often take years to finish and the initial discussions, negotiations and 
circumstances could change with time and characters sometimes make demands after 
consent has been given. Filmmakers are dependant on characters for their stories and 
finishing their films, and the situation could potentially challenge film production 
processes. 
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Consideration of pace and rhythm is important when editing a film.243 Whilst watching a 
film, there is no time to stop in order to read or watch again, as opposed to written text. In 
order to make a film appealing to potential audiences, many factors including the style, 
the pace, the visual treatment, the message, the angle, the factual correctness and 
verification of facts need to be considered, in order to produce a credible product. 
 
The production of historical films is complex and need multiple skills in order to execute. 
Challenges encountered in the production of Captor and Captive includes: condensing a 
comprehensive piece of work into a 52-minute film; explaining the background of the 
Border War within the Cold War context, and various role players involved to viewers 
with no background knowledge; ensure factual correctness since the film deals with 
historical matters; consideration of audience and commercial appeal, and accommodating 
a wide range of expected target markets; dealing with a traumatized character Van der 
Mescht and his family’s demands and expectations; wearing many hats and conducting 
many roles within the process due to budget constraints; little access and time spent with 
Ashipala, due to locating him late in the process with negotiations to gain film access 
regarding SWAPO’s involvement; budget constraints impacted on quality of product, 
was only able to use one camera and at times needed two, for instance where Van der 
Mescht and Ashipala met for the first time in 30 years, the moment was so powerful and 
more than one camera would have captured a better reality, often had to film in harsh sun 
or dusk situations without filters and lights to ensure quality footage, filmed without a 
sound technician which impacted on sound quality, had little time to film in Namibia 
after Van der Mescht and Ashipala met and had to travel long distances with crew and 
characters.  
 
Van der Mescht, Cheryl and their two daughters, who became sub characters and part of 
the process, were very keen on the idea of a documentary film about his experience as a 
POW and the impact it had, and still has on their lives. They agreed to share their story, 
participate in the film and allow the author into their lives. They were also keen to meet 
                                                 
243 The term editing refers to structuring the film footage into sequences to form a storyline. Editing allows 
modification of events on screen, shortening or lengthening of sequences and rearranging the chronology.  
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Van der Mescht’s SWAPO captor and the prospect of visiting the site of his capture at the 
waterhole in the north of Namibia. The family hoped that it would bring closure to a 
painful chapter in their lives.  
 
The process was started by spending time with Van der Mescht and his family to get to 
know them and document his side of the story, initially without a camera. Logistical 
access was easy since the author and Van der Mescht both lived in Gauteng. Months were 
spent at the Documentation Centre of the Department of Defence in Pretoria to obtain 
official records of Van der Mescht’s capture, imprisonment and release. The documents 
were classified as secret and the bureaucracy involved for declassification prolonged the 
process. Van der Mescht had vague memories of what has happened to him. His story 
had many gaps and had to be filled by official documents and information from former 
SADF personnel serving at the time of his capture and imprisonment, as well as his 
captor Ashipala. The information was shared with Van der Mescht and his family who 
knew little of the incident apart from what Van der Mescht could vaguely remember. It 
was the first time that they learnt what has really happened during the attack and 
thereafter, and how the negotiations to release him were conducted. It was also the first 
time since the incident that Van der Mescht was confronted with the realities of what has 
happened to him between 1978 and 1982. Cheryl related that the filming process was a 
difficult time for her husband to relive the memories and talk about it. When he returned 
from Angola he shut down emotionally, seldom spoke about the incident, carried on with 
life, and as a result little healing and acceptance took place over the years. The filming of 
Captor and Captive was an opportunity for Van der Mescht to find closure and peace.    
 
The process of production of Captor and Captive was supported by Louis Bothma who 
performed his national service during the period that Van der Mescht was captured. In 
fact, he saw Van der Mescht at Elundu, a few days before the capture took place, since 32 
Battalion was active with cross-border patrols in the area. Bothma played a vital role in 
giving emotional support to Van der Mescht and his family, as a fellow soldier who 
understands the trauma and context. In addition, the Van der Mescht family was offered 
professional psychological support during the process, but did not accept. Van der 
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Mescht was also invited to join informal meetings held by the Engineering Corps 
(Sappers) who formed a support group for former Sappers, and did not accept the offer 
either.  
 
There was limited information available about SWAPO’s role in the attack and upon 
embarking on the project it was unknown who the captor was. Obtaining the information 
was a lengthy process due to limited funds and recourses to make the film, as well as a 
general distrust between former enemy forces, that still prevailed at the time. Only in 
September 2009, official contact was made through a military network with SWAPO in 
Windhoek. It was important to follow correct procedures and diplomacy to gain filming 
access to the right people. A former officer commander of 32 Battalion, Eddie Viljoen, 
who communicates with former PLAN commanders, facilitated the process which led to 
a meeting in Windhoek with the Minister of Defence, Charles Namoloh. He held a senior 
position in the operation where Van der Mescht was captured and introduced the author 
to PLAN soldiers, including Ashipala, who participated in the operation. It was the first 
time that the SWAPO version of the incident became officially known. Access to 
SWAPO’s archive SPARC was arranged through Per Sanden who manages the facility. 
The opportunity was used to interview and film Ashipala who was very willing and eager 
to participate in the film.  
 
Research visit to meet SWAPO in Windhoek, October 2009, facilitated by former 32 Battalion 
soldiers.  
From left to right: Danger Ashipala, Rina Jooste, Charles Namoloh, Louis Bothma, Martin Shalli, 
Gert Jacobie. 
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Filming an interview with Ashipala in Windhoek, October 2009. 
 
To substantiate on Van der Mescht and Ashipala’s stories and set the context for the war, 
two so-called experts were interviewed to present the SADF and SWAPO’s respective 
ideologies and reason for participating in the war. Both former soldiers, Ep van Lill and 
Martin Shalli, participated in the battle discussed in the film, held senior positions at the 
time and could therefore comment from a point of authority. However they cannot be 
held accountable for representing the absolute truth about their respective organizations.   
 
With reference to Captor and Captive, the narrative forms the backbone, and supporting 
visuals and text records complete the film. A variety of elements were combined to 
construct the film. This included interviews with the characters, sub characters and two 
experts; archive film footage; still photos; text records from archives; newspaper 
clippings; cutaways and re-enactments. Very often, factual information does not have 
supporting visual footage because everything cannot be filmed, especially in historical 
films. That is when re-enactments or creative treatment of existing footage are used. 
Talking heads, a term referring to experts being interviewed, can become monotonous 
when there are no cutaways to use. Filmmakers have to ensure availability of enough 
appropriate visual stimulation for audience attention.  
 
With reference to Captor and Captive, there were many challenges regarding the 
availability of enough cutaways and visual material. Film archive footage was sourced 
from various sources however there were limitations due to budget constraints. No visual 
footage of the attack on the waterhole and capture of Van der Mescht by Ashipala were 
available. Re-enactments were not an option due to the chosen style of the film, in 
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addition to it being a costly exercise. The film’s editor Margaux Truter worked through 
50 hours of available film archive footage to reconstruct an attack and capture scene. 
Visual material of soldiers, ammunition and the geographical location where Van der 
Mescht was captured were used effectively, coupled with emotive music and sound 
effects. This option requires a skilled and creative film editor.     
 
There was no film footage available of Van der Mescht whilst in prison, and filming in 
Angola at the Sao Paulo prison where he was held was not an option. The old fort prison 
in Johannesburg was filmed as a credible visual alternative and used effectively as 
cutaways. There was no film footage available of the family at home during the period of 
Van der Mescht’s imprisonment, except for a few still photos. To support Cheryl’s 
interview, specifically where she talks about the loneliness whilst her husband was in 
prison, a blonde girl playing with a doll was filmed, depicting isolation and loneliness, 
suggesting their daughter Chantal. A street scene and block of flats in Boksburg were 
filmed to depict where they lived and the footage was treated to suit the period of the 
1970’s. This editing technique is referred to as grading, which means adjusting the color 
of the visual material. There was no film footage available of the spy swap and 
dramatized footage was obtained that depicted the scene. The footage was graded to suit 
the period. There are many more examples throughout Captor and Captive where limited 
or no film footage was available to use within scenes and the film editor had to make 
many creative plans.  
 
With regards to matters of objectivity and truth, Van der Mescht received more screening 
time than Ashipala. This was not the intention but emotional, logistical and geographical 
factors transpired into more time spent with Van der Mescht. Limited official information 
was available about the spy swap where Van der Mescht was exchanged for a Russian 
spy alongside eight Western spies. The primary source was Van der Mescht who is not an 
accurate source. A request for information was made to the former Director-General of 
the NIS, Niёl Barnard, who was responsible for leading the negotiations that led to the 
eventual release. The request was denied and alternative former NIS channels and 
sources were blocked. The same applies to information requested about former Special 
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Force soldier Wynand du Toit. Requests were made to the Department of Defence, 
Documentation Centre and Special Force channels without success. It seems as if the 
information is not accessible to the public or evidence has been destroyed, despite the 
PAIA established for this purpose.  
  
There are many editing techniques available to manipulate and reconstruct footage and 
narration to suit selected viewpoints or take films in different directions. With reference 
to Captor and Captive, selected sequences of the film was manipulated, mainly the 
portrayal of Van der Mescht as a main character. Van der Mescht is traumatized and 
emotionally closed. The filmed footage was slightly manipulated, based on ethical 
considerations to protect Van der Mescht; sales and distribution considerations and 
considering viewers emotions to feel empathy towards the main character. It seems as if 
the method succeeded since the general feedback of the film is mostly that of empathy 
towards Van der Mescht, except for feedback from the Afrikaner market. 
  
The method used to manipulate Van der Mescht’s portrayal as a character was to focus 
on Cheryl’s emotions, using it as a thread throughout the film. The portrayal of Cheryl’s 
character was not manipulated and she was represented as close to reality as is possible 
when capturing characters through documentary film. Portraying his wife as the 
supportive and loving person she is, diverted the focus from an angry Van der Mescht 
and assisted in empathy towards his situation. To further support this method, a loving 
family man, father and husband was emphasized.  
 
The treatment of the second main character Ashipala posed less challenges except the 
limited access which mostly transpired into issues of filmic quality. The filmed interview 
with Ashipala in Windhoek after meeting him for the first time necessitated the service of 
a local Oshivambo speaking cinematographer for political reasons. With limited choice in 
selecting a suitable candidate the result was footage of poor quality not meeting broadcast 
standards. At the time as much footage as possible had to be filmed to ensure getting 
maximum exposure. The fact that very little time was spent with Ashipala before he was 
filmed for his first interview, contributed to less content and emotion as was desired, 
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coupled with the use of a translator. Ashipala’s home language was Oshivambo and he 
was not fluent in English. The following solutions were made: creative use of limited 
cutaways to conceal the poor cinematography during his interview; use of an English 
voice over to narrate Ashipala’s dialogue as opposed to using English subtitles and 
thereby concealing the lack of emotion and language barrier. The choice of the tone and 
emotion used in the voice served to portray Ashipala as the strong and proud soldier that 
he was. Limited manipulation was needed to obtain the desired results. 
 
The manner in which Van der Mescht and Ashipala were portrayed and played off 
against each other when they met for the first time and traveled to the place of capture 
was represented as close to reality as possible, an no intervention was intended or needed. 
Ashipala treated Van der Mescht in a very respectful manner with a patriarchal approach. 
He naturally came across as the victor of the story without any intervention.   
  
First time meeting between Ashipala and Van der Mescht, Windhoek, December 2009.  
Photos courtesy of Eugene Loggenberg. 
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Ashipala explains to the Van der Mescht family how the capture took place at the waterhole, Elundu, 
December 2009. 
Photo courtesy of Eugene Loggenberg. 
 
There is a perception that documentary filmmaking is a glamorous enterprise. On the 
contrary, it is very hard work in often hostile environments and landscapes with limited 
funding possibilities in a very competitive and over saturated market with filmmakers 
often having to conduct various roles to save on overheads. Documentary filmmaking is 
an expensive enterprise and access to funds remains a constant struggle for the most 
successful filmmakers. Possible funds include access to global film funding bodies as 
well as commercial broadcast and distribution channels. This means that documentaries 
ideally have to appeal to the largest audience possible. Documentary films, funded by 
film funding bodies or commissioned by broadcasters, are subject to certain expectations 
and criteria. The pressure of the commercial marketplace necessitates consideration of the 
balance between ethics and aesthetics.  
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Late afternoon filming at the waterhole, Elundu, waiting for sunset golden hour. The day started at 
04h00 in the morning for both crew and characters due to logistical matters.  
 
 
Filming in Ovamboland from left to right: Rina Jooste, Kamati ka Elio, Louis Bothma, Danger 
Ashipala. 
Photo courtesy of Eugene Loggenberg.  
 
According to Pichaske, study after study shows that audiences generally watch films to 
be entertained, rather than being educated. Textbooks on the craft of documentary 
filmmaking focus on the following elements to make a good documentary film: a plot 
with a simple three-act structure, engaging and colorful characters relating to basic 
archetypes, conflict and resolution and above all simplicity. Films should not have too 
many facts, figures and detail.244 The criteria also apply to the access of funding from the 
South African national film fund, the National Film and Video Foundation (NFVF).  
 
Documentary film doesn’t appeal to the mass market as opposed to feature and 
dramatized films of entertainment value, and plays to a much smaller market which 
translates into little revenue. It seldom shows return on investment, not considered 
                                                 
244 Pichaske, K. Colour Adjustment: Race and Representation in Post-Apartheid South African 
Documentary, PhD Thesis, Film and Media Studies, University of Cape Town, 2009, p 52. 
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commercially profitable, and therefore cannot rely on commercial investors. In the South 
African context, this situation is accelerated by the limited domestic and fragmented 
market and filmmakers are continuously seeking international funding, distribution and 
markets. This means consideration of different demands and expectations of both 
domestic and international audiences, and funding bodies. Stories are often simplified to 
make sense to audiences with limited knowledge of South African culture and history and 
thus oversimplifying it for domestic audiences.245 The lifetime of a film also has to be 
considered, since film festival circuit criteria are usually restricted to three years after 
date of production, and broadcasters also have their own criteria in this regard.  
 
South African documentary filmmaker Mark Kaplan says: “We have toiled to make 
documentaries that we want to be seen as widely as possible. To do so we have had to 
satisfy broadcasters in ways that has altered and shaped the way in which the story is 
told, the style, the length and so on. We are told to make our films presenter driven and 
influenced by reality television. This has been a form of tyranny but it is changing fast 
because broadcasters no longer have the financial clout they had. Funding is getting 
harder but there are new ways emerging and this means that there are new film forms 
emerging on new platforms”. 246  
 
With reference to Captor and Captive, the film struggled to attract funding and the author 
and Bothma decided to invest in the film themselves. The cinematographer, editor and 
post production team offered their service on a pro bono basis. Filmmakers refer to this 
practice as a passion project and often it is a great learning experience not to be repeated 
as funds are seldom recouped. Traveling to Namibia with the Van der Mescht family and 
accommodating Ashipala and his group in the north of Namibia inflated the expenses. 
After completion of Captor and Captive, the NFVF paid towards a grant which enabled 
payment for the pro bono services. Working without a broadcast commission or film fund 
gives filmmakers a degree of carte blanche although one still has to seriously consider 
potential markets and distribution platforms.  
                                                 
245 Pichaske, K. Colour Adjustment: Race and Representation in Post-Apartheid South African 
Documentary, PhD Thesis, Film and Media Studies, University of Cape Town, 2009, p 53. 
246 Mark Kaplan, email questionnaire, March 2013. 
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With reference to Captor and Captive, the expected target audience falls within a wide 
scope since the film touches on many universal elements including war, love, betrayal, 
redemption and reconciliation. The film was screened at the following film festivals and 
platforms: Bioscope independent theatre in Johannesburg (2011); AfricAvenir screening 
in Windhoek (2011); Luxor African Film Festival in Luxor (2012); Cape Winelands Film 
Festival in Cape Town (2012); Al Jazeera International Documentary Film Festival in 
Doha (2012); Baghdad International Film Festival in Baghdad (2012); International 
Images Film Festival for Women in Harare (2013). Sales were made to the SABC and the 
Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC). According to feedback received from the 
SABC, the film was well received by the black middle class. At a local film market in 
Johannesburg, it was screened to a class of mostly black film students who appreciated 
the historical content and the perspectives that they are not often presented with, and 
specific mention was made towards the reconciliation effort. It was also screened to a 
class of mostly black film students in Cape Town who echoed the same sentiments as 
their counterparts in Johannesburg, and requested to see more films with similar themes.  
  
The film was well received by white progressive and liberal English and Afrikaans 
speaking viewers. Having screened at three film festivals in the Middle East and 
considering the high profile of the Al Jazeera film festival, it seems as if the film attracted 
interest in the Arab world in the wake of the Arab Awakening following the revolt that 
broke out in Egypt in February 2011. The conclusion is made that the theme of 
reconciliation and a story from the African continent is the point of interest.               
 
According to feedback received from the NBC and AfricAvenir film organization in 
Windhoek, the film was received with great excitement and satisfaction by the SWAPO 
supporting public, with requests for more screenings. It was expected considering the 
portrayal of Ashipala as a national liberation hero and it was the first time that he 
received public screening time in Namibia and that his story was told. In addition, 
SWAPO who became the ruling party in Namibia after independence is portrayed as a 
heroic military force. 
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AfricAvenir screening of Captor and Captive to a sold out audience, Windhoek 2011. 
Photo courtesy of AfricAvenir. 
 
 
Questions and answers facilitated by Martin Shalli and Charles Namoloh. 
Photo courtesy of AfricAvenir. 
 
The above feedback and conclusions is not based on an organized survey, and thus 
difficult to measure. It is literally based on feedback received from the respective 
broadcasters and close observations from attending film festival screenings, audience 
reactions followed by question and answer sessions, and correspondence at times. It is 
thus very limited in its assumed conclusions, but do however shed some light on audience 
appeal and public reaction.      
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It was expected that the main target audience in South Africa would be conservative 
Afrikaners with a political preference towards the rightwing, a group that Van der Mescht 
feels comfortable with. However, no interest or support was received from this segment 
of the public. A number of DVDs was sold to a shop managed by Radio Pretoria, an 
independent Afrikaner radio station with rightwing leanings. No interest was shown, nor 
was any DVDs sold to date. Radio Pretoria presenter Friedel Hansen invited the author 
for an interview about Captor and Captive, with the intention to raise publicity. The film 
starts with a two minute introduction explaining the Border War to set the context of 
what is to follow; explanatory text is combined with Border War footage. Hansen made 
mention of the following text that appeared in this section: Young white men were 
conscripted to the SADF to fight in South West Africa. Young SWAPO freedom fighters 
gave their lives willingly to liberate their country. He mentioned that it is factually 
incorrect to use the terminology of conscript in the context of the war when so many PF 
soldiers actively and proudly participated. He further mentioned that it is wrong to use 
the terminology of freedom fighters to describe a bunch of terrorists whose armed force 
was ineffective and referred to PLAN as a bunch of “flentergatte”, without military 
teeth.247 He added that his listeners would agree with his comments. Hansen strongly 
critiqued the fact that according to him, a junior officer, namely Van Lill, was 
interviewed to represent the SADF who was portrayed in a bad light.248 Hansen didn’t 
once ask about the wellbeing of Van der Mescht before, or after the filming took place 
and never mentioned the humanitarian and reconciliation effort of the film. In addition to 
disregarding the main character of the film by not once mentioning or enquiring about 
him, Hansen made a derogative statement about Ashipala, the only commentary towards 
the second main character of the film. Negative comments and critique concluded an 
interview with no positive feedback. The interview was a live transmission and it seemed 
pointless to argue or try and defend the film’s intention and point of view with a presenter 
who had an obvious agenda beforehand.  
 
                                                 
247 “Flentergatte” directly translated: a group of disorganized, spineless people.  
248 Ep van Lill was in command of the Ratel infantry combat vehicles and employed in a senior position 
during the follow-up operation to find Van der Mescht in Angola. 
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It is interesting to note how the politics plays out around the content of Captor and 
Captive. An interview conducted by SA-FM, a radio station owned and managed by the 
SABC, also with the intent to raise publicity for the film had a complete different 
approach. The focus of the interview was mainly on the reconciliation and humanitarian 
effort, applauded the portrayal of Ashipala and SWAPO and sympathized with Van der 
Mescht.   
 
Afriforum, a civil rights organization and subsidiary of the trade union Solidarity, whose 
aim is to protect the civil rights of Afrikaners, agreed to give publicity to Captor and 
Captive in their widely circulated newsletter where the DVD was advertised. The CEO of 
Afriforum was positive that the publicity would create interest and showed support in this 
regard. Not a single request for a DVD sale or information about the film was received 
through this medium. It seems unbelievable, given the current interest in the Border War. 
  
The Afrikaner establishment did not support Captor and Captive either, but this could 
have been expected since the SADF was portrayed in a negative light, which wasn’t the 
intention upon embarking on the film, but naturally transpired. The Heritage Foundation, 
working in close conjunction and association with the Voortrekker Monument and 
located at the same premises, promotes the preservation of the heritage of the Afrikaner. 
During the planning phase of the film, support in the form of finance, endorsement or 
marketing assistance was requested from the Heritage Foundation. The request for 
support was based on the fact that the film contributes towards the history of the Border 
War, features the story of an Afrikaner and contributes towards nation building. The 
Managing Director of the Heritage Foundation is a former SADF general and member of 
the Afrikaner establishment and employs former SADF members. The request was 
denied and any further attempts for support were also denied. The Heritage Foundation 
has a retail outlet that sells Afrikaans language publications including books and digital 
media. Occasionally they also stock English publications of relevance. After numerous 
requests, the shop declined to sell DVDs of the film and the reason given was that it 
contains too much English language. The language used in the film comprise of 40% 
Afrikaans, 40% English and 20% Oshivambo, and the main character is an Afrikaner, 
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mainly using Afrikaans dialogue in his narrative. This attitude again underlines the 
opposing emotions and viewpoints involved regarding the Border War; as well as the 
negative attitude towards Van der Mescht. Captor and Captive was submitted for a 
possible sale to KykNET, whose target market is exclusively for Afrikaans speaking 
people, and was also declined. In summary, all the various attempts to find support for 
Captor and Captive from the Afrikaner camps upon the first phase and towards 
completion of the film failed dismally.  
   
It is interesting to note that the documentary film Betrayed (2007), following the lives of 
three former 32 Battalion soldiers, produced and directed by the author, received a very 
positive feedback from Afrikaners across the political spectrum. In addition it also 
received wide acclaim from a wide range of South Africans from various political, 
economical and language divides. The dominant message concluded that white males 
who participated in the Border War is trying to make sense of a seemingly pointless war 
and feels that the NP government sold them out to the ANC. Despite this message which 
is not entirely positive towards the Afrikaner establishment or the SADF, it was received 
in a positive light, completely in contrast to the reaction towards Captor and Captive. It 
seems as if the derogative, negative attitude and lack of support towards Captor and 
Captive which stems from the Afrikaner market is indicative of the attitude towards Van 
der Mescht with reference to being a bad troop who was a traitor. It is however difficult 
to measure and one can only assume that this is part of a complex situation, regarding the 
current debates about the Border War. It seems as if the Afrikaner establishment that 
maintained the rumor of Van der Mescht being a traitor for their own benefit, again 
played a role in ensuring that Captor and Captive is not brought to the attention of the 
Afrikaner public, because it portrays the SADF in a bad light. 
  
In addition to the negative reaction received from the Afrikaner market, attempts to find   
distribution and sales agents struggled, and limited interest in this regard was received at 
film markets globally. This fact has nothing to do with the local Afrikaner dynamics and 
it seems as if Captor and Captive is not of great interest to the global market. It also 
underlines the fact that documentary film does not have a mass appeal and distribution 
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platforms are very limited and over saturated. Again, it is difficult to measure and a 
complex scenario. It was however expected that the film would receive local support 
from a certain sector of the Afrikaner market which did not materialize. In summary, 
Captor and Captive performed badly in the market place, but due to its historical nature 
the situation might change as trends in the global film market change and there might be 
interest shown in the future. It remains a valuable historical product with a strong 
message.  
 
Van der Mescht was under the impression that he received bad treatment from the SADF 
and NP government which is only partly true. He did not realize the extent and 
complexity of the negotiations to release him and perceived the SADF and NP 
government as the enemy who kept him in prison for over four years, not attending to his 
or Cheryl’s needs. Official SADF documents states that Cheryl received his salary whilst 
he was imprisoned, and upon his return, he received backdated salary from the SADF in a 
lump sum, equal to the period that he was imprisoned.249 Cheryl relates how the welfare 
officer, Major van Wyk, who was specifically tasked to look after their emotional and 
financial welfare, took special care of her and Chantal, and how she appreciates it, to this 
day.250 The situation was both uncomfortable and complex with Van der Mescht held as a 
POW for over four years in a hostile country, lack of information and communication 
about his future whilst he was there, when he returned home he was looked upon as a 
traitor by fellow soldiers and the public, to this day. He never enquired about anything, 
made assumptions and shut down emotionally.  
 
Van der Mescht completed the filming process in December 2009, and it turned out that 
the Van der Mescht family perceived the project as glamorous and a potential capital 
gain. After much deliberation, the agreement concluded with the family resulted in a once 
off payment and further financial remuneration in the event of Captor and Captive 
reflecting profit. Without this agreement, Captor and Captive would not have been 
                                                 
249 Personnel file, Ref Army HQ (82) CF 02.03.76 – 19.05.82 Van der Mescht G.J. 71511430 BT, 
Documentation Centre, Department of Defence.  
250 MVV, Group 5, Box 73, Ref MV/62/14, Welfare report 4 May 1981, Documentation Centre, 
Department of Defence. 
Cheryl van der Mescht, interview, 2007 – 2009.  
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released. However, to date the film has not made a return on its investment and reflects 
considerable debt. According to psychologists who deal in PTSD, it seems as if Van der 
Mescht hasn’t found closure after the filming process, despite the many efforts.251 His 
story remains a tragic one, leaving lasting scars.   
 
People’s circumstances differ and they react in different ways to situations exposed to in 
life. Since the Anglo Boer War, South African soldiers were held as POWs, and the 
circumstances are different in each war, with many similarities as mentioned in the study. 
Van der Mescht’s situation as a POW is not unique, and he is one of many unfortunate 
soldiers who got captured during the ugly business of war. However, Van der Mescht was 
indeed given hostile treatment by the SADF and NP government and its public as 
discussed at length in the study. He conducted his compulsory national service and 
subsequent camps and followed the laws and regulations as was expected from SADF 
conscripts at the time. During his last camp his only duty as a Sapper soldier was to 
ensure that the soldiers operating in the area has access to clean drinking water. The 
infantry soldiers responsible for his security could not provide for his safety on the night 
of the attack. Van der Mescht was the unfortunate person at the wrong place at the wrong 
time which led to much misery and trauma in his life.  
 
Sadly, Ashipala passed away in May 2010, shortly after the filming was completed. He 
never had the opportunity to see the finished product of Captor and Captive which is 
tragic since he was looking forward to the end result. Ashipala thoroughly enjoyed the 
filming process and was proud to appear in the film. Captor and Captive is fortunately 
able to leave a positive legacy of Ashipala to his family and the people of Namibia, as 
well as demystify the rumor that Van der Mescht was wrongly accused of being a traitor. 
The hope remains that the film will still be relevant and attracts more attention in years to 
come.   
 
 
                                                 
251 Psych X and various anonymous psychologists, interviews, 2007 – 2012.  
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Conclusion 
 
The main focus of the dissertation is an analysis of the representation of history through 
film, with reference to the documentary film Captor and Captive. It further provides a 
comprehensive overview of the historical event that Captor and Captive is based upon, 
mainly through interviews with primary sources, supplemented by archival records. 
 
The conclusion was made that the genre of film holds a strong position in its 
representation of history, and filmmakers around the world especially in developing 
countries are contributing to the phenomena. Films based on historical events are able to 
represent an informative picture of the past and an alternative manner to inform people 
not interested or able to read historical text. It can potentially reach a wider audience. 
Films are however more limited than historical text to deal with comprehensive and 
complex information. It is challenging to condense content including ideas, viewpoints 
and ideologies into a limited time frame, as opposed to historical text which can be 
elaborated on. Historical text is able to provide more in depth information and arguments 
which allows for critical thinking. However, both historical text and film has a unique 
role to play in preserving historical events, each with their own set of rules and 
conventions and can either stand alone or complement each other. In a constantly 
changing and dynamic world, a multi-disciplinary approach is inevitable.  
 
Documentary filmmakers dealing with historical events have a responsibility to represent 
the past as accurately as possible. It is advisable that they consult with historians to 
ensure credible content. Historical text and documentary film of any genre is not 
considered absolutely objective or truthful; and depends on the perspective, agenda, 
ideology and viewpoint of the author or filmmaker. When filmmakers set out with a clear 
point of view and seek subjective truths, the content might be more authentic, as opposed 
to trying to sell it as being the absolute objective truth. 
 
The historical incident regarding the capture of Van der Mescht by Ashipala discussed in 
the dissertation took place during the Border War (1966 – 1989). Propaganda films were 
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produced during the war by the South African authorities, to popularize and defend the 
war to its public. Filmmakers and organizations opposing the war produced a limited 
number of films which was usually banned and didn’t reach its intended South African 
audience. After the war, there was an initial silence which is common with most wars, 
since it usually takes 20 years after a war before participants’ start talking and venting 
out. Literature, film and theatre about the Border War are currently very topical and   
evolving. The latest book by military historian Leopold Scholtz, The SADF in the Border 
War 1966 – 1989, published in 2013, was written many years after the war ended for the 
sake of historical perspective, the dust to settle and for official documentation to become 
available through various archives and institutions.  
 
The SADF perceived Communism as one of the threats to the safety and security of its 
public and it is argued that the Border War was waged within the broader context of the 
Cold War to keep the Communists at bay. The South African authorities used 
Communism as one of the main reasons to defend the Border War. Young conscripted 
men were killed, captured or injured in neighboring Namibia and Angola and the public 
was uncomfortable with the situation. The NP government was dependant on its public to 
remain in power and had to defend its position. Today, many years after the war, there 
are various opposing viewpoints about the causes of the war debated within the public 
sphere and the media. A valid argument is that the cause for the war should be found 
outside of the parameters of the Cold War and Communist threats. It suggests an 
exploration of the war within a wider historical context, starting with the annexation of 
Namibia by Germany in 1884. The first clash between South African forces and the 
Ovambo people was in 1917, and not in 1966, stated as the official start of the Border 
War. The various opposing viewpoints are indicative of the varying emotions involved in 
the aftermath of the Border War, and are mostly voiced in the media in reaction to 
reviews on publications of the war. Comments are mostly restricted to the opinions of 
former conscripts and PF soldiers who romanticize the war and defend any criticism 
towards it; former conscripts who tries to make sense of the war and suffer from war 
trauma, who asks if it was worth it, question why they had to fight in a war, and feels 
betrayed by the NP government whom they feel sold them out to the ANC; and lastly the 
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liberal voices who objected to national service and criticize the Border War as a matter of 
principle.  
 
The historical event discussed in the dissertation took place within a period of complex 
political dynamics and conflict in southern Africa, with various role players involved, 
against the backdrop of the Cold War. In the middle 1970’s, SWAPO embarked on a 
strategy to counter the military strength of the SADF, and increased its guerilla activities 
in northern Namibia and southern Angola. A decision was made to capture SADF 
soldiers and use them as propaganda material to further the cause of SWAPO within the 
global anti-apartheid community. This led to the successful capture of Van der Mescht in 
February 1978, who subsequently became a valuable propaganda item as a POW of 
SWAPO. It turned out that Van der Mescht became Ashipala’s trophy and he became a 
legend within SWAPO and a hero for the struggle for liberation; partly because of his 
soldiering skills and partly because of his capture of Van der Mescht. Ashipala wanted 
South Africans to remember him for saving the life of an enemy and emphasized that 
Van der Mescht was kept alive during the attack and subsequent retreat to Angola until 
he was handed over to the SWAPO commanders.   
 
Shortly after the incident, a rumor developed within the SADF that Van der Mescht was a 
traitor that walked over to join the enemy, and that the capture was a smoke screen. The 
story is still prevalent today, and he is often referred to as a bad troop by former SADF 
officers and troops. The capture of Van der Mescht was both a shock and embarrassment 
to the SADF which perceived PLAN as a guerilla army without discipline and military 
teeth. Yet PLAN managed to successfully capture Van der Mescht approximately 10 
kilometers from the Angolan border inside Namibia. The rescue operation including 
trained infantry soldiers, paratroopers, aircraft and mechanized motor convoys failed to 
find Van der Mescht. The capture made news headlines in South Africa and abroad, and 
highlighted the possibility of young men getting killed and held captive in Angola and it 
became increasingly difficult to hide from the public. The NP government needed the 
public’s vote to remain in power. It seems that it was easier to put the blame on a troop 
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without rank and of low social standing with little use for the SADF, than to accept 
responsibility for the incident. 
 
Limited information is available on South African POWs held captive during the Border 
War; partly because the war was secretive, and partly because the issue of young men 
held captive in Angola was a political embarrassment to the authorities. The first record 
of POWs dates to 1975 and 1976 during the period of Operation Savannah when eight 
SADF soldiers were captured inside Angola, during different incidents. They all got 
released in 1978, shortly after Van der Mescht became a POW. The next available record 
is that of Special Force soldier Wynand du Toit who was captured in 1985 in Angola, and 
held as a POW by MPLA for a period of two years and four months. He was captured 
during a secret mission to sabotage the oil refinery in Cabinda. Du Toit, a PF soldier was 
tortured because he had access to valuable intelligence information, in contrast to Van der 
Mescht who was a conscript and of no value to the enemy regarding intelligence.  
 
There are both similarities and differences in the circumstances in which Van der Mescht 
and Du Toit were captured, imprisoned and released. They were captured by different 
enemy forces during different periods in the war, resulting in different political dynamics 
to their respective circumstances. It is clear that Du Toit received a better welcome when 
he returned home and became a national hero whilst Van der Mescht was branded a 
traitor. Class division that stems from a historical Afrikaner perspective on class played a 
role in the manner that Van der Mescht and Du Toit were treated and perceived by their 
government and public. Du Toit was considered of a higher social standing because of his 
educational and military credentials as opposed to Van der Mescht who was considered 
working class. However, both men suffered severe trauma being held prisoner in a 
foreign hostile country, irrespective of class or social standing.  
 
Audience and public reaction towards the screening of Captor and Captive is discussed 
in the dissertation. It is not based on an organized survey, complex to measure and 
limited in its assumed conclusions, yet it does shed some light on the matter. In South 
Africa, the film was well received by progressive and liberal viewers across the cultural 
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divide. The film was very well received by the Namibian public, referring specifically to 
SWAPO supporters. Captor and Captive screened at three film festivals in the Middle 
East and seems as if the film attracted interest in the Arab world in the wake of the Arab 
Awakening, following the 2011 revolt that broke out in Egypt.  The conclusion is made 
that the theme of reconciliation of a story from the African continent is the point of 
interest.    
 
Various attempts to find support from the Afrikaner market for Captor and Captive since 
inception of the project towards completion failed dismally. The lack of support and 
negative attitude is indicative of the attitude towards Van der Mescht with reference to 
being a bad troop who was a traitor. One can only assume that this is part of a complex 
situation, regarding the current emotional debates about the Border War. It seems as if the 
Afrikaner establishment that maintained the rumor of Van der Mescht being a traitor for 
their own benefit, again played a role in ensuring that Captor and Captive is not brought 
to the attention of the Afrikaner public. 
  
Van der Mescht’s situation as a POW was not unique. He is one of many unfortunate 
soldiers who got captured during the ugly business of war. However, Van der Mescht did 
indeed receive hostile treatment by the SADF and NP government. During his last 
compulsory military camp which he dutifully attended to, his duty as a Sapper soldier 
was to ensure that soldiers have access to clean drinking water. The section of nine 
infantry soldiers responsible for securing the waterhole and safety of the two Sapper 
soldiers could not secure his safety on the night of the attack, which led to much misery 
and trauma in his life.  
 
Captor and Captive and the supplementing dissertation are able to leave a positive legacy 
of Ashipala who passed away shortly after the completion of the film; demystify the 
rumor that Van der Mescht was wrongly accused of being a traitor; and contribute 
towards the historiography of the Border War collection.  
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